A private citizen’s attempt to oust three members of the City of Wilmington Board of Park Commissioners, based on allegations that they failed to properly take an oath of office, has been dismissed by the Ohio Twelfth Appellate District Court. The court ruled that the citizen, Quintin Koger Kidd, lacked the legal standing required under Ohio law to bring such an action, regardless of the underlying merits of his claims regarding the oaths.
The case centered on the legal mechanism known as *quo warranto*—a proceeding used to challenge whether a person is lawfully holding a public office.
The Allegations: Missing Oaths and Public Records
The dispute began in July 2025 when Relator Quintin Koger Kidd submitted a public records request to the City of Wilmington, seeking copies of the oaths of office for the sitting Park Commissioners: Jeff Earley, Carlos Rogers, and Ned Thompson.
According to Koger Kidd’s complaint, the City responded at the end of July 2025 stating they had no such records on file. Following this response, Koger Kidd initiated the *quo warranto* action, arguing that the Commissioners were unlawfully holding their positions because they had violated Ohio Revised Code section 733.68, which mandates taking an oath of office. Koger Kidd asked the court to remove the Commissioners, declare their official acts void, and award him costs.
The Defense: Standing and Mootness
The Respondents—the Park Commissioners, the Park Board, and the City—moved to dismiss the case under Civil Rule 12(B)(6), arguing two main points: first, that Koger Kidd lacked the necessary standing to sue, and second, that the action was moot because the Commissioners *had* actually taken their oaths. The Respondents provided copies of the executed oaths with their motion.
Koger Kidd countered that while he wasn’t seeking a seat on the Park Commission himself, he had a “direct and personal interest” in ensuring that only duly sworn officials exercised public power. He also challenged the authenticity of the oaths provided by the Respondents. In a subsequent filing, Koger Kidd argued that because he qualified as an “any person” under the Ohio Open Meetings Act, he should have standing, especially since he claimed the City had a pattern of violating that Act, potentially invalidating the meetings where the oaths were sworn.
The Court’s Ruling: Standing is Paramount
The appellate court, in an opinion written by Judge Siebert, ultimately sided with the Respondents, granting the motion to dismiss. The core issue, the court found, was standing.
Under Ohio law governing *quo warranto* actions, the pool of eligible parties who can challenge an officeholder is narrowly defined by statute (R.C. 2733.05 and 2733.06). An action must be brought by either the Attorney General, a prosecuting attorney, or a private person who specifically claims they are entitled to the office being unlawfully held.
The court noted that Koger Kidd admitted he was not a prosecutor and was not claiming any entitlement to the Park Commissioner seats. His status as a resident or elector, the court clarified, is insufficient, by itself or combined, to confer standing. The court emphasized that the Ohio General Assembly intentionally maintained these strict standing requirements over the years.
“Because Koger Kidd lacks standing, the motion to dismiss is granted,” the opinion stated in Paragraph 19.
Failure to Meet Quo Warranto Elements
Even if Koger Kidd had met the standing requirement, the court found the petition failed on another essential element of a *quo warranto* claim. To succeed, a relator must plead facts showing the respondent is unlawfully holding office, *and* that the relator is entitled to the office, *and* that there is no adequate remedy at law.
The court pointed out that a private citizen must plead facts showing their claim to the office is made “in good faith and upon reasonable grounds.” Since Koger Kidd did not allege he was entitled to any of the positions, the petition failed to establish all necessary elements for the writ.
Validity of the Oaths
Finally, the court addressed Koger Kidd’s contention that the Commissioners had not properly taken their oaths. The court found that the Respondents had sufficiently proven otherwise by attaching the executed oaths to their motion.
The court cited precedent suggesting that such documents, when properly executed according to R.C. 3.24 (which requires the administering person’s signature, title, and date), can be considered valid evidence in this context. Since Koger Kidd failed to cite legal authority proving the oaths were inadmissible or invalid, the court concluded this argument also failed as a matter of law.
In summary, the court dismissed the case solely on procedural grounds—Koger Kidd did not have the legal right to bring the lawsuit in the first place.