The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the 108-month sentence of Jacklin Cheramy, who was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and aggravated identity theft. Cheramy argued that the district court incorrectly calculated his sentence by considering his prior Florida drug convictions as “controlled substance offenses.” However, the court disagreed, citing a previous ruling that clarified how to handle such cases.
The Core of the Dispute
The central issue in this case revolves around how to classify prior state drug convictions when determining a federal sentence. Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant’s sentence can be increased if they have a prior “controlled substance offense.” The Guidelines define this as an offense under federal or state law that prohibits the manufacture, distribution, or possession of a controlled substance.
Cheramy’s argument centered on the idea that his 2006 Florida convictions for cocaine and marijuana offenses shouldn’t count as “controlled substance offenses.” He claimed that the Florida laws at the time of his convictions were broader than federal law, specifically including substances that were not federally controlled at the time of his federal sentencing. Essentially, he wanted the court to look at the federal definitions of controlled substances *at the time of his federal sentencing*, not the state definitions from when he was originally convicted.
The Guiding Precedent: *Dubois* and Its Twists
The court’s decision hinges on the case of *United States v. Dubois*. The *Dubois* case, and its subsequent iterations, provided the crucial legal framework for this case.
* Dubois I (March 2024): The Eleventh Circuit initially ruled that for prior state offenses, a “controlled substance” is defined by state law at the time of the *state conviction*, even if that substance is no longer regulated by the state or is not federally regulated at the time of the *federal sentencing*. This was the key precedent that went against Cheramy’s argument.
* Supreme Court Intervention (January 2025): The Supreme Court got involved, granting certiorari (a review of the case) and sending it back to the Eleventh Circuit for reconsideration in light of the *United States v. Rahimi* decision.
* Dubois II: The Supreme Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Dubois I and remanded for reconsideration.
* Dubois III (June 2025): The Eleventh Circuit, after considering the *Rahimi* case, ultimately reaffirmed its original stance from *Dubois I*. They rejected the argument that the prior ruling was incorrect.
Applying the Law: The Court’s Reasoning
The court, in the Cheramy case, directly referenced the *Dubois* rulings. They explained that *Dubois I*, as reinstated by *Dubois III*, specifically addressed the question of which definitions of controlled substances to use. Because *Dubois* established that the state’s definition at the time of the *state conviction* is what matters, Cheramy’s argument was essentially rejected.
The court emphasized that under the prior-panel-precedent rule, they are bound by the *Dubois* decision. This rule means that a later court must follow the rulings of a previous panel on the same issue, unless the Supreme Court or the full Eleventh Circuit overrules it.
Examining the Details: Florida Law and Federal Definitions
The court’s analysis also delved into the specifics of Florida law regarding cocaine and marijuana.
* Cocaine: In 2006, Florida’s definition of cocaine included substances like ioflupane. While the CSA definition of cocaine includes “[c]ocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers,” the definition in the Code of Federal Regulations was amended in 2015 to exclude ioflupane from its schedule of controlled substances.
* Marijuana: In 2006, Florida’s definition of marijuana included hemp. In 2019, Florida decriminalized hemp, which it defined as cannabis with a low THC concentration.
Cheramy argued that because substances like ioflupane and hemp were not federally controlled at the time of his federal sentencing, his prior Florida convictions should not be considered “controlled substance offenses.” However, the court, following *Dubois*, found this argument unpersuasive, because the relevant definitions are those in place at the time of the *state conviction*.
Conclusion
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms Jacklin Cheramy’s sentence. The court’s reasoning is firmly rooted in the *Dubois* case and the prior-panel-precedent rule. Because *Dubois* established that state law at the time of the *state conviction* controls the definition of a “controlled substance offense,” Cheramy’s arguments about the federal definitions at the time of his sentencing were rejected.