A recent ruling by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has overturned the 180-month sentence of Jerome Miller, Jr., who was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court found that the lower court incorrectly applied an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because Miller’s prior Florida convictions for delivering cocaine did not qualify as “serious drug offenses” under federal law.
The case revolves around a critical legal concept: how to determine if a state conviction meets the criteria for a federal sentencing enhancement. The ACCA increases the penalties for felons who unlawfully possess firearms if they have three or more prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. The court’s decision hinged on the specific definitions of “cocaine” under both Florida and federal law, and when those definitions are compared.
The Incident and the Charges
In February 2022, Miller, along with two other individuals, entered a victim’s home, brandished a firearm, and demanded money and the victim’s truck. They took the victim’s keys, forced him to sign over the title to the truck, and drove away in the vehicle. Law enforcement officers later apprehended Miller while he was driving the stolen truck. Upon searching Miller and the truck, officers discovered ammunition on his person and a firearm in the center console.
Based on the evidence, a grand jury charged Miller with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The statutory maximum sentence for this offense at the time was ten years’ imprisonment. However, the government argued that Miller faced an enhanced penalty range of 15 years to life under the ACCA because of his prior cocaine delivery convictions in Florida. Miller pleaded guilty but contested the application of the ACCA enhancement.
The Core of the Dispute: The Definition of Cocaine
The heart of the legal issue was whether Miller’s three Florida convictions for delivering cocaine qualified as “serious drug offenses” under the ACCA. The ACCA defines a serious drug offense as an offense under state law involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance, as defined in the federal Controlled Substances Act, for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed.
The court uses a “categorical approach” to determine if a state conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense. This means the court looks only at the elements of the state offense, not the specific facts of the case. The court compares the state law to the federal definition of a controlled substance to see if the state law is broader than the federal definition. If the state law punishes more conduct than the federal definition, it cannot be used as a predicate offense for the ACCA.
Miller argued that his Florida convictions should not be considered serious drug offenses because Florida’s definition of cocaine included ioflupane, which the federal definition excluded at the time he committed the offenses. Ioflupane is the active ingredient in a drug used to diagnose Parkinson’s disease.
The Timeline and the Changing Laws
The court’s decision hinged on the timing of key events and how the definitions of cocaine evolved. Miller committed the Florida cocaine delivery offenses in February and March 2017. At that time, Florida law defined cocaine more broadly than federal law, including ioflupane.
However, by the time Miller was convicted in August 2017, Florida had changed its law to exclude ioflupane from its definition of cocaine, aligning it with the federal definition. The district court had sided with the government, concluding that because the definitions of cocaine matched at the time of Miller’s convictions, the ACCA enhancement was proper.
The Court’s Reasoning: Looking to the Date of the Offense
The Eleventh Circuit, however, disagreed. The appellate court examined Supreme Court precedents to determine which version of the law should be applied: the one in effect when the crime was committed, or the one in effect when the defendant was convicted.
The court cited *McNeill v. United States*, a Supreme Court case, which established that when applying the categorical approach, the court should look to the state law in effect at the time of the defendant’s conviction for the state offense. However, the Court also cited *Brown v. United States*, which said that sentencing courts should consult the federal drug schedules in effect when the state drug offense was committed.
The Eleventh Circuit determined that these two cases could be read together. The court found that because Florida had a saving provision in its constitution that amendments to its criminal laws did not apply to pending cases, the court must look to the version of Florida law in effect at the time Miller committed the offenses. Under that version of Florida law, ioflupane was included in the definition of cocaine, creating a mismatch with the federal definition.
Because Florida’s definition of cocaine was broader than the federal definition at the time Miller committed the offenses, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Miller’s Florida convictions did not qualify as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. The court vacated Miller’s sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing without the ACCA enhancement.
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision underscores the importance of carefully examining the specific elements of state and federal laws, as well as the timing of legal changes, when determining whether a prior conviction can be used to enhance a federal sentence. The court’s ruling will spare Miller the enhanced sentence and will send the case back to the district court for resentencing.