The Alabama Supreme Court has upheld a lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Premier Medical Group, Inc., effectively ending a medical malpractice suit against the group based on the dismissal of the direct claims against the operating physician, Dr. Kent L. Burton. The central issue revolved around the legal doctrine of *respondeat superior* (vicarious liability) and whether dismissing the agent (the doctor) with prejudice due to the expiration of the statute of limitations also extinguishes the claim against the principal (the medical group).
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, adhering to the general Alabama rule that a dismissal with prejudice against an agent acts as an adjudication on the merits, thereby shielding the principal from vicarious liability—unless the plaintiff explicitly reserved the right to sue the principal via a written or on-the-record agreement.
The Underlying Incident and Lawsuit
The case stems from a medical procedure performed on Leonard L. Hixon on December 5, 2022, at Springhill Medical Center. Hixon alleged complications, including facial paralysis, following the surgery performed by Dr. Burton and others.
Hixon initiated the lawsuit in December 2024, naming Premier Medical Group, Inc. (“Premier”) and others under the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA). Although Dr. Burton was mentioned in the caption, he was not properly listed as a party, and Hixon failed to serve him with the initial complaint.
In January 2025, Hixon amended the complaint to formally include Dr. Burton and served him. Dr. Burton promptly moved to dismiss the claims against him, arguing they were time-barred under the AMLA’s two-year statute of limitations, which began running from the December 2022 procedure.
The Dismissal of the Agent
Crucially, Hixon’s counsel informed Dr. Burton’s counsel that they did not oppose the dismissal. Hixon subsequently filed a response stating, “no opposition” to the motion and asked the court to dismiss Dr. Burton.
On February 12, 2025, the trial court granted the motion, dismissing the claims against Dr. Burton with prejudice, citing the AMLA statute of limitations and Hixon’s lack of opposition. However, the order explicitly stated that the “Case remains ACTIVE as to all other defendants,” including Premier.
The Principal Seeks Judgment
Following the dismissal of Dr. Burton, Premier moved for summary judgment. Premier argued that since its liability to Hixon was purely vicarious, stemming only from Dr. Burton’s alleged actions (*respondeat superior*), the dismissal of the agent with prejudice meant there could be no underlying fault to hold the principal liable for.
Hixon fought this motion, pointing to the trial court’s language that the case remained “ACTIVE” against Premier. Hixon argued this showed the court intended to sever the claims against Premier for separate resolution. Hixon also filed a Rule 60 motion, asking the court to clarify that the dismissal of Dr. Burton was *without* prejudice, characterizing the “with prejudice” designation as a clerical error that unfairly prejudiced his case against Premier.
The Trial Court’s Clarification
During the hearing on the Rule 60 motion, the trial judge clarified the meaning of the “Case remains ACTIVE” language. The judge explained that this standard boilerplate language was added to prevent administrative clerks from mistakenly dismissing the entire lawsuit when only one defendant was dismissed *pro tanto* (partially). The judge confirmed this was an administrative measure, not a substantive ruling that Hixon had successfully reserved claims against Premier.
The trial court ultimately denied Hixon’s request to change the dismissal to “without prejudice,” noting that the statute of limitations *had* run as to Dr. Burton, meaning the dismissal *was* with prejudice and could not be brought again.
When Premier’s summary judgment motion was heard, the trial court found no evidence—no written agreement, no on-the-record stipulation—that Hixon and Dr. Burton had expressly agreed to reserve the vicarious liability claim against Premier when Dr. Burton was dismissed. Because the general rule in Alabama dictates that a judgment on the merits (even one based on the statute of limitations) against an agent defeats a vicarious liability claim against the principal, the trial court granted summary judgment for Premier.
The Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the decision *de novo*. Justice Cook, writing for the majority, relied on established Alabama precedent: a dismissal with prejudice against an agent generally exonerates the principal unless the parties entered a *pro tanto* agreement that expressly reserved the claimant’s right to pursue the principal.
The Court noted that such a reservation must be clearly evidenced, typically in writing or on the court record, citing statutes requiring attorney agreements to be in writing or entered into the court minutes. The Court found that Hixon’s counsel simply stating “no opposition” to Dr. Burton’s motion did not meet this standard for expressly reserving the claim against Premier.
The Court dismissed Hixon’s reliance on the trial court’s “ACTIVE” language and statements made during the Rule 60 hearing. These statements, the Supreme Court found, merely confirmed the procedural status of the remaining parties but did not constitute the necessary express agreement required to sever the vicarious liability claim from the agent’s dismissal.
Because the dismissal of Dr. Burton based on the statute of limitations was treated as an adjudication on the merits that exonerated him, and because no express reservation existed, the Supreme Court affirmed that Premier could not be held vicariously liable.
Dissenting Views Highlight National Divide
While the majority affirmed the ruling based strictly on Alabama procedural requirements for reserving claims, the concurring opinions highlighted a complex legal debate occurring across the country.
Justice Shaw concurred in the result but argued that the premise—that a dismissal based on a non-merits defense like the statute of limitations should automatically bar a timely vicarious claim against the principal—should be re-examined. He distinguished the current situation from prior Alabama cases where the agent was found *not negligent* by a jury or where claims were voluntarily abandoned.
Justice Cook, writing specially, expanded on this theme, noting that many other states (including Mississippi, Virginia, and Delaware) allow the suit against the principal to proceed when the agent is dismissed solely on a procedural ground like the statute of limitations, arguing that such a dismissal does not truly adjudicate the “wrongfulness of the agent’s conduct.” Justice Cook encouraged future litigants to fully brief this distinction, suggesting the Legislature might need to clarify Alabama’s default rule in this area.
Despite these concerns raised in the special writings, the Supreme Court ultimately held that under existing Alabama law, Hixon failed to preserve his claim against Premier by not securing an express reservation when Dr. Burton was dismissed.