The Michigan Court of Appeals has affirmed a lower court’s decision to send a mother, Brooklynne Rae Davis, to trial on a charge of first-degree child abuse, ruling that the prosecution did not need to show an affirmative act of harm. Instead, the court found that severe, prolonged neglect—specifically the failure to feed, hydrate, or seek medical care for her 19-month-old twin—was sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer the necessary criminal intent.
The case centers on the death of one twin, SS, and the near-fatal condition of the surviving twin, AS. Ms. Davis was initially charged with felony murder related to SS, but in this appeal, the focus was solely on the first-degree child abuse charge concerning AS. Davis argued that because the evidence only showed omissions (failures to act), and not active abuse, the charge should be reduced to second-degree child abuse, which explicitly includes omissions as a basis for conviction.
The Crux of the Legal Dispute: Act vs. Omission
First-degree child abuse under Michigan law (MCL 750.136b(2)) requires a person to “knowingly or intentionally cause serious physical harm or serious mental harm to a child.”
Davis’s defense hinged on the idea that this statute implicitly requires a direct, affirmative action, unlike the second-degree statute, which specifically lists “omission” as a way to commit the crime. She contended that simply failing to provide care, while possibly negligent or reckless, did not meet the high bar of “knowingly or intentionally causing” serious harm required for the first-degree charge.
However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, relying heavily on recent precedent, particularly the case of *People v Morrow*.
The appellate panel explained that the key difference between the first- and second-degree statutes is not whether the action was an act or an omission, but rather the *level of intent*. First-degree child abuse is a specific-intent crime. This means the prosecution must prove the defendant intended the *harm itself* or knew that serious harm would result from their actions or inactions. Second-degree abuse, conversely, often only requires intent regarding the act or omission itself, regardless of whether serious harm was intended.
The court concluded that because the first-degree statute does not explicitly use the word “act,” it can be satisfied through omission, provided the required specific intent (knowledge or intent to cause serious harm) is present.
Evidence of Severe Harm to AS
The evidence presented at the preliminary examination painted a grim picture of the surviving twin, AS, who was 19 months old when taken to the hospital.
Detective Briana Pierson testified that authorities responded to Davis’s home after she reported a deceased child (SS). Dr. Cory Schmidt, a pediatrician, described AS’s critical condition upon arrival at the hospital on August 23, 2024:
* Hypernatremia: Dangerously high sodium levels, indicating severe dehydration.
* Severe Malnutrition: AS weighed only 16 or 17 pounds, the same weight he was at 12 months old, meaning he had failed to gain weight for nearly a year. Dr. Schmidt noted this weight put him below the first percentile for his age.
* Organ Injury: Kidney and mild liver injury were present.
* Encephalopathy: An altered level of consciousness due to the high sodium levels, making him difficult to keep awake.
* Untreated Skin Condition: Severe, uncontrolled eczema that had become excoriated (open and scabbed over).
Dr. Schmidt testified that AS’s condition was life-threatening and that the combination of diagnoses strongly suggested he “was not being fed and not being given fluids by a caregiver.” Had treatment been delayed further, the child faced permanent brain damage and death.
Inference of Intent
The district court determined there was probable cause to bind Davis over on the first-degree charge because a finder of fact could infer the required intent from the circumstances. The Court of Appeals agreed.
The appellate court reasoned that the evidence—the extreme weight loss, severe dehydration, altered mental state, and untreated physical wounds—was so severe that a jury could reasonably infer that Davis *knew* her failure to feed, hydrate, or seek medical attention would result in serious physical harm.
The court noted that while the prosecution didn’t provide a clear timeline for how long the neglect lasted, the ongoing nature of the omissions, which led to a life-threatening state, was enough to establish probable cause for the specific intent element of first-degree child abuse.
Because the initial bindover decision by the district court was not an abuse of discretion, the circuit court was correct in denying Davis’s subsequent motions to quash the charge and dismiss the case.