Constitutional Law - Criminal Law

Court Rules Kentucky Manslaughter Conviction Doesn’t Qualify as “Crime of Violence,” Vacates Sentence

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of *United States v. Tooley* that a prior Kentucky conviction for second-degree manslaughter does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. This decision has led the court to vacate Davon S. Tooley’s sentence for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon and remand the case for resentencing.

The Core Issue: Crime of Violence and Sentencing Enhancements

The central question in this appeal was whether Tooley’s previous manslaughter conviction could be used to enhance his sentence for the firearm possession charge. Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon faces a higher base offense level if they have a prior conviction for a “crime of violence.” This enhancement significantly impacts the length of the prison sentence.

The Categorical Approach: Looking at the Statute, Not the Facts

The court followed the “categorical approach” to determine if Tooley’s prior conviction was a “crime of violence.” This approach means the court examines the *statutory definition* of the offense – in this case, Kentucky’s second-degree manslaughter law – and not the specific facts of Tooley’s prior case. The court needed to decide if the *elements* of Kentucky’s second-degree manslaughter met the definition of a “crime of violence” under federal law.

Defining “Crime of Violence”: The Role of “Use of Physical Force”

The Sentencing Guidelines define “crime of violence” in several ways. The relevant definition here is an offense under state or federal law that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” The Supreme Court case *Borden v. United States* plays a critical role in understanding this definition.

The *Borden* Decision and Mens Rea: Purposeful, Knowing, Reckless

In *Borden*, the Supreme Court clarified that the “use of physical force” element of a “crime of violence” requires a certain level of *mens rea*, or mental state. The Court held that the definition covers purposeful and knowing acts but excludes reckless conduct.

* Purposeful: The person consciously desires a particular result.
* Knowing: The person is aware that a result is practically certain to follow from their conduct.
* Reckless: The person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk.

Kentucky’s Manslaughter Law: The “Wanton” Element

Kentucky’s second-degree manslaughter statute states that a person is guilty when they “wantonly” cause the death of another person. The court needed to determine if “wantonly” in Kentucky law was equivalent to the “reckless” standard defined in *Borden*.

“Wantonly” vs. “Recklessly”: The Court’s Analysis

The court meticulously compared the definition of “wantonly” under Kentucky law with the definition of “recklessly” as described in *Borden* and the Model Penal Code. Kentucky law defines “wantonly” as being aware of and consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk. The court found that this definition is functionally identical to the *Borden* definition of “recklessly.”

The Key Finding: Wantonness = Recklessness = Not a “Crime of Violence”

Because the court determined that wantonness under Kentucky law is equivalent to recklessness, it concluded that Tooley’s second-degree manslaughter conviction did not qualify as a “crime of violence.” The court cited the Supreme Court’s ruling that a person who acts recklessly has not used force “against” another person in the way the clause requires. Therefore, the district court erred in using Tooley’s prior conviction to enhance his sentence.

The Plain Error Standard: Why the Court Reversed the Sentence

Tooley did not object to the sentencing calculation in the district court. Therefore, the appellate court reviewed the case for “plain error.” To establish plain error, a defendant must show that:

1. An error occurred.
2. The error was obvious or clear.
3. The error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.
4. The error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.

The court found that all four prongs of the plain error test were met. The error was clear because the court’s conclusion directly followed binding Supreme Court precedent (*Borden*). The error affected Tooley’s substantial rights because it subjected him to a longer sentence. Finally, by misapplying settled law, the error affected the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings.

The Government’s Arguments and the Court’s Rejection

The government argued that the Kentucky definition of “wantonly” was closer to “knowingly” than “recklessly.” The court rejected this argument, stating that the requirement of “awareness” in the Kentucky statute was about the risk, not the result. The court found that this definition still aligned with the concept of recklessness, not knowledge.

The Outcome: Sentence Vacated and Case Remanded

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Tooley’s sentence and remanded the case back to the district court for resentencing. The district court will now have to recalculate Tooley’s sentence without the enhancement based on his second-degree manslaughter conviction. This decision could potentially result in a shorter prison term for Tooley.

Case Information

Case Name:
United States of America v. Davon S. Tooley

Court:
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Judge:
Helene N. White, Circuit Judge