The Illinois Supreme Court has sided with a Chicago police officer, Tamica N. Rainey, in a case concerning attorney fees related to her duty disability benefits. The court’s decision, issued on November 20, 2025, clarifies the interpretation of the Illinois Pension Code and its implications for police officers who successfully challenge the discontinuation of their disability benefits.
Background of the Case
The case stems from injuries Officer Rainey sustained in two car accidents while on duty in 2013 and 2015. She was awarded duty disability benefits in 2017 for neck and shoulder injuries. These benefits are governed by Section 5-154 of the Illinois Pension Code. The law also requires officers to undergo annual examinations to assess their disability status, as outlined in Section 5-156.
In March 2022, the Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (the Board) scheduled a hearing to determine if Rainey’s benefits should continue. Rainey requested and was granted a continuance to obtain legal counsel and medical records. After several hearings, the Board voted to discontinue her duty disability benefits, concluding she was no longer disabled.
However, when Rainey reported for duty, the Chicago Police Department found her unable to perform her duties. She was not cleared for full duty and couldn’t be assigned a position.
Legal Battles and Initial Rulings
Rainey sought administrative review in the Cook County circuit court. The court reversed the Board’s decision, citing a previous Illinois Supreme Court ruling that an officer remains disabled if the police department can’t provide a suitable position with necessary accommodations. The trial court also awarded Rainey attorney fees and costs, totaling over $33,000, based on Section 5-228(b) of the Pension Code.
The Board appealed, but the appellate court upheld both the reversal of the Board’s decision and the award of attorney fees and costs. The Board then petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court, solely challenging the attorney fees and costs award.
The Supreme Court’s Analysis
The central question before the Supreme Court was whether Rainey was entitled to attorney fees and costs under the Pension Code. The Board argued the fee provision didn’t apply when benefits were discontinued, only when an initial application was denied. Rainey argued the plain language of the law entitled her to fees because she successfully challenged the Board’s decision.
The court examined Sections 5-154, 5-156, and 5-228(b) of the Pension Code. Section 5-154 outlines the right to duty disability benefits, while Section 5-156 details the process for obtaining and maintaining those benefits, including annual examinations. Section 5-228(b) addresses administrative remedies and states that if a police officer whose application for duty disability benefits has been denied prevails in an administrative review, they can recover court costs and litigation expenses, including reasonable attorney fees.
The court agreed with the appellate court’s interpretation: Section 5-154 provides an ongoing right to benefits, and Section 5-156 sets the process. The court found that the discontinuation of Rainey’s benefits was, in essence, a continuation of the process of applying for and receiving benefits.
The Supreme Court rejected the Board’s argument that Section 5-228(b) differentiates between an initial application and the continuation of benefits. The court emphasized that the statute’s plain language doesn’t limit attorney fees to only those who win challenges to their initial application. The court concluded that the Board’s interpretation contradicted the legislative intent to assist disabled officers who successfully challenge the denial of their benefits, including the discontinuation of those benefits.
Rejecting Prior Court Decisions
The Supreme Court also addressed two previous, unpublished appellate court decisions, *Warner v. Retirement Board of the Policeman’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago* and *Koniarski v. Retirement Board of the Policeman’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago*. These cases had concluded that Section 5-228(b) applied only to initial applications for disability benefits, not their discontinuation. The Supreme Court found these decisions “conclusory” and lacking in proper legal analysis, and therefore, not persuasive.
Legislative Intent and Policy Considerations
The court emphasized the importance of supporting officers who are disabled due to their job-related injuries. Awarding attorney fees, the court reasoned, helps “level the playing field” for officers who must defend their benefits against the Board’s resources. The court found that police officers like Rainey, who respond to the Board’s review of their disability benefits, should not be penalized for defending those benefits when they are improperly discontinued.
The court also noted the distinction in the law between duty-related disabilities and ordinary disabilities. Section 5-228(b) specifically limits attorney fees to officers with duty-related disabilities, which aligns with the legislative intent to prioritize officers injured in the line of duty.
Finally, the court dismissed the Board’s argument that pending legislation, which would have explicitly allowed attorney fees in cases like Rainey’s, indicated the current interpretation was incorrect. The court stated that the failure of the legislation to pass did not change the interpretation of the law.
The Outcome
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The court ruled that Section 5-228(b) of the Pension Code authorizes the award of attorney fees and costs to a police officer who prevails in administrative review, whether they are challenging the denial of initial benefits or the discontinuation of existing benefits. This decision provides clarity and support for police officers seeking to protect their disability benefits.