The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has handed a significant win to the federal government in an immigration case, ruling that a district court overstepped its authority by reviewing the denial of an asylum seeker’s application to become a lawful permanent resident. The appellate court found that Congress intentionally barred judicial review over the Secretary of Homeland Security’s discretionary decisions regarding status adjustment, even those involving eligibility criteria.
The case centers on Abrahim Fofana, a native of Liberia who was granted asylum in 2001 after admitting to raising funds for the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) while studying abroad. Fofana later sought to adjust his status to become a lawful permanent resident under Section 1159(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The Long Road to Adjustment Denial
Fofana’s path to residency hit a major roadblock in 2018 when U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied his application. The agency determined he was inadmissible because soliciting money for ULIMO qualified as providing material support to a terrorist organization, specifically citing provisions related to Tier III terrorist groups.
Fofana sued the Secretary of Homeland Security and other USCIS officials in Minnesota federal district court. While his earlier appeals dealt with issues like collateral estoppel, the core of the dispute on remand involved whether the USCIS decision was “arbitrary and capricious.”
The district court sided with Fofana, concluding the agency’s decision was flawed on several grounds. It questioned the agency’s finding that ULIMO was a terrorist organization, arguing the agency failed to address whether the organization’s violent activities were authorized by its leadership. Furthermore, the lower court found the record didn’t support the idea that Fofana knew or should have known ULIMO was engaged in terrorism. The district court ordered the case sent back to USCIS for reconsideration.
The Jurisdictional Hurdle
The government immediately appealed, arguing the district court never had the jurisdiction to scrutinize the underlying eligibility determination in the first place.
Writing for the Eighth Circuit panel, Chief Judge Colloton focused squarely on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), the statute Congress put in place to limit judicial review of discretionary immigration relief.
This statute has two key clauses barring review. Clause (i) prevents courts from reviewing judgments regarding relief under specific sections, including § 1255 (adjustment of status). Clause (ii) acts as a catchall, barring review of “any other decision or action… the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.”
Fofana argued that the adjustment process under § 1159(b) involves two steps: first, a non-discretionary check to see if eligibility criteria are met, and second, the Secretary’s final discretionary decision to grant status. He contended the court could review the first, non-discretionary step, but not the second.
Supreme Court Precedent Shapes the Outcome
The Eighth Circuit rejected this two-step argument, leaning heavily on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in *Patel v. Garland*.
In *Patel*, the Supreme Court interpreted the language in Clause (i)—”any judgment regarding the granting of relief”—to be extremely broad. The Court held that “any judgment” covers *all* determinations necessary to decide eligibility, not just the final, discretionary grant or denial.
Although *Patel* dealt with Clause (i), the Eighth Circuit found the logic extended directly to Clause (ii). Clause (ii) uses the phrase “any other decision or action.” The court reasoned that since “any judgment” in Clause (i) means “judgments of whatever kind,” then “any other decision” in Clause (ii) must mean decisions “of whatever kind”—not just discretionary ones.
Because the statute governing Fofana’s adjustment of status explicitly states the authority to adjust status “is in the Secretary’s discretion,” the entire decision—including the factual and legal findings about inadmissibility—falls under the jurisdictional bar of Clause (ii).
The court explicitly distinguished prior Eighth Circuit precedent, like *Bremer v. Johnson*, which had allowed review of certain “non-discretionary legal determinations” underlying discretionary actions. The panel stated that *Patel* required a clarification: when the underlying authority is defined by statute as discretionary, the entire decision is insulated from judicial review.
By concluding the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s findings on inadmissibility, the Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court’s judgment and ordered the case dismissed. This ruling confirms the limited scope of judicial review over the Secretary’s discretionary power in granting lawful permanent residence to those previously granted asylum.