The Second Appellate District of Ohio has affirmed a trial court’s judgment concerning a contentious post-divorce dispute over parenting time, concluding that the mother, Ju Mao, failed to show a due process violation or an abuse of discretion by the lower court. The core of the appeal involved Mao’s efforts to obtain compensatory parenting time after her ex-husband, Forest Bright, allegedly denied her scheduled mid-week visits following their divorce finalization.
The appellate court found Mao’s arguments unpersuasive across four main assignments of error, ultimately upholding the trial court’s ruling that no “make-up” time was necessary, even after clarifying that Mao was indeed entitled to parenting time every Wednesday during the school year.
Background of the Dispute
The legal battle stems from the divorce between Forest M. Bright and Ju Mao, finalized by a decree on June 30, 2025. Bright was awarded legal custody, and Mao was granted specific parenting time rights.
Shortly after the divorce was finalized, Mao filed motions seeking “make-up” parenting time. She claimed Bright had improperly denied her mid-week parenting time every Wednesday during the school year for over three years—time that had accrued prior to the final divorce decree—and had also denied her a recent Wednesday visit after the decree was issued.
The trial court addressed Mao’s first motion on September 9, 2025. The judge reviewed the existing separation agreement, interim orders, and the final divorce decree to settle a dispute over whether Mao was entitled to parenting time every Wednesday or only every other Wednesday. The trial court clarified that Mao was, in fact, entitled to parenting time every Wednesday during the school year.
However, despite agreeing with Mao’s interpretation of the schedule, the court denied her request for compensatory time, stating there was “no means nor necessity for any ‘make-up’ parenting time.” Mao subsequently moved to vacate this entry, which the trial court also denied, leading to this appeal.
Clerk’s Handling and Due Process Claims
Mao’s first assignment of error focused heavily on procedural issues, alleging a due process violation based on the clerk of court’s handling of two similar motions she filed in late August 2025. She argued the clerk delayed docketing her operative motion for 11 days, instead filing an earlier “draft” version, causing her to miss the ruling on her first motion.
The appellate court quickly dismissed this claim. Judges Tucker, Huffman, and Hanseman noted that the Civil Rules Mao cited (Civ.R. 3(E) and a non-existent Civ.R. 5(D)(3)) did not apply to the situation. Furthermore, the court pointed out that both motions were substantially similar, seeking the same relief based on the same underlying disagreement (Wednesday vs. every-other-Wednesday visits).
Crucially, the court found that the trial court considered the relevant language from the divorce decree when ruling on the first motion, even though Mao claimed the second, properly documented motion containing that exhibit was delayed. The court saw no due process violation arising from the docketing confusion, as the issue was resolved under the first motion which was timely heard.
Recharacterization of the Motion
Mao also argued that the trial court erred by reframing her “Motion to Compel Make-Up Parenting Time” as a mere matter of “interpretation” rather than one of enforcement.
The appellate panel disagreed. They noted that the entire purpose of the trial court’s initial ruling was to resolve the ambiguity between the parties regarding the schedule. “To resolve the dispute, the trial court began by examining pertinent language… For the parties’ benefit, it clarified that Mao in fact was entitled to mid-week parenting time every Wednesday,” the opinion stated. Only after this clarification did the court deny the request for make-up time. The appeals court found nothing improper about interpreting the language to enforce the order correctly.
Denial of Make-Up Time and Constitutional Claims
The most significant part of the appeal concerned the trial court’s refusal to award compensatory time, which Mao argued violated her fundamental parental liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The appellate court addressed this by separating the alleged missed time into two categories: pre-decree and post-decree.
Regarding the years of missed parenting time that occurred *before* the June 30, 2025 divorce decree, the court applied the doctrine of *res judicata*. The opinion explained that final decrees allocating parental rights are final orders, and any claims for relief based on pre-decree conduct should have been raised and resolved before the decree was filed. Since the decree lacked a provision for make-up time for those years, Mao could not obtain that relief now.
For the single instance of missed time *after* the decree—an alleged missed Wednesday on August 27, 2025—the court deferred to the trial court’s broad discretion in awarding make-up time. The trial court had concluded there was no “necessity” for compensatory time, attributing the conflict to a genuine disagreement over the schedule rather than contemptuous behavior by Bright. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in this finding, nor did it believe that refusing make-up time for one missed visit constituted an actionable substantive due process violation.
In conclusion, the Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment of the Greene County Common Pleas Court in its entirety.