The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has affirmed the convictions and sentencing of Keion Lamonte Jemison, who was convicted in connection with the 2022 shooting death of Danny Dixson, Jr. The central issue on appeal was whether Jemison’s prior conviction for “reckless aggravated assault” qualified as a “crime of violence,” which significantly increased the severity of his sentence for illegal firearm possession.
The appellate court ultimately sided with the State, concluding that under Tennessee law, aggravated assault of any degree—including one based on reckless conduct—is indeed classified as a crime of violence for the purpose of enhancing the firearm possession charge.
The Shooting Incident
The case stems from a confrontation on January 14, 2022, outside a Nashville hotel. Jemison, the registered guest of Room 139, approached Mr. Dixson, who was sitting in a parked car with a friend, Angela Scivally. The exchange quickly escalated over a debt. Jemison reportedly became agitated, accused Dixson of owing him $350, and then shot Dixson once in the upper left thigh with a 9-millimeter pistol.
Following the initial shot, Dixson managed to drive a short distance before retrieving his own .22-caliber pistol and firing back at Jemison several times, striking the hotel room window. Tragically, Dixson died shortly after from the gunshot wound to his thigh, which severed his femoral artery.
Jemison was subsequently indicted on charges including second-degree murder, aggravated assault resulting in death, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (against Ms. Scivally), and possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony crime of violence. He was convicted of the lesser charge of reckless homicide instead of murder, along with the other counts, resulting in an effective sentence of twenty-three years.
The Sentencing Dispute: Recklessness vs. Violence
Jemison’s appeal focused entirely on the sentence imposed for Count 4: possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony crime of violence. If the prior felony qualified, the offense was sentenced as a Class B felony; if not, it would have been a Class E felony.
Jemison argued that his prior conviction—a 2019 case for “reckless aggravated assault” in Montgomery County—should not count as a “crime of violence.” He cited specific statutes (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-120(b)) that define violent offenses for repeat violent offender enhancements, where reckless aggravated assault is reportedly absent. He contended that only aggravated assaults committed intentionally or knowingly should qualify as violent crimes.
The State countered that the definition relevant to the firearm possession statute (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1301(3)) explicitly includes “aggravated assault” of any degree as a crime of violence.
The Court’s Ruling: Plain Language Prevails
The Court of Criminal Appeals examined the relevant statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1301(3), which defines “crime of violence” for the purposes of the firearm possession law. The court found the language clear: it specifically includes “aggravated assault.”
The opinion referenced a prior ruling, *State v. Brown*, which noted that while the *mens rea* (mental state—intentional, knowing, or reckless) affects the punishment for the underlying aggravated assault, the conviction itself remains “aggravated assault,” which is categorically a crime of violence under the relevant statute.
Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr., writing for the panel, stated, “When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, as it is in this case, we simply apply its plain meaning.” Therefore, any degree of aggravated assault, including the reckless version Jemison previously committed, counts as a crime of violence, making the enhanced Class B felony sentence appropriate.
The Effect of Stipulation
The appellate court also pointed to a critical procedural point: Jemison had agreed to a stipulation at trial. Before the jury heard the case, the defense counsel agreed that Jemison had been previously convicted of a “felony crime of violence or a felony involving the use of a deadly weapon.” This stipulation was read into the record and entered as an exhibit, allowing the jury to find the element necessary for the Class B felony conviction on Count 4 without hearing the specifics of the prior case.
The court ruled that Jemison could not agree to a fact at trial and then contest that same fact on appeal. Citing established precedent, the opinion noted that a party is bound by concessions made via stipulation during trial.
Other Issues Waived
Jemison also briefly argued that the trial court had “usurped” the jury’s role by instructing them on the definition of a crime of violence. However, the court dismissed this argument as waived because the brief lacked necessary record citations. Furthermore, the court noted that Jemison failed to raise this issue in his motion for a new trial, which is generally required for challenging jury instructions on appeal.
In conclusion, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in its entirety.