The Toledo Municipal Court’s decision to deny Christopher Rogers’s request to seal the record of a dismissed aggravated theft case has been partially upheld and partially reversed by the Ohio Sixth Appellate District Court. The appellate court agreed with Rogers that the trial court failed to follow mandatory procedural steps when making its decision, necessitating a remand. However, the court firmly rejected Rogers’s argument that the alleged victim, Everi Holdings, Inc., lacked the constitutional right to object to the sealing simply because the criminal charges against him were dropped.
The Dismissed Charge and Motion to Seal
The saga began in January 2024 when Christopher Rogers was charged with Aggravated Theft. The complaint alleged that Rogers exploited a processing error in the EVERI Cash Club Wallet App, resulting in the victim, Everi Payment, Inc. (now Everi Holdings, Inc.), losing $157,897.38.
However, the case took a swift turn. In March 2024, the charge was dismissed by the court at the request of the prosecutor and the investigating officer from the Ohio Casino Control Commission.
Following the dismissal, Rogers filed a motion in June 2024 to seal the record under Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) 2953.33(B)(2). This statute outlines the specific criteria a court must analyze before granting such a motion following a dismissal or acquittal.
Victim Opposition and Marsy’s Law Debate
Everi immediately opposed the sealing, filing a notice asserting its rights as a victim under Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution—commonly known as Marsy’s Law. Everi argued that keeping the records unsealed was important for potential future civil recovery and because Rogers could still face refiling of charges while the statute of limitations remained open.
Rogers countered by arguing Everi had no standing to object because the theft charge was dismissed; therefore, in his view, there was no longer a “victim” to assert rights under Marsy’s Law.
At the October 2024 hearing, the trial court ultimately denied Rogers’s motion to seal, stating that Rogers’s interest in sealing the record was “outweighed by the victim and government’s interest in maintaining the records while the statute of limitations allows for refiling.” Rogers appealed, raising two main issues: the trial court’s failure to follow required sealing analysis (Assignment of Error Two), and the court’s acceptance of Everi’s objection (Assignment of Error One).
Procedural Errors Lead to Reversal and Remand
The appellate court addressed Rogers’s second assignment of error first, finding it had merit. R.C. 2953.33(B)(2) sets out a detailed, mandatory checklist for a trial court when ruling on a motion to seal a dismissed case. This checklist includes determining if proceedings are pending, whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice, and critically, weighing the defendant’s interest against the government’s need to maintain records.
The appellate panel noted that the trial court’s judgment entry simply stated the motion was denied because the statute of limitations had not run and the victim objected. The court conceded, as the State agreed in a concession of error, that the trial court failed to make several required determinations on the record.
“A trial court errs when it fails to make each of the required determinations under R.C. 2953.33(B)(2) on the record,” the opinion stated, citing precedent. Because of this procedural defect, the appellate court reversed the denial and remanded the case back to the trial court to conduct the full statutory analysis required by law.
Marsy’s Law Rights Exist Without Conviction
The court then tackled Rogers’s first assignment of error: that Everi, as the charging document was dismissed, was no longer a victim entitled to object. This issue was crucial because if Rogers were correct, Everi could not participate when the case was remanded for a proper hearing.
The appellate court strongly disagreed with Rogers’s interpretation of Marsy’s Law. Rogers argued that since R.C. Chapter 2930 (the statutory codification of Marsy’s Law rights) did not specifically mention motions to seal, and because a “conviction” requires a verdict and sentence, Everi could not assert victim status before a conviction.
The Sixth District found these arguments “unfounded.”
First, the court clarified that the Ohio Constitution grants rights directly, and the statute’s silence on a specific procedure is irrelevant if the constitutional right exists. R.C. 2930.011 itself recognizes that the statute does not limit the constitutional rights under Article I, Section 10a.
Second, and more fundamentally, the court rejected the idea that victim status hinges on conviction. Marsy’s Law explicitly grants victims the right to be heard in proceedings involving “plea, sentencing, disposition, or parole.” The court pointed out the logical absurdity of Rogers’s position: if rights only attached after conviction, a victim could never exercise their right to be heard on a plea agreement or sentencing, as those events precede the conviction itself.
To cement this, the court relied on a recent Ohio Supreme Court decision involving police officers whose identities were protected as Marsy’s Law victims even though the alleged offender died before any conviction could occur.
“Thus, the rights granted under Marsy’s Law cannot be contingent on the offender’s conviction,” the opinion concluded. Accordingly, the appellate court found Rogers’s first assignment of error “not well-taken,” confirming Everi’s right to participate in the proceedings upon remand.
Conclusion
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s implicit finding that Everi was a victim with standing, but reversed the actual denial of the sealing motion due to insufficient findings. The case is sent back to the trial court with instructions to conduct a complete analysis under R.C. 2953.33(B)(2), ensuring Everi’s constitutional rights are respected throughout the new hearing.
Judge Thomas J. Osowik dissented regarding the first assignment of error, arguing that the trial court never explicitly ruled on Rogers’s motion to disqualify Everi’s standing, making the appellate review of that issue premature.