The Michigan Court of Appeals has reversed a lower court’s decision to dismiss an Operating While Intoxicated (OWI) charge, ruling that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle based on observing the driver’s intoxication less than an hour before the stop.
The ruling centers on the concept of “reasonable suspicion,” which is the legal standard needed for police to conduct a brief traffic stop. The appeals court found that the initial observation of the defendant, Dustin Ross Anderson, being visibly drunk, combined with the short timeframe before he was seen driving, provided the officer with the necessary justification, even without witnessing any immediate traffic violations.
The Initial Encounter
The sequence of events began on the night of April 6, 2023, when Officer Ray Prater of the Pinckney Police Department responded to a medical emergency at the home of the defendant’s father. During his visit, Officer Prater spoke with Mr. Anderson and noted several indicators that he was intoxicated: Anderson admitted to drinking, had bloodshot and watery eyes, and the officer detected a strong smell of intoxicants. Furthermore, the officer observed empty beer cans around the residence. At this point, Officer Prater believed Anderson was intoxicated but did not administer sobriety tests or stop him from driving.
Approximately 45 minutes to an hour after leaving the father’s house, Officer Prater was driving when he spotted a vehicle and ran the license plate. The check revealed the car was registered to Anderson. As the officer followed the vehicle for over a mile, he observed it make an abrupt right turn, prompting him to initiate a traffic stop.
Upon stopping the vehicle, Officer Prater confirmed Anderson was the driver and subsequently arrested him for OWI. A later blood draw showed Anderson’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.116, significantly above Michigan’s legal limit of 0.08.
Lower Courts Disagree on the Stop’s Legality
Following the arrest, the district court (the trial court for this misdemeanor charge) dismissed the OWI charge. The court ruled that the stop was improper because Officer Prater lacked the required probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The district court seemed to place heavy weight on the abrupt turn, which it deemed insufficient justification, while downplaying the prior observation of intoxication.
The prosecutor appealed this dismissal to the circuit court. The circuit court upheld the district court’s decision, finding that the stop lacked reasonable suspicion. It noted that Officer Prater did not see any typical driving infractions like swerving or crossing lanes. Furthermore, the circuit court expressed concern that the officer only knew the car was registered to Anderson, not definitively that Anderson was driving, and characterized the officer’s belief that Anderson was still intoxicated an hour later as merely a “hunch.”
Appeals Court Focuses on Reasonable Suspicion
The prosecutor took the case to the Michigan Court of Appeals, arguing that the prior observation of intoxication, coupled with the short time elapsed, created a clear and articulable suspicion that Anderson was driving while impaired.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the matter by examining the district court’s factual findings for clear error, but assessed the ultimate question of reasonable suspicion *de novo* (anew, without deference to the lower court’s legal conclusion).
The panel noted that reasonable suspicion requires more than a “hunch,” but it is a significantly lower threshold than probable cause. Citing established precedent, the court emphasized that an officer does not need to witness erratic driving if other articulable facts suggest impairment.
Crucially, the appellate court pointed out that both lower courts agreed Anderson was “drunk” during the initial encounter. The defense’s main argument—that the suspicion dissipated over 45 to 60 minutes—was rejected.
“That contention cannot be squared with the relatively low threshold for establishing reasonable suspicion,” the opinion stated. The court reasoned that Officer Prater was entitled to draw the “specific reasonable inferences” that a person intoxicated just an hour prior might still be impaired while driving. The possibility that Anderson might have sobered up does not negate the *reasonableness* of the officer’s suspicion at the time of the stop.
The appellate court also corrected the lower courts’ focus. It determined the district court erred by minimizing the significance of the earlier intoxication observation and focusing too heavily on the abrupt right turn. The totality of the circumstances—including the admission to drinking, the odor of alcohol, and the prior intoxication—provided the necessary grounds for the stop, regardless of the driving behavior observed afterward.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Officer Prater had reasonable suspicion based on the prior interaction. Consequently, the orders dismissing the case and suppressing evidence were reversed, and the matter was sent back to the district court for the OWI charge to proceed.