The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has denied Fort Myer Construction Company’s bid to dismiss retaliation lawsuits filed by its former associate general counsel, Matthew Adams. Adams claims he was fired after raising concerns about racial discrimination within the company.
In a Memorandum Order issued by Judge Trevor N. McFadden, the Court found that Adams’s complaint contained sufficient factual allegations—when accepted as true—to support his claims of retaliation under federal law (Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981) and the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA).
Adams, who joined Fort Myer in June 2022, alleged that his job involved assisting outside counsel with employment claims and conducting internal investigations. According to the complaint, Adams raised concerns about racial discrimination internally, leading to his eventual termination roughly a month after he was briefly elevated to acting general counsel. After being fired, Adams filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and subsequently sued.
Fort Myer moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Adams failed to meet the basic requirements for a retaliation claim at this early stage of litigation. The Court disagreed, allowing the case to move forward.
The “Manager Rule” Debate Avoided—For Now
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must show three things for a retaliation claim: (1) they engaged in a statutorily protected activity, (2) they suffered a materially adverse action (like being fired), and (3) a causal link connects the two.
Fort Myer focused its attack on the first prong, arguing that because Adams was an in-house counsel whose job description included investigating employment issues, his complaints were merely part of his regular duties. The company attempted to invoke the so-called “manager rule,” often applied in Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) cases, suggesting Adams needed to show he acted *outside* his official role to be protected.
However, the Court noted that the legal landscape is murky regarding whether the manager rule even applies to Title VII retaliation claims, citing rulings from other circuits that suggest the text of Title VII does not support such a narrow reading.
Crucially, the Court found it didn’t need to definitively settle the manager rule question yet. Even if the rule applied, Adams’s allegations were sufficient for the motion-to-dismiss phase. The complaint suggested Adams’s complaints went beyond his standard duties of assisting outside counsel and investigating claims, implying he transcended his official scope.
“Perhaps at summary judgment Fort Myer will be able to show the manager rule applies… and that his complaints about the ongoing discrimination fell completely within the scope of his job,” the Court noted. “But the Court need not decide that now.”
Causation: Timing and Direct Allegations Are Key
The second major hurdle Fort Myer challenged was causation—whether Adams’s protected activity was the “but-for cause” of his termination. The Court emphasized that this standard is not high at the motion-to-dismiss stage; the plaintiff only needs a “plausible inference.”
Adams cleared this bar in two ways:
1. Direct Allegation: His EEOC charge explicitly stated that his protected activity (complaining about discrimination) caused his termination. The Court found this direct assertion sufficient at this juncture.
2. Temporal Proximity: Adams alleged that his last act of opposition occurred in August 2023, and he was fired on September 8, 2023. The Court viewed this gap of less than three months as “close” enough to support an inference of retaliation, even acknowledging that a three-month gap can sometimes be considered too long.
Fort Myer countered that Adams failed to name the specific person who fired him, but the Court dismissed this, stating that at this preliminary stage, a plaintiff does not need to identify the exact decisionmaker who knew about the protected activity.
The defense also argued that Adams’s brief promotion to acting general counsel after his predecessor was put on leave broke the chain of causation. The Court found this argument unpersuasive, noting that Adams’s own filings suggested this promotion was merely an intermediate step toward sidelining the entire legal department. Furthermore, there was no indication he received better pay or benefits during that short tenure.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that while Fort Myer raised “significant concerns” that might be relevant later in the litigation, Adams had met the “low bar” required to survive a motion to dismiss.
The denial means that Adams’s claims under Title VII, Section 1981, and the DCHRA will proceed against Fort Myer Construction Company in federal court.