The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has affirmed the denial of a death row inmate’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, concluding that the state court’s ruling regarding ineffective assistance of counsel was not an unreasonable application of federal law. The appeal centered on several contentious issues, most prominently the claim that one of the petitioner’s two trial attorneys occasionally fell asleep during the proceedings.
Juan Carlos Alvarez, sentenced to death for the 1998 murders of Michael Aguirre and Jose Varela during gang-related violence in Houston, Texas, appealed the district court’s rejection of his habeas petition. The Fifth Circuit, in a decision authored by Circuit Judge Edith H. Jones, upheld the denial across the board, rejecting Alvarez’s arguments regarding his representation, mitigation evidence presentation, and forensic testing issues.
The “Sleeping Lawyer” Allegation
The most heavily litigated issue involved Alvarez’s assertion that his lead trial counsel, Frumencio Reyes, was constitutionally ineffective—and constructively absent—because he allegedly slept during parts of the trial. Alvarez supported this claim with affidavits from two jurors executed years after the trial.
The majority opinion, however, emphasized the high bar set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) for overturning state court decisions. The court determined that the state courts, despite not explicitly mentioning the sleeping lawyer claim in their final ruling, were presumed to have adjudicated it on the merits, meaning the federal court must review the decision under the deferential AEDPA standards.
Under AEDPA, Alvarez needed to show the state court’s decision was “objectively unreasonable” or contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Fifth Circuit found no such error.
The court noted that Alvarez had two lawyers: Reyes, who was retained shortly before trial, and John Denninger, who had been involved for over a year. The majority stressed that Denninger actively participated, conducting voir dire, examining witnesses, making objections, and delivering one of the closing arguments.
“Unfortunately for Alvarez and the dissent,” the opinion stated, “there is no clearly established Supreme Court law holding that a defendant was subjected to a violation of the Sixth Amendment where one counsel allegedly performed defectively but a second, engaged attorney effectively participated in representing the defendant.”
Furthermore, the court found the juror affidavits—the core evidence for the claim—to be insufficient to overcome the state court’s implicit factual findings. The affidavits were executed nearly a decade after the trial, and Reyes himself had previously provided affidavits during state proceedings denying incompetence. The court also pointed out that co-counsel Denninger, who could have corroborated or refuted the sleeping claim, died in 2011 before Reyes offered his later, self-incriminating affidavit in 2019.
The court also dismissed the argument that Reyes’s alleged sleep automatically triggered a *Cronic* analysis (which presumes prejudice when counsel is entirely absent or fails to test the prosecution’s case). Because Denninger was fully engaged, the majority found that Alvarez was not constructively denied counsel under the required Supreme Court precedent.
Ineffective Mitigation Evidence and DNA Claims
Alvarez also argued that his counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase by failing to investigate and present more robust mitigating evidence regarding his background, poverty, and potential brain damage or PTSD. This argument was framed under *Wiggins v. Smith* and *Andrus v. Texas*.
The Fifth Circuit found this claim unavailing, agreeing with the district court that trial counsel had already presented significant mitigating evidence, including testimony from family members and an expert psychologist (Dr. Laval) who evaluated Alvarez before trial. The court noted that Dr. Laval found no mental illness or signs of the brain damage Alvarez now claims.
The court distinguished Alvarez’s case from *Andrus v. Texas*, where the Supreme Court found deficient performance because counsel failed to uncover a “tidal wave” of evidence regarding abuse and severe mental health issues. In contrast, Alvarez’s trial counsel actively reviewed files, consulted family, and used an expert, leading the court to conclude that counsel’s strategy was reasonable under the circumstances.
Finally, Alvarez sought to revisit claims regarding DNA evidence processed by the Harris County Crime Lab, arguing it was tainted. The court noted these claims had already been dismissed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) as procedurally defaulted in prior state habeas proceedings. Even addressing the merits, the court found the claim meritless, noting that the blood samples in question were re-tested by independent experts and confirmed the victim’s blood was on Alvarez’s recovered shotgun.
Denial of Requests to Stay Proceedings
The court also denied Alvarez’s various motions to stay the federal appeal to pursue new evidence—specifically, the 2019 affidavit from Reyes admitting he “might have” slept. The court held that this evidence was untimely and could have been presented earlier with due diligence. To stay the appeal now would violate the spirit of AEDPA, which aims to streamline federal habeas proceedings (*Rhines v. Weber*).
Dissenting View
Circuit Judge Priscilla Richman dissented, focusing solely on the “sleeping lawyer” claim. Judge Richman argued that the unrebutted juror evidence established deficient performance under *Strickland v. Washington*.
The dissent asserted that sleeping during the direct examination of a witness whom counsel must later cross-examine is inherently prejudicial, especially in a capital case. Judge Richman contended that the majority wrongly minimized the impact of Reyes’s absence by focusing too heavily on the presence of co-counsel Denninger, arguing that Texas trial practice often restricts co-counsel involvement during a single witness’s testimony.
“Unconscious counsel equates to no counsel at all,” Judge Richman wrote, arguing that the spectacle of the lead attorney sleeping severely undermined the integrity of the adversarial process, warranting relief under the principles established in *United States v. Cronic*.
Ultimately, the majority ruled 2-1 to affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief.