The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has affirmed a district court’s decision to make a criminal fine and special assessment due immediately while simultaneously establishing a payment schedule for an indigent defendant. The ruling clarifies a point of contention under 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1), confirming that these two directives are not mutually exclusive when a defendant lacks immediate means to pay.
The case involved Logan Harden Patrick, who pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. As part of his sentence, the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho ordered him to pay a $1,000 fine and a $100 special assessment, totaling $1,100.
The Core Legal Dispute: Immediate Due Date vs. Payment Schedule
Patrick did not challenge the substance of the penalties themselves. Instead, his appeal centered entirely on the statutory interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1). This statute states that monetary penalties “shall make such payment immediately, unless, in the interest of justice, the court provides for payment on a date certain or in installments.”
Patrick argued that this language created a strict choice: the court could either declare the full amount due immediately OR establish an installment payment schedule, but it could not do both simultaneously.
The district court, however, took a hybrid approach. Recognizing Patrick’s indigency, the court ordered the $1,100 due immediately, but then set nominal payment terms: no less than $25 per quarter while incarcerated (through the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, or IFRP) and $25 per month (or 10% of gross income) while on supervised release. The court explicitly stated this structure allowed Patrick to discharge the obligation over time while ensuring the debt remained a “current obligation.”
De Novo Review and Ninth Circuit Precedent
The Ninth Circuit panel, comprising Judges Gould, Tallman, and Christen, reviewed the question of statutory interpretation *de novo* (meaning they examined it fresh, without deference to the lower court’s interpretation).
Judge Tallman authored the opinion, holding that the district court did not violate § 3572(d)(1). The court found that the district court properly declared the total amount due immediately—which is the statutory default—while setting up a manageable payment schedule tailored to Patrick’s lack of current resources.
The court relied heavily on its own recent case law concerning restitution orders, specifically *United States v. Myers*. In *Myers*, the court had previously held that ordering restitution “immediately” while simultaneously setting minimum monthly payments did not violate the statute. The court reasoned that the immediate directive sets the expectation that the entire debt is owed, while the schedule dictates the *minimum* required payments toward that debt, particularly when the defendant is incarcerated.
Interpreting “Immediate Payment”
The opinion clarified a key distinction: ordering a fine “due immediately” does not necessarily mean “immediate payment in full.”
“By default, § 3572(d)(1) makes the fine and special assessment due immediately,” the opinion noted. This immediate declaration serves several purposes, including establishing the debt as a lien on the defendant’s property under 18 U.S.C. § 3613, which treats criminal fines like tax liabilities.
The payment schedule, in this context, acts as a mechanism for discharge over time, especially considering the defendant’s indigency. This structure allows the government to collect immediately if the defendant suddenly receives substantial resources (such as an inheritance or settlement), referencing statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) which mandate applying such “substantial resources” to outstanding fines.
Support from Sister Circuits
The Ninth Circuit also found its interpretation consistent with decisions from other federal appellate courts. The court cited the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in *United States v. Ellis* and the Eighth Circuit’s decision in *Matheny v. Morrison*.
In *Ellis*, the Seventh Circuit upheld an identical structure, stating that “immediate payment does not mean immediate payment in full; rather it means payment to the extent that the defendant can make it in good faith, beginning immediately.”
The panel distinguished its ruling from a prior Ninth Circuit case, *United States v. Holden*, where the court found an inconsistency because the district court had ordered both a “single lump-sum payment of immediate restitution in full *and* setting a payment schedule,” deeming those mutually exclusive. In Patrick’s situation, the court found no lump-sum requirement, only a requirement to pay the total amount over time according to the established schedule.
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court’s order was legally sound, aligning with existing case law that recognizes the dual function of making a debt immediately enforceable while providing a practical means for indigent defendants to satisfy that debt over time. The district court’s judgment was affirmed.