The Second District Court of Appeals of Ohio has affirmed a lower court’s decision granting summary judgment to Capital One, N.A., in a debt collection case against Dave R. Campbell Sr., concluding that the appellant’s defenses were “purely frivolous.” The ruling definitively dismissed Mr. Campbell’s attempts to use complex, non-traditional legal theories—including references to the 1882 Bills of Exchange Act and the Cestui Que Vie Act—to dispute a credit card balance of over $7,600.
The appellate court’s opinion detailed a protracted series of filings by Mr. Campbell, who represented himself (pro se) throughout the process. The core issue remained simple: Capital One sued for an unpaid credit card balance of $7,671.42, and Campbell argued he had already paid it using purported “bills of exchange.”
Procedural Hurdles and Frivolous Claims
The appeal began with a procedural snag: Mr. Campbell failed to submit a proper brief listing his assignments of error as required by Ohio Appellate Rule 16(A). Despite this deficiency, the court elected to review the substance of his arguments in the interest of justice, noting that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as represented parties.
The court construed Campbell’s claims as focusing on three main areas: the trial court’s denial of his numerous motions, failure to explain evidentiary rulings, and denial of due process.
The appellate panel quickly dismissed these contentions, focusing heavily on the nature of the evidence Campbell presented. Mr. Campbell’s defense revolved around notations he allegedly made on the credit card payment stub, such as marking it “accepted for deposit” and claiming he was paying the full amount due, despite enclosing no actual money.
The court found his reliance on historical legislation completely misplaced.
“Very little authority exists in Ohio regarding the Bills of Exchange Act,” the opinion stated, referencing a 1915 Ohio Supreme Court case noting that Ohio adopted the Negotiable Instruments Act in 1902, superseding older English acts. Furthermore, courts in other jurisdictions have deemed citation to the 1882 Bills and Exchange Act “legally frivolous on its face.”
The Cestui Que Vie Connection
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the lower court proceedings involved Mr. Campbell’s use of the Cestui Que Vie Act of 1666. Although Campbell denied being a “sovereign citizen,” the court noted this act is closely associated with that movement. This theory, according to the court, is typically used to assert that the government is the custodian of the individual’s estate, thus owing them money.
The appellate court characterized Campbell’s argument as an attempt to assert that Capital One was the custodian of his estate and owed him money, rather than the other way around. Citing federal case law, the judges called this legal fiction “not based in law but in the fantasies of the sovereign citizen movement.”
The court also found no fault with the trial court’s denial of Campbell’s discovery motions, noting that some requests were premature, while others were deemed “nonsensical and irrelevant,” such as asking Capital One, “Whose job is it to pay interest?”
Affirming Summary Judgment
The central legal battle concerned Capital One’s motion for summary judgment. Under Ohio Civil Rule 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Capital One successfully met its initial burden by presenting authenticated copies of the Customer Agreement and account statements showing a clear progression from a zero balance to the $7,671.42 debt.
Mr. Campbell failed to respond to this motion. He never submitted an affidavit or any proper evidentiary materials required by the rules to contest the facts presented by Capital One.
“Any error committed by the trial court in granting summary judgment is waived if the non-moving party fails to file a brief or evidence in opposition,” the court explained, noting that in such cases, the review is limited to “plain error.”
The appellate court found no such error. Because Campbell failed to produce any evidence that he had actually made the claimed payment of $28,455.42 using his “bills of exchange,” the trial court was correct to rule in favor of the creditor based on the undisputed contract and statements.
In conclusion, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, dismissing both the primary debt claim and Mr. Campbell’s counterclaim with prejudice.