In a significant ruling for DUI enforcement in Georgia, the Court of Appeals has affirmed a trial court’s decision allowing the use of blood test results against a driver who attempted to revoke his consent to the test several days after the sample had already been drawn. The ruling solidifies the precedent that once a driver voluntarily consents to a blood draw following a DUI arrest, that consent cannot be unilaterally withdrawn before the lab analysis is complete.
The case centers on Ankur Vij, who was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) in October 2023. Following his arrest, Vij initially consented to a blood test to determine his alcohol content. However, several days later—after the blood had been drawn and sent to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) laboratory, but before the results were analyzed—Vij’s attorney formally notified the GBI in writing that Vij was withdrawing his consent.
The GBI rejected the revocation, citing existing case law, and proceeded with the analysis. The resulting data led to multiple charges against Vij, including DUI (per se), DUI (less safe), open container, speeding, and failure to carry a license. Vij subsequently moved to suppress the blood test results, arguing that under the Fourth Amendment, he retained a constitutional right to privacy in his blood even after it was drawn, allowing him to revoke consent anytime before the actual testing occurred.
The trial court denied the motion, prompting an interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals agreed to review.
The Court’s Stance on Consent and Revocation
Writing for the Third Division, Judge Markle laid out the established framework governing warrantless blood draws in Georgia. While Georgia’s implied consent law (OCGA § 40-5-55(a)) deems drivers to have consented to testing upon arrest for DUI, the court acknowledged that the extraction of blood is still a search subject to Fourth Amendment protections.
Crucially, the opinion emphasized that once a driver voluntarily consents to the blood draw, the need for a warrant or probable cause is eliminated. The core legal question then became whether the consent, once given and acted upon by drawing the blood, remains revocable.
The Court of Appeals firmly answered “no,” pointing to established precedent. “Importantly, we have already determined that a criminal defendant ‘could not withdraw [his consent to a blood test] after submitting to a blood draw,’” the opinion stated, referencing prior rulings like *Newman v. State* and *State v. Simmons*. The court saw no reason to deviate from this established holding.
Rejecting the “Continued Privacy Interest” Argument
Vij’s primary argument was that he maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his untested blood sample, analogous to privacy interests in other areas subject to search restrictions. He heavily relied on *State v. de la Paz* to argue that the subsequent chemical analysis was a separate invasion of privacy requiring renewed consent or a warrant.
The appellate court found this reliance misplaced. In *de la Paz*, the defendant had refused the initial blood draw, necessitating a warrant. The subsequent issue in that case involved law enforcement testing the blood for drugs when the warrant only authorized alcohol testing—a clear exceeding of the warrant’s scope.
The current court clarified that *de la Paz* did not establish a general rule that an untested blood sample retains an “overarching continued privacy interest” that allows for post-draw revocation of consent.
Judge Markle noted that what Vij was attempting was “the equivalent of an accused revoking his consent to the examination of items already seized during a valid search, such as the subsequent testing of suspected narcotics.” The court dismissed this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as “extreme and inconsistent with our precedent.”
By affirming the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, the Court of Appeals ensures that once a driver voluntarily provides blood for testing, the State is entitled to analyze that sample without fear that the driver can unilaterally halt the process days later.
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.