The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Mercy Health Services Iowa Corp. (doing business as MercyOne Siouxland Medical Center) in a lawsuit brought by a former physician assistant, Michelle Siebrecht. Siebrecht had alleged discrimination based on disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), as well as retaliation for taking leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).
The appellate court found that Siebrecht could not establish she was a “qualified individual” under disability law because she could not meet the essential functions of her job, and similarly found insufficient evidence to support her FMLA retaliation claim.
The Crux of the Dispute: Essential Job Functions
Siebrecht worked in the emergency room (ER) at Mercy’s critical access facility in Hawarden, Iowa. This rural ER requires 24/7 staffing by at least one provider. Siebrecht, along with other Advanced Practice Providers (APPs), was contractually obligated to work three 24-hour shifts per two-week pay period, including weekend coverage.
Following diagnoses of multiple sclerosis (MS), Siebrecht took two periods of FMLA leave. Upon returning, her doctor imposed significant restrictions: no more than one 24-hour shift per week and no weekend shifts, noting that ER weekends were typically more hectic. These restrictions were expected to last through the end of 2022.
The core of the district court’s and the Eighth Circuit’s ruling rests on what constitutes an “essential function” of Siebrecht’s job. Siebrecht argued that the essential function was simply patient care, not specific scheduling.
The Court disagreed, siding with Mercy. The Eighth Circuit pointed to several factors: Mercy explicitly deemed the required shifts essential; the requirement was written into every APP employment contract; and if Siebrecht wasn’t working those shifts, others (including temporary PRNs or locums) had to cover, creating unfair burdens. The court noted that “essential function encompasses more than core job requirements; indeed, it also may include scheduling flexibility.”
Since the ability to work three 24-hour shifts per pay period and cover weekends were deemed essential functions, and Siebrecht could not meet these requirements even with proposed accommodations, the court concluded she failed the first test for a qualified individual under the ADA and ICRA.
Accommodation Attempts Fail the “Qualified Individual” Test
Siebrecht proposed two accommodations: a reduced work schedule (fewer and no weekend shifts) or reassignment to a different position.
The reduced schedule accommodation was rejected because, as established, the schedule requirements were essential job functions. If she couldn’t perform the essential functions, a reduced schedule wouldn’t make her qualified.
Regarding reassignment, the appellate court stressed that under the ADA, reassignment is only required if a vacant position exists for which the employee is otherwise qualified. Siebrecht failed to identify any specific vacant position she qualified for during the relevant time. A passing comment from the Hawarden CEO suggesting she “can work at MercyOne her 24 [hour] shift” was insufficient, as the CEO did not manage the MercyOne system, and the comment didn’t confirm an actual vacancy.
Finally, Siebrecht claimed Mercy failed to engage in the “interactive process” required under the ADA. While the court acknowledged Mercy knew of her disability and requests, Siebrecht could not survive summary judgment because she failed to show that *any* reasonable accommodation would have enabled her to perform the essential job functions—a necessary step even if the employer failed to negotiate in good faith.
FMLA Retaliation Claim Lacks Causal Link
Siebrecht also claimed Mercy fired her in retaliation for taking FMLA leave. To prove this, she needed to show a causal connection between her protected leave and her termination.
The only evidence Siebrecht presented for causation came from the deposition of the Hawarden CEO, who stated he believed Siebrecht should be terminated due to her “unreliability.” Siebrecht interpreted the CEO’s subsequent reference to “blocks of situations” as referring to her two FMLA leaves.
The Eighth Circuit found this interpretation unreasonable. The CEO explicitly clarified that his comments about unreliability stemmed from her medical restrictions—specifically, her inability to cover the required 24-hour shifts—which he stated caused an “unfair burden on others.” The court found the CEO’s testimony, when viewed in its entirety, linked the termination reason to the inability to meet essential scheduling demands, not the act of taking FMLA leave itself.
Furthermore, even if a prima facie FMLA case existed, the court found no evidence of pretext. Mercy stated two reasons for termination: the expiration of her contract and her inability to perform essential functions. The court noted these reasons were not necessarily contradictory, as the FMLA does not require employers to accommodate employees who cannot perform essential functions once their leave ends.
The court also dismissed Siebrecht’s comparison to another APP whose contract was allowed to lapse without termination. Siebrecht failed to show this colleague was “similarly situated in all relevant respects,” noting the other APP appeared to have verbally accepted a contract extension before their temporary renewal period expired, distinguishing the circumstances.
In conclusion, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding no genuine dispute of material fact existed to support Siebrecht’s claims under either disability or leave laws.