A federal judge has dismissed a lawsuit filed by three landlords against the District of Columbia over its COVID-19 eviction moratorium, finding that the city’s policies did not violate their constitutional rights.
The Case Background
Alexander Gallo, DeShaun Proctor, and Gavin Clarke, all property owners in the District, sued the city, claiming that the eviction moratorium, enacted in March 2020, and the subsequent filing moratorium infringed upon their rights under the Contracts Clause, Due Process Clause, and Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The moratorium prevented landlords from evicting tenants during the public health emergency, except in specific cases like illegal conduct or undue hardship, and also temporarily barred the filing of eviction lawsuits.
The Court’s Ruling
Judge Trevor N. McFadden of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia sided with the city, granting its motion to dismiss the case. The judge found that Gallo’s claims were barred by *res judicata*, a legal doctrine preventing the same parties from relitigating issues already decided by a court. Gallo had previously filed similar lawsuits challenging the moratorium, which were ultimately dismissed and affirmed on appeal.
Res Judicata Explained
The Court explained that *res judicata* applies when a prior lawsuit involved the same claims, the same parties, a final judgment on the merits, and a court of competent jurisdiction. Because Gallo’s current lawsuit stemmed from the same “nucleus of facts” as his previous cases – his inability to evict a tenant during the moratorium – the doctrine barred him from raising those claims again, even under new legal theories.
The Constitutional Claims
Even if *res judicata* didn’t apply to Gallo, the court found that none of the landlords’ constitutional claims had merit.
Contracts Clause Claim
The Contracts Clause prevents states from passing laws that impair contractual obligations. The landlords argued that the moratorium interfered with their lease agreements. The court rejected this argument, stating that the relevant D.C. Code section does not create a private right of action, and that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a vehicle for enforcing the Contracts Clause.
For Gallo, the court noted that he had no contractual relationship with the tenant in question, as the tenant was a “tenant at will” after a foreclosure. For Proctor, the court pointed out that she entered into her lease *after* the moratorium was already in place, meaning it couldn’t have interfered with her reasonable expectations.
While Clarke did have a pre-existing lease, the court found that the moratorium didn’t “substantially impair” his contractual relationship, as it didn’t extinguish any cause of action or immunize any party from suit. He could still sue for back rent after the moratorium ended.
Due Process Claim
The landlords also argued that the moratorium violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights. The court rejected both procedural and substantive due process arguments.
Procedurally, the landlords failed to explain how the District provided inadequate process in passing the moratoria. Substantively, they failed to identify a fundamental right that was infringed.
Takings Clause Claim
Finally, Proctor and Clarke argued that the moratorium constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. The court rejected both physical and regulatory takings theories.
A physical taking occurs when the government requires a landowner to submit to the physical occupation of the land. The court found that because Proctor and Clarke voluntarily leased their properties, there was no physical taking.
A regulatory taking occurs when a law denies all economically beneficial or productive use of a property. The court found that the moratorium didn’t relieve tenants of their obligation to pay rent and the landlords could still recoup the economic value of their properties after the moratorium ended.
The court concluded that the unrecovered rent and damages did not rise to the level of “striking evidence of economic effects” required to prove a regulatory taking. Moreover, the court noted that similar regulations had occurred before and that the moratorium served a legitimate public purpose.
The Outcome
The court dismissed Gallo’s claims with prejudice, meaning he cannot refile them. Proctor and Clarke’s claims were dismissed without prejudice, leaving the door open for them to potentially refile if they can plead additional facts to support their claims.