The appellate court has sided with a nursing home resident, ruling that his guardian of the person lacked the legal authority to sign a binding arbitration agreement on his behalf, thereby allowing the underlying lawsuit for alleged injuries to proceed in court.
This decision by the Ninth Judicial District Court of Appeals affirms a lower court’s denial of a motion by the Arbors at Stow facility (and related entities, collectively “Arbors”) to halt the civil lawsuit filed by Kenneth D. Barker and compel the parties into mediation or arbitration.
The case hinges on the specific, statutory powers granted to different types of guardians under Ohio law when an individual, like Mr. Barker, has been deemed incompetent by a probate court.
The Background: Injury Claims and the Arbitration Clause
Kenneth D. Barker was a patient at Arbors at Stow, a skilled nursing facility. Before his admission, the Summit County Probate Court had found Mr. Barker incompetent and appointed two separate guardians: one for his person (responsible for his care and well-being) and one for his estate (responsible for his finances and legal matters).
In April 2024, Mr. Barker, acting through his appointed guardians—Lindsey M. Schulz (guardian of person) and Justine S. Winger (guardian of estate)—sued Arbors. The complaint alleged serious and permanent injuries resulting from negligence, recklessness, and willful conduct during his stay.
Crucially, when Mr. Barker was admitted in March 2023, Ms. Schulz, acting as the guardian of the person, electronically signed a separate “Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement,” or arbitration agreement. This agreement stipulated that disputes exceeding $50,000 arising from Mr. Barker’s stay would be resolved outside of court through mediation or arbitration. The agreement explicitly stated that signing it was voluntary and “NOT required for [Mr. Barker] to obtain any service from the facility.”
Arbors moved to enforce this agreement, arguing the lawsuit should be stayed pending arbitration. Mr. Barker countered that the guardian of the person simply did not have the authority to waive his right to a jury trial by signing away access to the court system. The trial court agreed with Mr. Barker and denied the motion, prompting the appeal.
The Core Legal Question: Who Can Sign Away Court Rights?
The appellate court noted that while arbitration is generally favored in Ohio, an arbitration agreement is still a contract, and a valid contract requires that the signing party had the authority to bind the principal. The court analyzed whether Ms. Schulz, as guardian of the person, possessed either *actual* or *apparent* authority.
Actual Authority: Limited to Care, Not Litigation
The court turned to the Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) to define the guardians’ powers. R.C. 2111.13 outlines the duties of the guardian of the person, which include protecting and controlling the ward, providing suitable maintenance, and authorizing medical or professional care.
The court acknowledged that a guardian of the person might need to enter into contracts related to the *provision* of care (like signing a service agreement with the facility). However, the arbitration agreement signed here was not about the *provision* of care; it was about how legal claims *arising from* that care would be resolved.
The court found that pursuing and resolving legal claims—including agreeing to arbitration instead of litigation—falls squarely under the duties assigned to the guardian of the *estate* (R.C. 2111.14), not the guardian of the person. Furthermore, because the arbitration agreement was voluntary and not required for Mr. Barker to receive services, signing it was deemed outside the scope of the guardian of the person’s statutory duties.
Citing precedent involving healthcare powers of attorney, the court concluded that because executing the arbitration agreement was not a duty authorized under R.C. 2111.13, Ms. Schulz lacked the actual authority to bind Mr. Barker to arbitration.
Apparent Authority: Knowledge of Guardianship Defeats Reliance
Arbors next argued that even without actual authority, Ms. Schulz possessed the *apparent* authority to sign the document, and Arbors reasonably relied on that appearance.
The appellate court rejected this argument, emphasizing that apparent authority must stem from the actions of the *principal* (Mr. Barker) holding the agent (Ms. Schulz) out as having power.
The facts showed that Mr. Barker had been officially deemed incompetent and placed under court-ordered guardianship *before* the agreement was signed. Arbors was aware of the dual guardianship structure. The court reasoned that because the facility knew Mr. Barker was under court supervision, Arbors could not reasonably believe that the guardian of the person alone could unilaterally waive Mr. Barker’s right to sue in court.
The court reiterated that apparent authority is judged by the principal’s actions, not the agent’s self-representation. Since Mr. Barker was incompetent and under court control, he could not have held out his daughter as having authority beyond what the statute granted her.
Conclusion
Because Ms. Schulz did not have the actual or apparent authority to execute the arbitration agreement on Mr. Barker’s behalf, the agreement was unenforceable. Consequently, the trial court was correct in refusing to stay the lawsuit and compel arbitration. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, meaning the negligence lawsuit against Arbors at Stow will proceed in the Court of Common Pleas.