The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit filed by Troy Prozan and Louis Aliota against the Millcreek Township Board of School Directors, concluding that the case was filed too late under both the statute of limitations and the statute of repose governing the state’s Sunshine Act.
The ruling brings an end, at least for now, to the ongoing litigation concerning alleged violations of the state’s open meeting laws. The court determined that Prozan’s attempt to correct the defendant in his lawsuit—switching from the Millcreek Township School District to the proper entity, the School Board—occurred long after the legal deadlines had passed.
The Initial Misstep and Remand
This case has a complicated procedural history rooted in a fundamental error regarding Pennsylvania law. Prozan initially sued the School District, alleging violations of Section 704 of the Sunshine Act, which mandates that official actions and deliberations by a quorum of an agency must occur at public meetings.
In the first iteration of the case (dubbed *Prozan I*), the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County dismissed the complaint. However, the Commonwealth Court stepped in and made a crucial clarification: under the Sunshine Act, the proper defendant is the School Board itself, not the broader School District. A school district is an agency of the Commonwealth, but the specific entity subject to the Sunshine Act’s requirements for open meetings is the board that governs it.
Because Prozan sued the wrong party, the Commonwealth Court vacated the dismissal but altered its nature. Instead of being dismissed “with prejudice” (which prevents refiling), the case was sent back to the trial court with instructions to dismiss it “without prejudice.” This procedural move was intended to give Prozan a clean slate to refile against the correct entity, the Board, without being immediately barred by the initial dismissal.
The Second Attempt Misses the Clock
Following the remand, Prozan filed a second amended complaint, correctly naming the Millcreek Township Board of School Directors as the defendant. The Board responded swiftly, filing a preliminary objection arguing that this new complaint was barred by both the 30-day statute of limitations and the one-year statute of repose specified in Section 713 of the Sunshine Act.
The core issue before the Commonwealth Court in this second appeal was whether Prozan’s attempt to sue the Board related back to the date of his original, timely filing against the District.
Judge Christine Fizzano Cannon, writing for the three-judge panel, firmly rejected Prozan’s arguments. The court emphasized that the School District and the School Board are legally distinct entities. While Prozan argued they shared staff, addresses, and counsel, the court noted that established precedent dictates they are separate for the purposes of Sunshine Act claims. This distinction was already settled law in *Prozan I*, making it the “law of the case.”
The court cited Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1033(b), which allows an amendment to correct a party’s name to “relate back” to the original filing date, provided the correct party receives notice within 90 days and isn’t prejudiced. However, this rule only applies when correcting a *mistake* in naming the party. Because the Board and the District are legally separate, naming the District first was not a mere clerical correction; it was suing the wrong defendant entirely.
Since the statute of limitations and, crucially, the statute of repose, had expired between the time the initial complaint was filed and when the Board was finally named, the second amended complaint was untimely.
Statute of Repose is Absolute
Prozan attempted to invoke equitable considerations, arguing that the Board knew about the lawsuit against the District and therefore shouldn’t be prejudiced by the delay. He also suggested that the previous appellate order allowing the refiling somehow authorized him to ignore timeliness rules.
The court dismissed these pleas, focusing heavily on the statute of repose. A statute of repose sets an absolute deadline for bringing a claim, regardless of when the plaintiff discovered the injury or mistake.
“The law is settled that equitable considerations play no part in the consideration of a statute of repose,” the opinion stated. Unlike a statute of limitations, which can sometimes be paused (tolled) due to fairness or extraordinary circumstances, a statute of repose acts as a complete barrier to liability after the set time. Since the one-year repose period had run before the Board was properly sued, no amount of equitable argument could save the claim.
Furthermore, the court clarified that the previous order to dismiss *without prejudice* only addressed the jurisdictional defect (suing the wrong entity); it did not grant Prozan a pass on subsequent statutory filing deadlines.
Because the second amended complaint was barred by the statutes of limitations and repose, the court did not even reach the merits of Prozan’s underlying Sunshine Act claim regarding the Board’s decision to file a cross-appeal. The trial court’s decision to dismiss the second amended complaint with prejudice was affirmed.