The Eleventh District Court of Appeals of Ohio has affirmed a lower court’s decision to deny Dominic Michael Harvey’s request for postconviction relief, ruling that his claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel were barred by established legal principles. Harvey, who is serving a sentence of 50 to 55 1/2 years to life following a guilty plea to several serious charges, failed to produce new evidence that wasn’t available when he initially entered his plea.
Harvey’s Conviction and Subsequent Filing
Dominic Michael Harvey was convicted in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas based on his guilty pleas to Aggravated Murder with a Firearm Specification, Attempted Murder with a Firearm Specification, Tampering with Evidence, and Receiving Stolen Property. The initial indictment included an Aggravating Circumstances Specification, which carried the possibility of the death penalty. However, Harvey pleaded guilty to an amended indictment, leading the State to drop that specification in exchange. He was sentenced in December 2023.
Interestingly, just six days after his sentencing hearing, Harvey attempted to withdraw his guilty plea, a request that the trial court ultimately denied in January 2024. Harvey did not pursue a direct appeal of his conviction at that time.
A year later, in December 2024, Harvey filed a *pro se* (representing himself) petition for postconviction relief. His central argument was that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming his attorney “pressured” him into pleading guilty. In February 2025, the trial court rejected this petition, noting that Harvey had provided no supporting documentation beyond his assertion of being pressured. Harvey then appealed this denial in March 2025.
The Legal Hurdle: Res Judicata
The core issue before the appellate court was whether the trial court was correct to dismiss the petition without a hearing. The standard of review for such a denial is whether the trial court abused its discretion—meaning whether it made a decision lacking sound, reasonable, and legal basis.
The appellate court stressed that postconviction relief is a collateral attack on a judgment, not a second chance to re-litigate issues that were or *could have been* raised during the original trial or direct appeal. This concept is known as *res judicata*.
For a defendant to overcome *res judicata* in a postconviction relief petition, especially one involving ineffective assistance of counsel, they generally must present “competent, relevant, and material evidence outside the trial court’s record” that was not available at the time of trial.
Ineffective Counsel Claims and the Record
The court noted a key distinction for ineffective assistance of counsel claims: if a petitioner relies on evidence outside the trial record, *res judicata* may not apply, provided they didn’t have a new attorney on appeal who could have raised the issue then.
Harvey’s petition claimed his counsel was ineffective because the attorney allowed him to plead guilty to an offense when evidence suggested self-defense (negating the required “prior calculation and design” for the aggravated charge). Harvey attached what he called investigative police reports to support this, claiming they showed self-defense.
However, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals found this evidence fatally flawed for the purpose of postconviction relief. The court pointed out that these police reports, regardless of their content, would have been available to both the defense and the prosecution at the time of the original trial and plea negotiations. Since Harvey did not file a direct appeal, and his petition for postconviction relief contained no evidence that *could not* have been known back in 2023, his claim was barred by *res judicata*.
Furthermore, the court reviewed the plea colloquy from 2023. During that proceeding, Harvey affirmed to the judge that he had discussed the rights he was giving up “at length” with his counsel, that he understood the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and that he was satisfied with his representation.
Conclusion: No Abuse of Discretion
Because Harvey failed to meet his burden of proving that substantive grounds for relief existed—specifically by failing to introduce new, external evidence demonstrating counsel’s ineffectiveness caused the plea to be unknowing or involuntary—the trial court was legally justified in denying the petition without a hearing. The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and Harvey’s sole assignment of error was without merit. The judgment was affirmed.