The Pennsylvania Superior Court has reversed a trial court’s decision that denied delay damages to the mother of a severely injured minor, ruling that a technical error in filing the motion should have been excused under the state’s rules of liberal construction.
The case stems from a serious 2015 chain-reaction collision in Philadelphia caused by a heavily intoxicated driver, Charles Kinsing (the Appellee). Maria Esther Arreguin, driving the lead car, and her then ten-year-old son, P.A.B. (the Appellant), were both injured. The son suffered significant facial injuries requiring multiple surgeries and resulting in permanent scarring.
Following a non-jury trial in January 2023, the trial court found in favor of Ms. Arreguin, awarding a substantial total of $4,111,746.38 in damages.
The Procedural Sticking Point: Rule 238 Notice
The core of the subsequent legal battle was Ms. Arreguin’s timely filing of a motion seeking delay damages under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238. This rule allows plaintiffs in personal injury cases to recover damages for the time the money has been delayed between the initial service of process and the final judgment.
However, Rule 238(c) mandates a specific procedural step: the motion *must* begin with a notice informing the defendant that they have 20 days to file a written response, or the delay damages may be added to the verdict.
Ms. Arreguin’s motion admittedly lacked this precise introductory notice. The Appellee, Mr. Kinsing, seized on this omission, arguing the motion was “defective on its face” and should be dismissed outright due to the strict language of the rule, which states the motion “shall begin with the following notice.”
The trial court agreed with the Appellee, denying the delay damages based solely on this failure to comply with the “strict, unambiguous language” of Rule 238(c).
The Appeal Focuses on Fairness: Rule 126
On appeal, Ms. Arreguin did not dispute that the notice was missing. Instead, she argued that the trial court abused its discretion by rigidly applying Rule 238(c) without considering Rule 126, the rule governing the liberal construction and application of procedural rules.
Rule 126 explicitly directs courts to apply rules “liberally to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Crucially, it permits courts to “disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not affect the substantive rights of the parties.”
The Superior Court, sitting en banc (meaning the full court heard the case), reviewed the issue as a pure question of law, applying a *de novo* standard. The court emphasized that procedural rules are not ends in themselves but tools to achieve justice, incorporating an equitable doctrine of “substantial compliance.”
Substantial Compliance Found
The appellate court noted that Ms. Arreguin had complied with every other aspect of Rule 238, making her filing a “substantial attempt to conform.”
The most compelling factor for the Superior Court was the lack of prejudice to the Appellee. Despite the missing formal notice, Mr. Kinsing was fully aware of the motion and actively opposed it.
“We further find highly relevant that, notwithstanding Ms. Arreguin’s failure to notify Appellee that he had 20 days to respond in writing… Appellee not only filed a timely response in opposition… but also raised numerous grounds in support of his opposition,” the opinion noted. Furthermore, Appellee’s counsel argued the matter at the subsequent hearing.
The court concluded that the Appellee suffered absolutely no prejudice from the procedural oversight. Significantly, the Appellee never argued on appeal that the error affected his substantive rights.
“Based on these facts, Appellee suffered no prejudice from Ms. Arreguin’s failure to notify Appellee that he needed to respond to the motion for delay damages in writing in 20 days,” the court declared.
The Outcome: Reversal and Remand
Because the trial court denied the motion solely on the basis of the notice defect, without weighing the dictates of Rule 126, the Superior Court found an abuse of discretion.
The appellate court vacated the judgment entered in favor of Ms. Arreguin (which was necessary to address the delay damages issue), reversed the order denying the delay damages motion, and remanded the case back to the trial court. The case must now return for consideration of the *other* substantive arguments Mr. Kinsing raised against the delay damages, which the trial court had previously bypassed.
The opinion was authored by Judge Dubow and joined by a majority of the court. Judge Sullivan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Judge King.