The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed the conviction and sentence of Benjamin Smith, concluding that the district court correctly handled issues related to the scope of the remand order and the pronouncement of supervised release conditions. Smith, previously convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, appealed following a resentencing that adjusted his initial sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.
The appellate court rejected Smith’s two main arguments: first, that the district court should have dismissed his indictment based on the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment ruling in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen*; and second, that the trial judge failed to adequately explain the standard conditions of his supervised release.
The Mandate Rule and the *Bruen* Challenge
Smith was originally sentenced in 2019 to 235 months in prison. Upon direct appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction but determined Smith did not qualify for the harsher sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The case was sent back to the District Court for resentencing.
Once on remand, Smith attempted a new legal maneuver. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the federal statute he was convicted under (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) was now unconstitutional following the Supreme Court’s landmark *Bruen* decision in June 2022. Smith contended that because *Bruen* represented an intervening change in controlling law, the district court was not strictly bound by the prior ruling (the “mandate rule”) and should consider his constitutional challenge.
The Eleventh Circuit firmly disagreed. The court cited the “mandate rule,” a principle ensuring that once an appellate court issues a ruling, the lower court must adhere to it strictly upon remand. Exceptions to this rule—such as an intervening change in controlling law—are narrow.
The court found two fatal flaws in Smith’s argument regarding *Bruen*:
1. *Bruen* Was Not “Intervening”: *Bruen* was decided in June 2022, while Smith’s initial direct appeal was still pending. The court noted that Smith had the opportunity during that appeal period to raise the *Bruen* challenge but failed to do so. Therefore, it was not an “intervening” change that occurred *after* the Eleventh Circuit issued its mandate for resentencing.
2. *Bruen* Did Not Dictate a Different Result: Even if the timing were excused, the Eleventh Circuit has already held that *Bruen* did not overturn its prior precedent upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to felons possessing firearms. Citing a recent decision, *United States v. Dubois*, the court confirmed that existing precedent remains valid post-*Bruen*. Since the law did not change in a way that required a different outcome for Smith, the exception to the mandate rule did not apply.
The appellate court thus found no error in the district court’s refusal to dismiss the indictment.
Supervised Release Conditions and Due Process
Smith’s second issue concerned the 13 standard conditions of his three-year term of supervised release. He argued the district court erred by not orally reading aloud every single one of those conditions or explaining why each standard condition was necessary for his case.
Because Smith failed to object to the conditions when they were referenced at the sentencing hearing, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed this claim under the demanding “plain error” standard.
The district court had stated on the record that Smith must comply with the “mandatory conditions of release” as well as the “standard conditions of supervision, which [had] been adopted by [the district court] and [were] incorporated by reference.” These standard conditions were available in writing and included in the final written judgment.
The Eleventh Circuit clarified that the Constitution requires the district court to pronounce discretionary conditions of supervised release to ensure the defendant has due process—the opportunity to challenge them. However, this requirement does not mandate reading the entirety of a standard, written list aloud.
The court held that referencing a written, adopted list of conditions is sufficient to satisfy due process, as it affords the defendant the opportunity to inquire about and challenge them if necessary. Smith had that opportunity but remained silent.
Furthermore, Smith argued the court needed to provide an individualized justification for each standard condition based on the general sentencing factors (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). The Eleventh Circuit rejected this, stating that while the court must explain the reasons for the overall sentence, it is not required to create a separate, itemized justification for every standard condition of release. The court’s general explanation for the sentence was deemed sufficient to cover the entire sentence, including the term of supervision.
Ultimately, the court found no error, plain or otherwise, in how the supervised release conditions were imposed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in its entirety.