The Georgia Court of Appeals recently issued a ruling on two consolidated cases involving a dispute over a mobile home placement and a subsequent lawsuit. The court reversed a lower court’s decision in one case and vacated and remanded another, clarifying the application of the state’s anti-SLAPP law.
Background of the Case
The cases stem from a disagreement in Cusseta-Chattahoochee County regarding the placement of Damon Hoyte’s mobile home. Hoyte bought property at 110 Stagecoach Drive in 2017. Melissa Haymond and her husband purchased a home nearby at 109 Mustang Drive in 2022. A mix of site-built homes and mobile homes characterizes the neighborhood.
Shortly after the Haymonds moved in, Melissa Haymond noticed a mobile home on what she believed was a lot smaller than the five acres required for such dwellings. She attended meetings and, along with other neighbors, prepared a petition and flyer opposing the placement of Hoyte’s mobile home. The petition, however, incorrectly listed the address as being on Mustang Drive when the property was actually located on Stagecoach Drive.
Hoyte later applied for a conditional use permit. Haymond and others created a second petition, this time with the correct address, opposing the mobile home’s return.
Hoyte, his wife, and their company then filed a lawsuit against Haymond, the county, and others, seeking $5 million in damages.
Case No. A25A1262: The Unified Government’s Appeal
In the first case, the Unified Government of Cusseta-Chattahoochee County appealed a superior court order. The superior court had reversed a magistrate court’s decision that denied several motions filed by Hoyte. These motions challenged his conviction for violating a zoning ordinance and sought a retrial.
The Court of Appeals addressed its jurisdiction, noting that the case did not involve an appeal by the state in a criminal case, which would be subject to specific limitations. The court determined it had jurisdiction.
The appeals court then found that Hoyte’s motions in the magistrate court were untimely. The court explained that the superior court lacked the authority to grant Hoyte’s motion to file his motions out of time. The court cited a Supreme Court case, *Cook v. State*, which stated that there is no legal authority for such motions.
The court also addressed Hoyte’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court stated that because the term of court had expired, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to allow the withdrawal of the plea.
The court addressed the motion to reopen the matter, which could be construed as a motion for a new trial. The court noted that the motion was filed more than 30 days after the final disposition. Hoyte failed to provide record citations or affidavits to support his claim.
The court said that Hoyte’s motion to vacate the final dispositions was untimely. The court found that the motion was not an appropriate way to vacate a criminal conviction.
Lastly, the court addressed the motion to recuse the magistrate court judge. The court noted that the motion to recuse was not accompanied by an affidavit, and the motion was not presented to the judge within the required timeframe.
In summary, the Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s decision, finding that the magistrate court correctly denied Hoyte’s motions.
Case No. A25A1365: Haymond’s Anti-SLAPP Motion
In the second case, Melissa Haymond appealed the denial of her motion to strike and dismiss Hoyte’s complaint under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute. Haymond argued that the trial court erred in relying on inadmissible evidence and in finding that her actions were not protected under the statute.
The Court of Appeals first addressed Haymond’s claim that the trial court improperly considered a written statement from Joseph Addison. The court found that this argument was not preserved for review because Haymond’s attorney did not object to the statement being read into evidence at the trial court level.
The court then turned to the anti-SLAPP motion. The court explained that the anti-SLAPP statute aims to protect citizens’ rights to participate in matters of public interest. The court reviews anti-SLAPP rulings *de novo*, meaning the court looks at the case as if it were new.
The court found that the trial court erred in its analysis of the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. The court concluded that Haymond’s petition, even with the incorrect address, could be considered an act in furtherance of protected speech because it was submitted to the Board in connection with its consideration of zoning issues.
The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case. The lower court must reconsider the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, which involves determining whether Hoyte has a probability of prevailing on his claims.