The Arizona Court of Appeals has upheld the aggravated assault conviction of Timothy Edward Egan, rejecting his claims that he was prejudiced by a confusing charge, an improper jury instruction regarding self-defense against an officer, and a series of errors made by the prosecutor during closing arguments.
Egan, an inmate at the Pinal County jail, was convicted of aggravated assault stemming from a physical altercation with a correctional officer, identified as E.L., in January 2024. Following his conviction and a four-year prison sentence, Egan appealed, arguing several points compromised his right to a fair trial. The Court of Appeals, however, found no reversible error in the trial court’s proceedings.
The Incident and the Charge
The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, describe a rapidly escalating confrontation. When Officer E.L. arrived to announce court times, Egan became agitated, claiming he should be released. As Egan moved toward the door, E.L. tried to stop him. Egan swiped the officer’s arm away. E.L. pushed Egan back into the cell and ordered him to turn around to be handcuffed. Egan then rushed E.L. aggressively, leading to a quick exchange where Egan struck, grabbed, and scratched the officer, breaking his glasses and causing bruising and cuts to his head and face. Backup officers arrived shortly after, restraining Egan with physical force and the use of a taser.
Egan was charged with one count of aggravated assault. On appeal, Egan argued that the prosecution presented evidence of two distinct assaults—the initial arm swipe and the subsequent physical attack—but only charged him with one count. He claimed this created a “duplicitous charge,” risking a non-unanimous jury verdict.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the case involved two separate physical contacts. However, the court focused on the specific elements of the crime charged: aggravated assault causing *physical injury*. The court noted that only the second, more violent interaction resulted in documented physical injury (bruising and cuts to the face and head). The initial contact—the arm swipe—did not result in any claimed physical impairment to the officer.
Because only the second interaction met all the elements required for the specific charge of aggravated assault causing physical injury, the court found no risk of a non-unanimous verdict. The jury was properly instructed to convict only if every element of the charged crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Self-Defense Instruction Scrutinized
Egan also challenged the jury instructions related to self-defense. When a defendant claims self-defense against a police officer or jail official, the defense is only available if the officer used force exceeding what the law allows.
The trial court included instructions outlining the lawful use of force by a correctional officer to maintain order, and stated that a defendant is only justified in using force if the officer’s force was unlawful. Egan contended this instruction improperly focused on the officer’s justification rather than his own.
Egan cited a recent case, *State v. Ewer*, arguing it overturned older precedent (*State v. Bojorquez*) that supported the trial court’s instruction. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It reasoned that *Ewer* dealt with modifying a standard self-defense instruction to apply to any “person,” which was deemed incorrect because justification analysis focuses on the defendant’s reasonable belief. However, *Ewer* did not address situations, like this one, where the alleged victim (the officer) has a specific statutory right to use force.
The appellate court determined that explaining the officer’s right to use reasonable force was necessary context for the jury to properly analyze Egan’s justification defense—specifically, whether E.L.’s force was unlawful in the first place. Therefore, the instruction was deemed appropriate and not an abuse of discretion.
Prosecutorial Missteps Found, But Deemed Harmless
The most extensive part of Egan’s appeal concerned alleged prosecutorial error during arguments. Egan claimed several instances—from soliciting testimony that challenged his credibility to making emotional appeals—collectively denied him a fair trial.
The court reviewed these claims, distinguishing between errors that required a harmlessness review (because they were objected to) and those reviewed for fundamental error (because no objection was made).
The court identified two specific instances where the prosecutor’s comments were improper errors:
1. Appeal to Emotion: The prosecutor mentioned that the victim officer, E.L., told his children he loved them every morning before work, “just in case something happen[ed] to him.” The state conceded this was improper because it was an attempt to appeal to the jurors’ passions and empathy, as no evidence about E.L.’s family life was introduced.
2. Vouching for Evidence: The prosecutor explained the lack of inmate witnesses by stating, “It is jail code. Snitches get stiches.” This was found to be improper vouching—using the prestige of the government to suggest why witnesses remained silent—and undermined a previous instruction the court gave regarding the state’s failure to preserve evidence (a *Willits* instruction).
However, the court found no error in other claims, such as the prosecutor using “we know” phrases while summarizing evidence or mentioning the officer’s long tenure to suggest he lacked a motive to lie.
Cumulative Effect Fails to Overturn Verdict
Despite finding two specific instances of prosecutorial error, the Court of Appeals concluded that the cumulative impact of these issues was insufficient to overturn the conviction.
The standard for reversing based on cumulative error is “very demanding,” requiring the defendant to show the trial was so infected with unfairness that the resulting conviction was a denial of due process.
The court noted that proper jury instructions often “cure” minor errors. In this case, the jury was repeatedly instructed that they were the sole judges of fact, that attorney arguments are not evidence, and that they should not be swayed by sympathy.
Ultimately, the court found that the weight of the properly admitted evidence proving Egan’s guilt, combined with the curative jury instructions, meant the errors did not have the required distorting effect on the trial as a whole. Egan failed to meet the high burden required to show an “obvious” injustice.
The judgment of conviction was affirmed.