The Virginia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, has issued a significant ruling clarifying when protective orders take effect, holding that a Preliminary Protective Order (PPO) that was never formally served on the respondent did not automatically terminate an existing Emergency Protective Order (EPO). The full panel reversed a prior decision and affirmed Diego Claramunt’s conviction for violating the initial EPO.
The core of the dispute centered on the specific language in Virginia statutes: while a PPO explicitly requires “personal service” to become effective, the statute governing EPOs is silent on the matter of when it takes effect relative to a subsequent PPO.
The Facts of the Case
The situation began on Sunday, May 29, 2022, when Diego Claramunt’s wife, Adriane, obtained an EPO against him due to allegations of family abuse. The EPO barred Claramunt from contacting Adriane or their children and granted her exclusive possession of the family home. Claramunt was personally served with this EPO shortly after midnight on May 30.
The following day, while the EPO was still in effect, Adriane obtained a PPO from the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District (JDR) court. This PPO carried similar restrictions but slightly altered the terms concerning contact with the children (allowing “no hostile” contact).
Crucially, the official service return sheet showed that Claramunt was never personally served with this new PPO. Although Claramunt was present at the courthouse when the PPO was issued (and even obtained a PPO against Adriane himself), the court never issued an order explicitly dissolving the existing EPO.
Claramunt subsequently contacted his children at school and retrieved personal items from the family home, operating under the belief that the newly issued PPO superseded the earlier EPO. Adriane initiated a complaint, leading to Claramunt being arrested and charged specifically with violating the *original EPO*.
The Conflicting Lower Rulings
In the JDR court, Claramunt was found guilty of violating the EPO. He appealed to the circuit court, which upheld the conviction, finding the EPO remained in effect.
However, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals initially reversed the conviction. That panel sided with Claramunt’s argument that the PPO superseded the EPO as a matter of law upon his “actual notice” of the PPO, meaning he could not be guilty of violating the now-superseded EPO.
The Commonwealth successfully petitioned for a rehearing by the full Court of Appeals (en banc) to resolve this critical statutory question.
The En Banc Court’s Decision: Service is Key for PPOs
In the definitive ruling, the en banc court affirmed Claramunt’s conviction. The majority opinion, written by Judge Richard Y. Atlee, Jr., focused squarely on the plain language of the governing statutes.
The court noted that Virginia law distinguishes between the three types of protective orders: EPOs, PPOs, and final protective orders. While the statutes for EPOs and final orders are silent on when they become effective relative to subsequent orders, the statute for PPOs (Code § 16.1-253.1(C)) is explicit: a PPO “is effective upon personal service.”
The majority reasoned that because the statute specifically ties the effectiveness of a PPO to personal service, an unserved PPO simply cannot take effect. If the PPO never became effective, it could not supersede the existing, validly served EPO.
“When the General Assembly amends a statute, the pre-amended version applies until the amended statute’s effective date,” the opinion stated, drawing an analogy that an order cannot bind a party until it becomes effective.
The court dismissed Claramunt’s testimony that someone handed him a copy of the PPO, noting that the circuit court was not required to believe self-serving statements, and the official service return indicated no service occurred.
The court emphasized that allowing actual notice—rather than mandated personal service—to activate a PPO would render the specific personal service language in Code § 16.1-253.1(C) meaningless. This interpretation, the court concluded, would violate fundamental principles of statutory construction.
Dissent and Concurrence Highlight Confusion
The outcome was not unanimous, revealing deep division among the judges regarding the proper interpretation of the protective order scheme.
Judge V.R. Chaney authored a strong dissent, joined by two other judges. The dissent argued that the PPO *did* supersede the EPO because Claramunt had actual notice, appeared before the judge, and received the new order. The dissent focused heavily on the remedial purpose of protective orders, arguing that requiring formal service despite actual knowledge creates “protection gaps” and undermines safety goals. Furthermore, the dissent contended that the judicial issuance of the PPO, which had different terms than the EPO, implicitly modified or superseded the magistrate-issued EPO, respecting the judicial hierarchy over the magistrate’s temporary order.
A concurring opinion, joined by six judges, agreed with the final result—affirming the conviction—but on entirely different grounds than the majority. The concurrence held that the EPO remained in effect simply because the JDR court, when issuing the PPO, did not *expressly* dissolve or modify the EPO as required by the EPO statute. This view suggested that both orders could coexist, forcing the respondent to comply with the “more demanding order” until the EPO expired.
The majority opinion ultimately adopted the narrowest ground shared by the court: that the unserved PPO was legally ineffective, thus leaving the EPO in force.
This decision clarifies that for a respondent to be bound by a PPO, formal personal service, as required by statute, must occur, even if the respondent was present when the order was issued.