The California Supreme Court has ruled that a state law making it a crime to file a knowingly false complaint against a peace officer violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. The court’s decision, issued on November 10, 2025, strikes down a key part of California Penal Code section 148.6, which requires individuals filing complaints against law enforcement to sign an advisory acknowledging that they can be criminally prosecuted if their claims are disbelieved.
The case, *Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles*, centered on a challenge to section 148.6(a) by the Los Angeles Police Protective League (LAPPL). The LAPPL sought to compel the City of Los Angeles to enforce the advisory requirement of the law. However, the City argued that the provision was an unconstitutional restriction on speech.
Background of the Law
California law (Penal Code section 832.5) mandates that law enforcement agencies investigate complaints against peace officers. Section 148.6(a) was enacted to address what the Legislature viewed as a growing problem of false complaints filed against officers, which they believed were intended to punish officers for simply doing their jobs. The law aimed to protect officers from the reputational and professional harms that could result from false accusations.
The specific provisions at issue are:
* Section 148.6(a)(1): Makes it a misdemeanor to file a knowingly false allegation of misconduct against a peace officer.
* Section 148.6(a)(2): Requires law enforcement agencies to have a procedure to investigate civilian complaints. It also mandates that before accepting a complaint, the complainant must read and sign an advisory. The advisory informs the complainant that it is a crime to file a knowingly false complaint.
In essence, the law sought to deter false complaints by threatening complainants with criminal prosecution.
The Supreme Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Groban, concluded that section 148.6(a) violates the First Amendment because it places an undue burden on protected speech. The court’s analysis focused on whether the law, even though it targeted knowingly false statements (a category of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment), created a consequential risk of deterring citizens from filing truthful or well-intentioned complaints of police misconduct.
The court found that several characteristics of the law, when considered together, created this risk:
* The law singles out for criminal treatment allegations of misconduct against law enforcement, a category of government officials whose actions are of particular concern to the public.
* The law criminalizes knowingly false allegations against law enforcement, while not criminalizing knowingly false statements made in support of law enforcement during an investigation.
* The law bars law enforcement from accepting a complaint unless the complainant agrees to sign an advisory warning that they can be criminally prosecuted if their claims are disbelieved.
* The law provides complainants with ill-defined and inconsistent descriptions of what specific types of false statements might trigger criminal liability.
* The law does not require that the statements actually be material to an actionable type of misconduct or that they cause any harm to the falsely accused.
The court determined that these elements, taken together, “threaten censorship of ideas” by discouraging citizens from filing truthful (or at least not knowingly false) complaints of police misconduct.
The court applied intermediate scrutiny, which requires that a law be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” The court acknowledged the government’s significant interest in deterring false complaints, but found that section 148.6(a) was not narrowly tailored to meet that objective. The court concluded that the statute, with its ill-defined criminal provision and the unusual admonition requirement, “burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Liu filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the law should be upheld. The dissent contended that section 148.6 is no more unconstitutional than laws against perjury or filing false police reports. Justice Liu argued that the law protects the integrity of government processes and that the majority’s concerns about a chilling effect on speech were speculative. The dissent also emphasized that the advisory specifically states that a person has the right to make a complaint and have it investigated even if there is not enough evidence to warrant action. The dissent argued that since the law targets knowingly false statements made in the context of filing a complaint, it is a valid regulation.
Impact of the Ruling
The Supreme Court’s decision has significant implications for the City of Los Angeles and potentially for other jurisdictions in California. The court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment, which had ordered the city to enforce the advisory requirement of section 148.6(a)(2). The city had stopped requiring the advisory after federal courts found the criminal provision of the law unconstitutional. The ruling affirms that the city can continue to not require the advisory.
The ruling also casts doubt on the validity of the law in other jurisdictions. The court’s decision is likely to be cited by those challenging similar laws in other states.
The court’s decision highlights the tension between protecting law enforcement from false accusations and safeguarding the First Amendment rights of citizens to speak freely, even when criticizing government officials. It also underscores the importance of narrowly tailoring laws to achieve their objectives without unduly burdening protected speech.