The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has reversed a decision by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that denied workers’ compensation benefits to a police officer for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) stemming from a fatal on-duty shooting. The Court found that the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) relied on factual determinations unsupported by the record and applied legal standards incorrectly, resulting in a decision that was both unreasonable and unjust.
The case centers on Steve Russo, a 14-year veteran officer with the Upper Darby Township Police Department, who was involved in a violent struggle on November 20, 2020, that ended with him fatally shooting a suspect after the suspect initiated a deadly confrontation. Russo sought to amend his accepted physical injuries to include PTSD, depression, and an elbow injury, and also filed a claim for wage loss benefits based on his psychological condition.
Dispute Over Legal Standard: Physical/Mental vs. Mental/Mental
Workers’ compensation claims for psychological injuries in Pennsylvania generally fall into three categories: mental/physical, physical/mental, and mental/mental. The required proof differs significantly based on the classification.
Russo initially argued for the physical/mental standard, asserting that the physical trauma he sustained during the struggle—including being choked and fighting for his gun—caused his subsequent psychological injury. The physical/mental standard requires proof that a physical work injury requiring medical treatment caused the psychic injury.
However, the Commonwealth Court disagreed with Russo on this point. The Court noted that the medical records from the emergency room visit immediately following the incident only showed complaints of soreness and pain, and Russo was released without significant treatment. Citing the precedent set in *Murphy v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.*, the Court concluded that minor physical symptoms ancillary to a traumatic event are insufficient to transform a mental/mental claim into a physical/mental claim. Therefore, the Court found the physical/mental standard inapplicable.
Focus Shifts to “Abnormal Working Conditions”
With the physical/mental standard dismissed, the Court focused on Russo’s argument under the mental/mental standard. This standard requires the claimant to prove the psychological injury resulted from abnormal working conditions, not merely a subjective reaction to normal duties.
Russo argued that the entire event—being chased, engaging in a life-or-death struggle, being placed in a chokehold, fighting for his service weapon, and ultimately shooting the suspect—was objectively abnormal.
The WCJ, Kathleen DiLorenzo, had found the incident to be a “normal-type condition” for a police officer, largely relying on the testimony of Police Superintendent Timothy Bernhardt. Bernhardt stated that such encounters are “normal” in modern policing, though he admitted the fatal shooting was the only one under his tenure.
The Commonwealth Court strongly rejected the WCJ’s finding, stating it was based on flawed reasoning. The Court held that the WCJ erred by focusing on isolated components of the incident (like discharging a firearm) rather than the “full convergence of events.” Citing the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Payes II*, the Court emphasized that abnormal conditions need not be “unique,” but must be extraordinary when viewed holistically.
The Court pointed out that Superintendent Bernhardt’s own testimony contradicted the finding of normalcy, noting that the Superintendent himself had never fired his weapon in 27 years on duty. The Court detailed the extreme facts: hand-to-hand combat, being lifted off the ground in a chokehold, the near loss of his service weapon, and the subsequent act of trying to save the dying suspect’s life.
“Nowhere in Supt. Bernhardt’s testimony is there support for the notion that this chain of events is of a kind that a Township police officer, or any police officer, may normally expect to encounter,” the opinion stated. The Court concluded, as a matter of law, that Russo was subjected to abnormal working conditions.
Rejection of Expert Testimony Deemed “Nonsensical”
A significant factor in the WCJ’s denial was the wholesale rejection of the testimony provided by Dr. Lee Solomon, a clinical psychologist who diagnosed Russo with PTSD. The WCJ cited three reasons for discrediting Dr. Solomon:
1. Discrepancies in physical injury details: The WCJ faulted Dr. Solomon for summarizing physical injuries differently than the initial Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable (NTCP) or ER records.
2. Chronological error on alcohol use: The WCJ claimed Dr. Solomon was wrong about when Russo began self-medicating with alcohol.
3. Omission of technical terms: The WCJ noted that Russo’s testimony did not mention specific technical symptoms like “anhedonia” or “decreased libido” detailed by Dr. Solomon.
The Commonwealth Court found these reasons “nonsensical.” The Court noted that Dr. Solomon, a psychologist, should not be expected to have precise knowledge of orthopedic details, especially when the underlying physical injury reports were inconsistent themselves. Furthermore, the Court found the WCJ misread Dr. Solomon’s reference to “at that time,” which the psychologist clarified meant *after* the initial evaluation, consistent with the delayed onset of PTSD. Finally, the Court stated that expecting a claimant to recite every technical term used by their expert witness is an arbitrary standard that undermines the purpose of expert testimony.
With Dr. Solomon’s competent, uncontroverted testimony linking the abnormal event to PTSD remaining unrebutted by the Township’s orthopedic expert, the Court found the WCJ’s rejection of the psychological evidence to be reversible error.
Humanitarian Purpose and Future Implications
The Court also addressed Russo’s argument that the WCJ’s decision violated the humanitarian purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Court expressed “grave concern” with the WCJ’s “cavalier treatment of the facts,” particularly an outburst during testimony where the WCJ editorialized that discharging a weapon did not seem “unusual and abnormal” based on her personal background as a Philadelphia native. The Court noted this violated the requirement for WCJs to conduct “fair and impartial hearings.”
The Court reversed the Board’s order and remanded the case, instructing the Board to remand it to a new WCJ to grant Russo’s Claim and Review Petitions concerning his disabling mental injuries and calculate appropriate wage loss benefits.
Notably, the Court also referenced the new Section 301(g) of the Act (effective October 29, 2025), which removes the “abnormal working condition” requirement for first responders claiming PTSD. Senior Judge Leadbetter concurred, using the opportunity to argue that the “abnormal working conditions” doctrine itself—a judge-made rule—should be scrapped entirely for all workers, as it treats those with mental injuries less favorably than those with physical ones.