A Kentucky appeals court has upheld a lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment, dismissing all claims against a legal custodian in a tragic 2018 single-vehicle accident that resulted in two fatalities and serious injuries to a third passenger. The case hinged on whether the custodian, Jeffrey Cross, could be held legally responsible for the driving behavior of his 17-year-old ward, Genoa Somersall, who owned and drove the car.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in an opinion rendered January 2, 2026, found that the estates of the deceased passengers failed to establish the necessary legal grounds—specifically ownership, control, or foreseeability—to hold Cross liable under several legal theories.
The Tragic Incident and Legal Claims
The consolidated civil actions arose from a one-vehicle accident on August 22, 2018, in Oldham County. Genoa Somersall, then a minor, lost control of her car, causing it to flip, resulting in the deaths of passengers Tamara Mefford and Selena Gilbert, and severe injury to Cheyanna Shuler.
The estates of the victims sued Genoa’s legal custodian, Jeffrey Cross, asserting claims based on the Family Purpose Doctrine, Negligent Entrustment, statutory liability under KRS 186.590, and Negligent Supervision. The Oldham Circuit Court had previously granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issues of material fact existed for a jury to consider on any of these claims against Cross.
No Basis for Family Purpose Doctrine
The Family Purpose Doctrine typically holds the owner of a vehicle liable for the negligence of a family member driving the car for a family purpose. However, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the doctrine hinges on the defendant *owning, maintaining, or controlling* the vehicle for family use.
The undisputed facts showed Genoa bought the car herself using her own money—funds derived from child support, Social Security benefits, and her own wages. Cross, who is Genoa’s step-grandfather (the ex-spouse of her maternal grandmother), had no ownership interest.
While Cross managed a restricted account for Genoa when she was younger, once she started working, she had independent access to her funds. The court noted that while Cross accompanied Genoa when she first looked at the car, he explicitly told her, “It’s your money, you’re purchasing it, it’s your decision.”
The court found that Cross neither purchased nor maintained the vehicle. Although he might have changed the oil once, Genoa personally paid for major repairs, like new brakes, shortly before the crash. Furthermore, the trip that led to the accident—driving friends to Michigan and back—was deemed to serve no family purpose. Therefore, summary judgment on this doctrine was appropriate as a matter of law.
Negligent Entrustment Fails on Control and Foreseeability
Negligent Entrustment holds an owner liable if they lend a vehicle to someone they know is incompetent or reckless. The Court of Appeals noted that this claim also failed because Cross did not own or control the vehicle. More crucially, the court found insufficient evidence that Genoa was an incompetent driver whose conduct Cross should have foreseen.
Statutory Liability Under KRS 186.590 Dismissed
Appellants argued Cross could be liable under KRS 186.590(3), which imposes liability on anyone who “gives or furnishes a motor vehicle to the minor.”
The court quickly dismissed liability under subsection (1) because Genoa had the required insurance coverage, which shields the person who signed the minor’s license application (Cross) from imputed negligence.
Regarding subsection (3), the court determined that Cross did not “furnish” the car. Since Genoa purchased it with her own funds, owned it, and operated it solely for her own purposes, Cross’s role as legal custodian was insufficient to trigger liability under this statute.
The Crux of the Decision: Negligent Supervision and Foreseeability
The most vigorously argued point involved the claim of Negligent Supervision. This theory requires proving that Cross knew, or should have known, that he had the ability to control Genoa and that such control was necessary to prevent foreseeable harm.
The court stressed that the duty to supervise hinges on the foreseeability of the child’s injurious conduct. Appellants suggested Cross should have foreseen danger because Genoa had a prior, minor accident in Cross’s vehicle, and because Genoa once asked to take a road trip to Chattanooga, which Cross denied.
The court found these facts insufficient to establish foreseeability of the specific, fatal events.
1. Prior Accident: The previous wreck involved a citation for a permit violation and careless driving, but the charges were largely dismissed, with Genoa pleading guilty only to a seat belt violation. Cross’s subsequent caution regarding his *own* car (insisting on riding along) did not translate to an expectation of reckless driving in *Genoa’s* car.
2. Unauthorized Trips: Genoa admitted to taking unauthorized trips to Corbin and Middlesboro, but Cross testified he was unaware of them. The court stated that hindsight knowledge of undisclosed behavior does not create liability for the supervisor.
3. The Michigan Trip: The accident occurred during an unauthorized, out-of-state trip to Michigan. Genoa testified that the decision to go was made secretly during the school day, and she specifically did not tell Cross about the trip, in part to avoid him finding out she wasn’t in school.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Cross was not negligent because he had no reason to anticipate this chain of deceit and dangerous driving. He believed Genoa was staying overnight with a friend nearby in Harlan, as she had permission to do.
“The mere fact that the parents do not have the ability to exercise control is not, in and of itself, proof that the parents violated a duty to control their child to prevent him from harming others,” the opinion stated, quoting prior case law. Since Genoa was generally a good student with no disciplinary history, Cross was not required to monitor her 24 hours a day.
Because the specific circumstances of the fatal trip—skipping school, traveling across state lines without permission, and driving dangerously—were not foreseeable based on Genoa’s prior conduct known to Cross, the Negligent Supervision claim also failed as a matter of law.
The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s decision, finding that summary judgment was properly granted across all claims against Jeffrey Cross.