The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is wrestling with the fallout from a previous ruling that declared a state law unconstitutional due to overbreadth. The case, *Ex parte Eric Todd Williams*, centers on whether a conviction under that now-defunct law should stand. The court, in a concurring and dissenting opinion by Judge Parker, with Judge Finley joining, delves into the complexities of overbreadth, its implications for the First Amendment, and the precedent set by previous court decisions.
The Heart of the Matter: Overbreadth and the First Amendment
At the core of the issue is a prior ruling, *Ex parte Lo*, which found the statute under which Williams was convicted to be “facially unconstitutional” because it was overbroad. Overbreadth, in legal terms, means that a law restricts more speech than is constitutionally permissible, potentially infringing on First Amendment rights. The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, and overbroad laws can chill protected speech by making people hesitant to express themselves for fear of violating the law.
The court has long held that a statute deemed facially unconstitutional is “void from its inception…as if it had never been.” This means the law is treated as if it never existed, and any convictions based on it are invalid. This principle creates a significant hurdle for the court: if the statute is void, how can a conviction based on that statute be upheld?
Judge Parker’s Concurrence and Dissent: A Clash of Legal Principles
Judge Parker, while ultimately concurring in the decision to grant relief to Williams, expresses reservations about the *Lo* ruling. He believes *Lo* was wrongly decided and argues that the court should reconsider it. He points to the *State v. Johnson* case, which he believes further undermines *Lo*’s holding. *Johnson* emphasized the need for a “realistic” and not “fanciful” basis for finding a statute unconstitutional, requiring a “lopsided ratio” of unconstitutional to constitutional applications. Judge Parker argues that *Lo* failed to conduct this type of analysis, focusing on hypothetical scenarios rather than actual examples of problematic prosecutions.
However, Judge Parker acknowledges that, under existing precedent, the *Lo* ruling remains binding. Because the statute was declared void, Williams’ conviction cannot stand. Denying relief in this situation, he argues, would contradict established legal principles and undermine the court’s credibility.
Deeper Dive into Overbreadth Doctrine
The opinion underscores the importance of the overbreadth doctrine as a key aspect of First Amendment law. It highlights that a state court cannot simply disregard this doctrine, as it is designed to protect the “marketplace of ideas.” The judge argues that a state should not have more power to restrict speech than the federal government.
The opinion also addresses the concept of “void ab initio,” which means “void from the beginning.” Once a statute is found facially unconstitutional, it is treated as if it never existed. Judge Parker cites Justice Scalia’s strong stance on this, arguing that there is no such thing as a “voidable law.” This principle reinforces the idea that the court must ignore the unconstitutional law and disregard any conviction based on it.
The Path Forward: Granting Relief and the Limits of Judicial Power
The court’s decision to grant relief to Williams is a direct consequence of the existing legal framework. The court recognizes that, under current precedent, it has no choice but to invalidate the conviction. Judge Parker emphasizes that the only way to deny relief would be to overrule the *Lo* decision or adopt alternative legal theories, neither of which has the support of a majority of the court.
The opinion makes it clear that the court’s role is to apply the law as it stands, even if individual judges disagree with the underlying principles. Judge Parker’s dissent from the refusal to reconsider *Lo* reflects his desire to change the legal landscape. However, he ultimately concurs in the decision to grant relief, recognizing the binding effect of existing precedent.