The Connecticut Supreme Court has issued a significant ruling concerning the procedural pathways for attorneys challenging disciplinary findings, ultimately deciding that while the rules generally require challenges to be made via timely appeal, procedural ambiguity in this specific case warranted an exception. The Court reversed a lower court decision, remanding the case to allow a suspended attorney to argue his due process claim, which had previously been barred due to a missed appeal deadline.
The case centers on Enrico Vaccaro, an attorney facing disciplinary action. The heart of the dispute wasn’t the misconduct itself—which the Grievance Committee had already found—but whether Mr. Vaccaro could challenge the process, specifically alleging that nearly three years of delays in hearing his grievance complaint violated his constitutional right to due process.
The Procedural Snag: Appeal vs. Presentment
Under Connecticut’s rules of practice, attorney disciplinary matters follow specific paths. If an attorney has been disciplined three or more times within five years leading up to a new grievance complaint, the Statewide Grievance Committee *must* direct the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel to file a “presentment” in Superior Court, as mandated by Practice Book § 2-47 (d) (1).
Crucially, when this mandatory presentment occurs, the Superior Court’s role is strictly limited. It is *not* a full rehearing (de novo). Instead, the court’s “sole issue” is determining the appropriate disciplinary *action* based on the misconduct already found by the committee and the attorney’s prior record.
Mr. Vaccaro’s grievance complaint, filed in 2018, eventually led to a finding of misconduct by a reviewing committee. Due to his prior reprimands, the committee was compelled by § 2-47 (d) (1) to send the case to Superior Court for sentencing, even though the committee felt a simple reprimand would have sufficed otherwise.
Before the Superior Court hearing, Mr. Vaccaro sought to dismiss the complaint based on the extensive delays, arguing a due process violation. The trial court refused to hear the due process claim, sticking strictly to the § 2-47 (d) (1) mandate to focus only on discipline. The Appellate Court upheld this, concluding that Mr. Vaccaro forfeited his right to raise the due process challenge because he failed to file a formal appeal under Practice Book § 2-38 after the Statewide Grievance Committee affirmed the finding.
The Supreme Court Weighs In: Clarity Over Forfeiture
The Supreme Court’s primary task was interpreting the interplay between § 2-38 (governing appeals from sanctions) and § 2-47 (d) (governing mandatory presentments).
The Court agreed with the Appellate Court’s *textual* analysis: when a presentment is ordered under § 2-47 (d) (1), any challenge to the underlying finding of misconduct (or procedural rulings like the denial of a motion to dismiss) *must* typically be raised through a § 2-38 appeal *before* the presentment hearing. If that appeal window closes, the findings become final, and the presentment court is confined to sentencing.
However, the Court acknowledged a critical failing: the rules are confusing.
“The language and organization of §§ 2-38 and 2-47 created a lack of clarity regarding the proper procedure for challenging findings of misconduct and for obtaining appellate review of constitutional claims in cases in which presentment to the Superior Court is directed pursuant to § 2-47 (d) (1),” the opinion stated.
Because the rules were ambiguous regarding when and how an attorney must appeal a misconduct finding when a presentment is ordered, the Court found that Mr. Vaccaro might have reasonably believed he did not need to appeal immediately. Given that an attorney’s license is a “vested property interest” protected by due process, the Court prioritized fundamental fairness over strict procedural enforcement.
“We cannot rule out the possibility that the lack of clarity in the rules of practice may have led the respondent to believe that he did not need to appeal,” the Court noted, leading to the decision to remand.
Remand for Due Process Hearing
The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed. The Supreme Court directed the lower courts to remand the case to the trial court, instructing it to allow Mr. Vaccaro to litigate the merits of his due process claim “as though he had filed a timely appeal” under the relevant rules.
The Court emphasized that this is a narrow, case-specific remedy due to the procedural uncertainty in the rules. Going forward, attorneys facing a § 2-47 (d) (1) presentment must appeal any challenge to the misconduct finding before the presentment hearing, or they will forfeit that right.
The Court concluded by strongly encouraging the Rules Committee of the Superior Court to revise the language in Practice Book §§ 2-38 and 2-47 to eliminate this ambiguity for future cases.
The Court also swiftly dismissed Mr. Vaccaro’s secondary argument that the trial court’s inherent authority overrides the procedural sequence of the rules. While the Superior Court retains inherent authority over attorney discipline, that authority must be exercised according to the established procedures outlined in the Practice Book.
Case Information