The North Dakota Supreme Court has affirmed two criminal judgments against Joshua Brock Martinez, rejecting his claim that the trial court improperly replaced a seated juror with an alternate juror, an action Martinez argued violated his constitutional rights. The high court ruled that replacing the juror did not constitute double jeopardy and that the district court acted within its discretion based on concerns about the juror’s impartiality following an interaction with the defendant’s relative.
The Charges and the Trial Incident
Martinez faced a barrage of serious charges stemming from two separate cases, including two counts of attempted murder, multiple counts of reckless endangerment, terrorizing, fleeing a peace officer, and various firearm offenses. The district court consolidated these cases for a single, seven-day jury trial in January 2025.
After jury selection, twelve jurors and two alternates were sworn in. However, problems arose quickly on the first day of trial. Juror 9 was observed by the State interacting closely with an individual in the courtroom gallery—specifically, greeting, talking to, and hugging the person. The State later identified this individual as Jacob Martinez, a relative of the defendant, Joshua Martinez.
The next morning, the State brought this observation to the attention of the district court. Judge Charles B. Neff, Jr., confirmed seeing Juror 9 acting “chummy” with someone in the back of the courtroom the previous day. The court promptly called Juror 9 in for questioning.
Juror Questioning and Defense Objection
During the inquiry, Juror 9 admitted he knew Jacob Martinez from work. He claimed he was unaware the man he interacted with was related to the defendant until after the conversation, when Jacob Martinez reportedly told him the defendant was his cousin. Crucially, Juror 9 assured the court that despite this connection, he could remain fair and impartial.
The State immediately moved to strike Juror 9 based on the interaction. Martinez’s defense counsel objected, asserting satisfaction with the juror’s assurances and seeing no basis for exclusion. The court acknowledged the difficulty of the situation, noting the trial was only on day two and they only had two alternates remaining. Judge Neff admitted he was “still vacillating” due to “serious concerns over the interaction.”
Following a brief recess, the judge made a decisive ruling. Despite believing Juror 9 was truthful, the court expressed persistent concern over the contact and announced its decision: “I will note the objection of the defense, but I am going to dismiss Mr. [W.] [Juror 9], and we will go from there.” Juror 9 was dismissed, responding that he didn’t want to “take any chances,” a sentiment the court agreed with. An alternate juror was then sworn in to take Juror 9’s place.
The Appeal: Double Jeopardy Claim
Martinez appealed the resulting guilty verdicts, focusing his argument on the substitution of the juror. He contended that because the jury had been empaneled and sworn—the point at which jeopardy attaches in a jury trial—the court’s action impermissibly altered the tribunal meant to judge him, violating his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court’s Analysis
Writing for the North Dakota Supreme Court, Justice Douglas A. Bahr systematically addressed Martinez’s constitutional claims.
First, the Court confirmed the general rule: jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn. However, the Court emphasized that this attachment “begins, rather than ends, the inquiry” into double jeopardy claims.
The central question became whether replacing a seated juror with an alternate terminates the original jeopardy, which would bar continuation of the trial. Citing numerous federal and state precedents, the Supreme Court concluded clearly that it does not.
“A court replacing a juror with an alternate juror does not implicate double jeopardy because it does not terminate the original jeopardy,” the opinion stated. Because the alternate juror had already been selected, qualified, sworn, and had heard all the evidence presented up to that point, the “unity of the original jury was not destroyed.” The Court found that this substitution did not trench upon Martinez’s right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal in a way that would trigger double jeopardy protection.
Abuse of Discretion Standard
Having dismissed the double jeopardy argument, the Court moved to the standard of review for replacing a juror—abuse of discretion. North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c)(1) allows the court to replace a juror with an alternate if the juror is “unable to perform or who are disqualified from performing their duties.”
The Court noted that while the district court did not explicitly state, “Juror 9 is disqualified,” the reasoning was clear from the record. The trial judge expressed “serious concerns” over the interaction between Juror 9 and the defendant’s cousin.
The Supreme Court deferred to the trial judge’s firsthand observation and assessment of the situation. “The district court expressed its concern on the record, determined Juror 9 was disqualified, and replaced him with an alternative juror as authorized by N.D.R.Crim.P. Rule 24(c)(1),” the opinion concluded. Finding that the basis for the decision was discernible and not arbitrary, the Court found no abuse of discretion.
Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgments, concluding that the substitution of Juror 9 with an alternate was legally sound.