The Eighth Appellate District Court of Ohio has vacated a lower court’s decision that would have forced a dog owner to either remove his dog from the city of Parma or have it destroyed. The ruling, issued on October 2, 2025, stems from a case involving Robert Wojas and his dog, Zeus.
The Incident and Initial Charges
The case began on May 27, 2024, when Wojas was walking his Belgian Malinois, Zeus, in Parma, Ohio. Wojas tripped and dropped Zeus’s leash, and the dog bit a neighbor. Following the incident, Wojas was cited for several violations of the Parma Codified Ordinances (P.C.O.), including failing to provide proof of rabies vaccination and annual registration, as well as violating the dangerous dog ordinance.
Amended Charges and Plea Deal
Wojas subsequently provided proof of vaccination and registration, completed a specialized training program with Zeus, and installed a fence in his yard. The charges were then amended, and Wojas pleaded “no contest” to an amended charge of “attempted dangerous dog,” a second-degree misdemeanor. The remaining charges were dismissed. During the plea, Wojas was only informed of the possible sentences under the general sentencing guidelines for second-degree misdemeanors.
The Controversial Sentence
After the plea, the trial court sentenced Wojas to a 90-day suspended jail sentence, 24 months of probation, and a $150 fine. However, the court then, without prior warning, invoked P.C.O. 618.26 and ordered that Zeus be removed from the city or destroyed, based on the court’s determination that the dog was “vicious” and had previously been declared dangerous.
The Appeal and the Court’s Reasoning
Wojas appealed the trial court’s order, arguing that the sentence was not authorized by law. He contended that because he pleaded guilty to an “attempted dangerous dog” charge, the court was limited to sentencing him under the general sentencing ordinance for second-degree misdemeanors, which does not include the option to order removal or destruction of the dog.
The appellate court agreed with Wojas. The court’s analysis focused on the interpretation of the relevant Parma ordinances, specifically P.C.O. 618.26, which allows for the removal or destruction of an animal if the court determines it is vicious. The court found that this ordinance applies specifically to violations under Chapter 618 (Animals) of the P.C.O.
The court cited previous cases, including *State v. Garner* and *State v. Brown*, where similar arguments were successful. The court noted that the “attempt” ordinance, P.C.O. 606.22, does not specifically include an attempted violation of the dangerous dog ordinance. Instead, it defines the act of attempting to commit an offense as a separate offense in itself.
The court concluded that because Wojas pleaded guilty to an “attempted dangerous dog” charge, and neither the dangerous dog ordinance nor the attempt ordinance contemplated the specific punishment of removal or destruction of the dog, the trial court’s sentence was not authorized. The court emphasized that when defining an offense or penalty, the ordinance must be strictly construed against the city and liberally in favor of the accused. Therefore, the trial court was required to sentence Wojas under the general sentencing ordinances for second-degree misdemeanors, which do not permit the removal or destruction of the dog.
The Ruling
The appellate court sustained Wojas’s appeal, vacated the trial court’s order regarding Zeus, and ordered that the city pay the costs of the appeal. The remainder of Wojas’s sentence, which was not appealed, remains in effect.