The City of New Haven’s attempt to dismiss a personal injury lawsuit stemming from a fall in a city tunnel has succeeded on appeal, as the Connecticut Appellate Court ruled that the injured plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence proving the city actually received her mandatory notice of claim.
The case centered on Valerie Vance’s claim against the city under Connecticut’s municipal highway defect statute (§ 13a-149). Vance was injured in September 2018 when she fell through a defective drainage gate in the Pitkin Street Tunnel, a public roadway maintained by the city. To sue the city under this statute, Vance was required to provide written notice of her injury, including details of the incident, to the city clerk or a selectman within 90 days of the fall—meaning by December 23, 2018.
The central issue on appeal was whether the trial court was correct in denying the City of New Haven’s motion to dismiss the highway defect claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a condition that arises when statutory notice requirements are not met. The city argued two main points: first, that the trial court wrongly assumed the city had admitted receiving timely notice based on its initial answer to the complaint; and second, that the evidence presented at trial did not actually support a finding that the notice was received.
Trial Court Relied on Flawed Admission Argument
The initial dispute arose from the city’s response to the plaintiff’s allegation in the complaint that notice had been given under § 13a-149. While the plaintiff stated in a different count of her complaint (regarding indemnification) that notice was given on a specific date, the highway defect count simply alleged that notice *was given*.
The City of New Haven answered this allegation by stating, “Denied as to the sufficiency of notice.” The trial court interpreted this response as a judicial admission that the city had, in fact, received the notice, focusing on the fact that the city did not explicitly deny receipt.
However, the Appellate Court disagreed. The appeals court explained that a judicial admission must be a “voluntary and knowing concession of fact” that is “clear, deliberate and unequivocal.” The court found that the phrase “sufficiency of notice” was appropriate because, under § 13a-149, the notice must be timely (within 90 days) and contain all essential elements to be legally sufficient. Since the plaintiff failed to specify *when* she sent the notice in the highway defect count, the city could not know if it met the 90-day deadline. Therefore, denying the allegation based on its *sufficiency* was a legitimate legal defense, not an admission of receipt.
Failure to Prove Actual Receipt
The second, and ultimately decisive, part of the city’s appeal concerned the evidence of notice itself. Under Connecticut law governing highway defect claims, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving two things: that the notice was delivered, and that the municipality actually received it within the 90-day window. This is a condition precedent to the court having jurisdiction over the case.
During the trial, the plaintiff called Mamie Rose Gardner, a deputy clerk for the city, who was responsible for receiving legal notices. Gardner testified that she had searched the clerk’s office records for December 2018 and found no record of the plaintiff’s notice of claim letter (dated December 4, 2018). While Gardner could not definitively say the letter was *never* received by the office—noting that mail might arrive unsealed—she repeatedly stated the office had “no record of receiving this.”
The Appellate Court reviewed the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff complied with the notice requirement under the “clearly erroneous” standard. The court noted that the plaintiff offered no documentary proof (like certified mail receipts) for this specific claim, unlike another claim she filed, which was sent via certified mail with a return receipt requested.
Crucially, the court emphasized that the burden was on Vance to prove delivery and receipt. The trial court appeared to try to infer receipt based on the late timing of the city’s motion to dismiss (filed just before trial, five years after the injury) and the possibility that one of the four clerks on staff might have misplaced the mail.
The Appellate Court dismissed these points. First, jurisdictional challenges like lack of proper notice can be raised at any time, even on appeal, so the timing of the motion was irrelevant. Second, the court found that any inference that the letter was received and then misplaced was based on “possibilities, surmise, or conjecture,” not reasonable probability. Since the city’s only witness, Gardner, testified there was no record of receipt, the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof.
The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court’s finding that the city actually received the notice was clearly erroneous because the record contained no evidence to support it. Consequently, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the highway defect claim.
The judgment in favor of Ms. Vance on the defective highway claim was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to grant the City of New Haven’s motion to dismiss that specific count.