The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack the statutory authority to order defendants to pay costs associated with criminal charges that are ultimately dismissed as part of a plea agreement, even if the defendant explicitly agrees to this condition. In a significant ruling that impacts criminal plea bargaining across the state, the Court vacated the dispositional orders against Ronald Richard Pagliai, finding that such an arrangement amounts to an unauthorized imposition of penalties.
The case centered on Ronald Pagliai, who faced multiple charges related to shoplifting and resisting arrest. As part of a negotiated resolution, Pagliai pleaded guilty to two counts of theft in the third degree, while the State agreed to dismiss the remaining two charges. Crucially, the plea agreement stipulated that Pagliai would pay the associated court costs for those dismissed cases.
The District Court followed the plea agreement, sentencing Pagliai on the guilty pleas and ordering him to pay costs—totaling nearly $500 for indigent defense recoupment and filing fees—in the dismissed cases. Pagliai challenged the cost assessment on the dismissed counts, leading the Iowa Supreme Court to grant discretionary review.
Statute is the Sole Authority for Costs
Writing for the majority, Justice McDonald firmly established the foundational principle: matters of crime and punishment in Iowa are “creatures of statute.” The judiciary’s role is to administer the law as commanded by the legislature, not to invent new penalties or financial obligations.
The Court noted that the judicial department cannot assess costs in a criminal case without explicit statutory authorization. This authority, or lack thereof, is governed by Iowa Code chapters 815 (indigent defense fees) and 910 (restitution).
The majority confirmed the State’s concession that no current statute authorizes courts to assess costs against a defendant in a dismissed criminal case. Current provisions under Chapter 815 allow cost assessment only upon conviction or acquittal (with ability-to-pay considerations). Chapter 910 allows for restitution, which includes court costs, but only when a judgment of conviction is rendered. Since a dismissal is neither a conviction nor an acquittal, the statutory basis for imposing these costs vanishes.
The Court also clarified the distinction between jurisdiction (the power to hear the case) and authority (the power to act within the case). While the District Court certainly had jurisdiction over the initial criminal matters, it lacked the *authority* to order costs in the dismissed portion of the deal.
Plea Bargains Cannot Override Statutory Limits
A critical aspect of the ruling involved whether Pagliai’s agreement to pay the costs—the “contract”—could cure the court’s lack of statutory authority. The Iowa Supreme Court definitively said no, relying on decades of precedent, most notably *State v. Howell*.
The Court reaffirmed that when a disposition (sentence or sanction) is not authorized by statute, it is considered “illegal” and is void. This illegality cannot be saved by party agreement, waiver, or estoppel. Allowing parties to bargain for unauthorized dispositions, the Court warned, impermissibly allows them to “make their own law,” effectively vetoing legislative action—in this instance, the legislature’s 2012 repeal of a previous statute that *did* allow cost assessment upon dismissal.
While the Court acknowledged precedents like *State v. Petrie* and *State v. McMurry*, which allowed cost apportionment on dismissed counts in multi-count *convictions*, the majority distinguished those cases. In *Petrie* and *McMurry*, a conviction occurred, providing the statutory hook for assessing costs related to the entire information; Pagliai’s situation involved pure dismissals in companion cases resolved via a global plea.
Remedy: State’s Choice on Remand
Because the central element of the plea bargain—the payment of costs on dismissed charges—was unlawful, the Court had to determine the appropriate remedy. The majority rejected simply vacating the cost order while enforcing the rest of the deal, fearing this would incentivize defendants to use appeals to secure better bargains than they struck below.
Instead, the Court adopted a remedy used in similar plea-bargain invalidation cases: giving the prosecutor a choice upon remand. The State must elect one of two options:
1. Vacate only the dispositional orders assessing fees and costs against Pagliai, thereby upholding the rest of the plea bargain (convictions and dismissals).
2. Vacate the entire plea bargain, the resulting convictions, the sentences, and the dispositional orders. If the State chooses this path, it may reinstate the previously dismissed charges.
Justice McDermott concurred in the judgment but argued the issue was fundamentally constitutional, not just statutory. He contended that imposing financial penalties on legally innocent individuals (those with dismissed charges) violates the Due Process Clause’s protection of the presumption of innocence, likening the practice to an unconstitutional punishment.
In dissent, Justice Waterman argued that Pagliai knowingly and voluntarily waived any objection to the costs as part of the bargain. He pointed out that this practice was common and supported by prior, albeit distinguishable, precedent (*Petrie* and *McMurry*). Justice Waterman stressed that allowing the defendant to walk away from the cost portion of the deal rewrites the bargain to his advantage, creating a “better deal on appeal.”
The majority’s decision vacates Pagliai’s convictions, sentences, and the challenged dispositional orders, sending the four cases back to the District Court for the State to make its election.