The Ohio Supreme Court has weighed in on a crucial procedural question for criminal defendants: when a motion for a new trial is based on newly discovered evidence, must the trial judge hold a formal, in-person hearing? The answer, according to the majority opinion, is no—but an evidentiary review is mandatory.
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals in the case of *State v. Bostick*, holding that while Criminal Rule 33(A)(6) requires an evidentiary hearing, it does not mandate that this hearing must be conducted orally. Whether to hold a formal, oral hearing remains within the sound discretion of the trial court.
The Case Background: A 20-Year-Old Conviction Challenged
The case stems from a 2003 conviction where Hollis Bostick was found guilty of felonious assault, attempted murder, and related firearm specifications stemming from the shooting of Tommie Griffin. Testimony at trial indicated a long-standing feud between rival groups, and Griffin testified that Bostick chased and shot him.
Bostick’s path to this appeal was long. After his initial conviction and a direct appeal that resulted in a resentencing order, Bostick filed an untimely motion for a new trial in 2021, based on newly discovered evidence: a police report created shortly after the shooting. This report allegedly showed that the victim, Griffin, initially identified Lonnie “Bud” McCann as the shooter while at the hospital.
Bostick argued that this evidence constituted a *Brady* violation (failure to disclose exculpatory evidence), supported a claim of perjured testimony, and demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court granted Bostick leave to file the motion, but after the State responded, the court ultimately denied the motion for a new trial without conducting any oral hearing.
Bostick appealed this denial, arguing that summarily denying the motion violated his constitutional rights. The Eighth District Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
The Central Legal Question: Oral vs. Evidentiary Hearing
The Supreme Court agreed to review only one proposition of law: whether a trial court *must* hold an evidentiary hearing when new evidence suggests the defendant might not be the perpetrator, especially when the evidence’s credibility is key to its value.
Justice Deters, writing for the majority, focused squarely on the language of Crim.R. 33(A)(6). The rule states that the defendant “must produce at the hearing on the motion… the affidavits of the witnesses.” The Court noted that the rule explicitly mentions the production of *affidavits*, not the production of the witnesses themselves for live questioning.
Drawing parallels from civil procedure (specifically summary judgment hearings under former Civ.R. 56(C)), the Court reinforced the idea that a “hearing” can be satisfied by a “nonoral, informal one.” This type of hearing allows the court to consider affidavits, depositions, and other submitted documents.
“The language used in the rule indicates that in the ordinary course, motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence will be determined through nonoral, evidentiary hearings,” the opinion stated.
While acknowledging past language in other cases (like *State v. Hatton*) that might have suggested an entitlement to an evidentiary hearing, the majority clarified that this only means the court must consider sworn evidence submitted by the defense—not that it must be presented orally.
Discretion and Lack of Request
The majority found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an oral hearing for two primary reasons. First, the Court reaffirmed that the type of evidentiary hearing is discretionary. Second, Bostick never actually requested an oral hearing.
During his time before the trial court, Bostick only attached his documents. He did not ask for live testimony, nor did he argue on appeal that the lack of an oral hearing prevented him from presenting necessary facts. The Court concluded, “One would be hard-pressed to conclude that a trial court abused its discretion when it declined to hold an oral hearing that was never requested.”
The Dissent’s Strong Objection
Justice Brunner issued a sharp dissent, arguing that the majority’s reliance on assumption was unacceptable. The dissenting justice contended that the trial court’s one-sentence entry denying the motion gave “no indication that a hearing of any kind was held,” let alone a proper evidentiary one.
The dissent emphasized the need for procedural due process, referencing U.S. Supreme Court precedent (*Harris v. Nelson*) which requires procedures necessary to correct miscarriages of justice. Justice Brunner argued that when a defendant presents substantive grounds for relief—as Bostick arguably did by presenting initial victim statements pointing to another shooter—a full evidentiary hearing should be the standard practice, not merely a nonoral review of paperwork.
The dissenter was particularly critical of the majority for relying on Bostick’s failure to request a specific type of hearing, stating that Crim.R. 33(A)(6) places no burden on the defendant to specify the hearing format. Justice Brunner concluded that summarily denying such motions is “arbitrary and unreasonable” and urged that the case be remanded for a full hearing where findings of fact and conclusions of law could be articulated for proper appellate review.
Despite the dissent’s strong objections regarding due process and the need for articulated findings, the Supreme Court majority affirmed the lower court’s decision, solidifying the rule that trial courts retain discretion over whether a new trial motion based on new evidence requires live testimony.