The Supreme Court of Georgia has accepted the voluntary discipline petition of attorney Stephanie Dianne Woodard, imposing a 12-month suspension for her admitted professional misconduct stemming from actions taken while serving as the Solicitor General of Hall County. This decision marks the second time the high court has reviewed Woodard’s case, ultimately settling on a specific length and effective date for her suspension.
Background of Misconduct
The case centers on conduct that occurred between July 2018 and September 2022, leading to Woodard pleading guilty to one misdemeanor count under Georgia law (OCGA § 45-11-4(b)(1) and (5)). These charges involved malpractice, misfeasance, or malfeasance in office, and willfully and knowingly demanding more cost than legally entitled to while acting as a public officer.
As detailed in the court’s prior opinion, Woodard was initially indicted on 24 felony counts by a Hall County Grand Jury. These allegations involved seeking and receiving improper reimbursements for expenses—totaling $2,219.28 from the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council and Hall County—for items ranging from a dog’s cremation to an LSAT prep course for her daughter.
Woodard contended many instances were unintentional errors, such as staff mistakenly pursuing reimbursement or using the wrong credit card. However, following negotiations, the felony charges were dropped (nolle prosequi), and Woodard pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor charges, receiving 12 months of probation under the First Offender Act, conditional on making full restitution.
First Attempt at Discipline Rejected
When Woodard first petitioned the court for voluntary discipline, she sought only a public reprimand. The Supreme Court rejected this in 2025 (Woodard I), finding the proposed sanction insufficient. The Court noted that her admitted violations—specifically breaching Rule 8.4(a)(3) (misdemeanor conviction involving moral turpitude related to fitness to practice law) and Rule 8.4(a)(4) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation)—were more akin to cases where suspensions of six to 18 months had been imposed, rather than a simple reprimand.
Renewed Petition and Sanction Agreement
Accepting the Court’s directive, Woodard filed a renewed petition seeking a suspension ranging from three to 12 months. She continued to assert numerous mitigating factors, including no prior disciplinary history, full cooperation, timely restitution, expression of remorse, and personal difficulties during the period of misconduct.
The State Bar of Georgia, after initially agreeing with the mitigating factors but noting aggravating factors like Woodard’s substantial legal experience, changed its stance slightly. While still recommending acceptance of the petition, the Bar now agreed with the Court’s assessment that a suspension was warranted. The Bar recommended a 12-month suspension but urged the Court to impose it without retroactive effect.
Woodard requested that any suspension longer than three months be imposed *nunc pro tunc* (retroactively) to August 30, 2024, the date she completed her criminal sentence, arguing she had since stopped practicing law.
The Court Imposes a Specific Suspension
The Supreme Court ultimately decided to accept Woodard’s petition, imposing a 12-month suspension. Crucially, the Court agreed to make the suspension retroactive, but to a different date than Woodard requested. The suspension is made *nunc pro tunc* to June 26, 2025.
This date represents when Woodard formally notified the State Bar that she was electing to become an inactive member of the Bar, which the Court viewed as the undisputed date she voluntarily ceased practicing law in a manner that triggered ethical filing requirements.
The Court rejected Woodard’s request for retroactivity to August 30, 2024. While Woodard claimed she stopped practicing law upon resigning from her elected office on August 9, 2024, the Court found her evidence weak. Her guilty plea did not strictly require her to cease all legal practice, and she failed to inform the Bar of her inactive status until nearly a year later, in June 2025. The Court found her initial failure to mention ceasing practice in her first petition also called the earlier date into question.
Justifying the 12-Month Length
In determining the length, the Court revisited its comparison cases. Woodard argued her situation was less severe than *In the Matter of Williams* (six-month suspension for stealing county funds) because her acts were not fully intentional and the amount stolen was smaller.
However, the Court countered that Woodard pleaded guilty to willfully and knowingly demanding excess costs, supporting an intentional mental state. Furthermore, her case involved violating both Rule 8.4(a)(3) (misdemeanor conviction) and 8.4(a)(4) (dishonesty), making it particularly serious, especially given her position of public trust. The Court found the facts materially similar to *In the Matter of Adams* (which resulted in an 18-month suspension for overbilling), concluding that a three-month suspension was inappropriate given the seriousness of the admitted rule violations.
The 12-month suspension, effective retroactively to June 26, 2025, is intended to penalize Woodard, deter others, and assure the public that legal ethics are maintained, even for former public officials. Since the suspension expires by its own terms 12 months from the effective date, no further action is required by Woodard for reinstatement beyond the passage of time.