The Washington Court of Appeals, Division Three, has reversed a lower court’s decision, dismissing a defamation lawsuit brought by former Pastor Micahn Carter against Mary Jones, a former assistant and parishioner. The case, which centered on Jones’s public accusations that a sexual encounter with Carter was rape, was ultimately dismissed by the appellate court under Washington’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), signaling a strong defense for speech related to matters of public concern.
The appellate court found that Jones’s statements, particularly in a blog post, were protected opinion, and that Carter, due to his public role as a pastor and author, qualified as a limited-purpose public figure. Furthermore, the court ruled that a letter Jones sent to an Alabama pastor was protected by a common interest privilege.
The Contentious Sexual Encounter
The core of the dispute stems from a sexual encounter between Carter and Jones in the church office on April 29, 2019, following a church leadership event. The accounts of what transpired are sharply contradictory. Carter claims the encounter was consensual, while Jones characterizes it as rape, noting she felt frozen and uttered, “Please don’t do this, you’re gonna regret this.”
The factual history leading up to the encounter involved a complex, intimate dynamic. Jones, who viewed the Carters as parental figures, was hired as Carter’s assistant. Evidence presented suggested a pattern of inappropriate behavior, including suggestive text messages and physical contact, which Jones discussed with other church leaders, including Pastor Kierstin Platt and Pastor Christina Vickers.
Following the April 29th encounter, Carter confessed to his wife, April, that he had engaged in an “affair,” and later resigned from his position at Together Church, citing a doctor’s diagnosis of a mental condition that caused him to act “not consistent with his character.” Jones, meanwhile, experienced significant trauma, though her initial descriptions to church leaders and her mother did not explicitly use the word “rape.” It was later, after seeking counseling (and leaving a therapist who urged her to press criminal charges), that her account solidified into an allegation of rape.
The Defamation Claims and the UPEPA Shield
Carter sued Jones in Washington state court, alleging defamation based on two communications: a July 2021 letter sent to Pastor Chris Hodges in Alabama (where Carter was then working) and a July 2021 blog post published on the platform Medium.
The appellate court analyzed the case through the lens of the UPEPA, Washington’s anti-SLAPP statute designed to quickly dismiss lawsuits that chill free expression on matters of public concern.
1. Public Figure Status and Actual Malice
A key factor in defamation law involves the status of the plaintiff. Because Carter was a lead pastor, author, and public evangelist—who had previously confessed to an “inappropriate incident” before his congregation—the court determined he was a limited-purpose public figure. This status requires the plaintiff to prove the defendant acted with “actual malice”—meaning the statement was made knowing it was false or with reckless disregard for the truth.
The court noted that Carter’s own actions, including his public apology blaming a mental condition and his decision to sue aggressively in two states to restore his reputation, bolstered the finding that he thrust himself into the public controversy.
2. Opinion vs. Fact
The court made a crucial distinction between Jones’s two communications:
* The Hodges Letter: This brief, direct accusation of “rape” sent to an Alabama pastor involved in Carter’s rehabilitation was deemed an actionable statement of fact. However, this statement was protected by a common interest privilege because the Alabama church had a legitimate interest in knowing the character of a pastor in its employ. Since Carter failed to show Jones acted with actual malice when sending this letter, the claim regarding the letter failed.
* The Blog Post: The lengthy blog post, however, was treated differently. Because Jones provided extensive personal context—detailing the grooming, her emotional turmoil, and her reliance on Carter as a father figure—the court found the ultimate accusation of “rape” constituted nonactionable opinion. The court reasoned that the detailed background allowed the reader to weigh the subjective elements of the encounter and judge the credibility of the assertion for themselves.
The court emphasized that allegations involving subjective evaluations of intent and state of mind are less suitable for defamation claims, especially when the context suggests personal narrative rather than purely verifiable fact.
Significance for Clergy Misconduct Cases
The ruling underscores the high bar public figures face in defamation cases, particularly when the alleged defamatory speech arises from workplace sexual misconduct involving a person in authority. The court cited expert testimony suggesting that power imbalances in clergy-parishioner relationships mean sexual contact can rarely be truly consensual, lending credence to Jones’s ultimate characterization of the event, even if her initial statements varied.
By dismissing Carter’s suit under the UPEPA, the Court of Appeals affirmed the law’s intent to protect individuals speaking out about alleged abuse of power in professional and religious settings, even if the details of their narrative shift over time following trauma or counseling. As a result of prevailing on the special motion, Jones was awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred at both the trial and appellate levels.