The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has vacated the sentence of Erika Kelley Day, ruling that a federal district court exceeded its authority when it reduced her sentence below the mandatory minimum for two separate drug and firearm offenses based on a government motion that only applied to one of those charges.
The core issue before the appellate court was a strict interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), the federal statute governing sentence reductions for “substantial assistance” to the government. This provision allows a judge to depart below a statutory minimum sentence, but only if the government specifically requests it.
The Case Background: Arrest and Charges
Erika Day’s case began with a routine traffic stop in Mobile County, Alabama, following a tip about a fugitive at a local RV park. Deputies pulled over Day’s car and discovered crystal methamphetamine in the front seat. A subsequent pat-down revealed she was carrying a handgun.
Day was eventually indicted on two federal counts:
1. Possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, carrying a mandatory minimum sentence of five years.
2. Firearm use attendant to a drug crime, carrying a mandatory consecutive minimum sentence of five years.
In her plea agreement, Day agreed to cooperate with the government, promising that if her assistance was deemed “substantial,” the government would move for a downward departure under Sentencing Guidelines section 5K1.1 or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. Crucially, the agreement explicitly stated that determining substantial assistance and the extent of any departure request was solely within the government’s discretion.
The Government Motion and the District Court’s Decision
After delays to allow Day’s cooperation to conclude, the government filed a motion for a downward departure under § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e), but this motion was explicitly restricted to Count One (methamphetamine possession).
Despite the narrow scope of the government’s request, the district court granted the motion, finding Day’s cooperation warranted an “extraordinary reduction.” The court then sentenced Day to “time served” on Count One and imposed a sentence of “one day on Count Two to be served consecutively.”
The federal prosecutor immediately objected, arguing that reducing the sentence below the statutory minimum for Count Two was illegal because the government’s motion had been restricted to Count One. The district judge overruled the objection, asserting the court had the authority to disregard the government’s self-imposed limitation.
The Eleventh Circuit’s Analysis: Strict Statutory Reading
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the legality of the sentence *de novo*. Chief Judge William Pryor, writing for the panel, focused sharply on the plain text of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).
The statute states a court may depart below “a level established by statute as a minimum sentence” only “[u]pon motion of the Government.” The court noted that while multiple sentences can be aggregated for administrative purposes, each offense carries a distinct, separate sentence.
“The text and structure of section 3553(e), along with our precedents, make clear that a substantial-assistance motion for one count does not allow a district court to depart from the statutory minimum on another count,” the opinion stated.
Because the government only moved for a departure on Count One, the district court lacked the statutory authority to reduce the sentence on Count Two below its five-year minimum without a corresponding motion. Citing Supreme Court precedent, the opinion reaffirmed that courts cannot depart below a statutory minimum without explicit government authorization.
Plea Agreement Not Breached
Day argued that affirming the sentence was necessary to cure an alleged breach of her plea agreement, suggesting the government could not unilaterally limit its departure obligation to a single count, especially since the plea hearing involved general discussions about receiving a “less severe” sentence.
The court dismissed this argument, finding no breach occurred. The plea agreement specifically referenced § 5K1.1 and Rule 35(b), but was silent on § 3553(e). The court held that “silence is not ambiguity,” and no promise was made regarding a § 3553(e) motion for Count Two. Furthermore, the agreement explicitly reserved the government’s right to determine the *extent* of any departure request.
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the sentence on Count Two was illegal because it was imposed without the necessary statutory foundation—a government motion targeting that specific count.
A Concurrence Highlighting Sentencing Asymmetry
While agreeing with the majority’s strict legal conclusion, Judge Kidd wrote a separate concurrence that offered a powerful commentary on the practical implications of this rigid sentencing framework.
Judge Kidd detailed Day’s remarkable rehabilitation over two years while awaiting sentencing, noting she successfully completed a year-long transitional program, maintained employment, repaired family relationships, and provided crucial undercover assistance to the government, leading to indictments against her former suppliers. The district judge, having witnessed this transformation, felt that imprisonment would be unhelpful to Day or the community, leading to the highly lenient sentence.
Judge Kidd lamented that under the current system, the district court’s equitable judgment was overridden by the prosecutor’s decision to limit the scope of the assistance motion. “By statute, only one person’s opinion mattered that day: Gloria A. Bedwell’s, the Assistant United States Attorney,” Judge Kidd wrote, noting the asymmetry where courts have broad discretion to impose higher sentences but limited power to impose lower ones without prosecutorial consent.
The ruling vacates the sentence for Count Two and remands the case back to the Southern District of Alabama with instructions to resentence Day in line with the opinion. This means Day will face resentencing for the firearm charge, likely resulting in a minimum of five years imposed consecutively, unless the government chooses to file a new, broader motion on remand.