The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has affirmed a lower court’s decision to accept Jerome Brown’s guilty plea, despite acknowledging that the District Judge improperly involved himself in the plea bargaining process. While the court found a clear violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it ultimately ruled that the defendant, Jerome Brown, failed to demonstrate that the judge’s actions substantially prejudiced his right to a fair trial.
Brown was facing serious federal charges related to drug trafficking and illegal firearm possession following a police raid in the Pittsburgh area. Authorities discovered over 13 kilograms of fentanyl, a handgun, ammunition, and $136,000 in cash at his car, home, and storage unit. Brown confessed shortly after his arrest.
The Plea Negotiations Go Off the Rails
Instead of proceeding to trial, Brown entered into plea negotiations with the government. The first proposed agreement included a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months in prison. However, the District Court rejected this deal, stating the proposed sentence didn’t align with the Sentencing Guidelines or the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Brown then withdrew that plea.
Returning to the table, the parties hammered out a second agreement, proposing a slightly longer sentence of 198 months. This is where the judicial intervention occurred. Under Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, judges are strictly forbidden from participating in plea negotiations.
Despite this clear prohibition, the District Court didn’t just accept or reject the second deal; it actively proposed its own sentence, suggesting “no greater than 235 months.” Brown postponed his scheduled plea hearing to address the court’s concerns, but the judge remained firm on the 235-month ceiling.
When the parties ultimately requested the 198-month sentence, citing Brown’s early cooperation, the District Court rejected the second plea outright. The judge then presented Brown with three paths: try to negotiate a third deal, enter an “open” guilty plea with the understanding the sentence would be no less than 235 months, or proceed to trial. Brown opted for the open plea based on the court’s clear indication of its sentencing floor. He subsequently received 235 months in prison plus ten years of supervised release, leading to this appeal.
Rule 11 Violation Confirmed, But Prejudice Must Be Shown
On appeal, Brown argued that the judge’s explicit proposal of a minimum 235-month sentence violated Rule 11(c)(1) and should automatically void his plea.
The Third Circuit panel, composed of Judges Restrepo, Montgomery-Reeves, and Scirica, agreed that the District Court committed an error. As Judge Restrepo noted in the opinion, the violation of Rule 11(c)(1)’s “bright-line rule prohibiting judicial interference” was “straightforward.” The government itself conceded that the court’s involvement was “obvious.”
However, the court emphasized that a judicial error under Rule 11 is not automatically grounds for vacating a plea. Citing the Supreme Court case *United States v. Davila* (Davila I), the Third Circuit stressed that Brown had to prove an additional element: that he “would have exercised his right to go to trial” but for the judge’s improper pressure.
The appellate court found that Brown failed to meet this burden.
Intent to Plead Was Clear
The record, according to the Third Circuit, demonstrated Brown’s consistent desire to resolve the case through a guilty plea. From the start, Brown admitted the drugs were his. Both the defense attorney and the prosecutor highlighted Brown’s commitment to pleading guilty early in the process. His attorney noted that Brown “intends to plead guilty today” and accept responsibility. The prosecutor pointed to Brown’s willingness to plead guilty to a 15-year sentence within six months of his arrest.
The panel concluded that the evidence showed a “mutual understanding from the beginning, one that Brown did not refute: ‘it was relatively clear this would be a plea, that Mr. Brown was not really going to fight this.'” Because the record clearly indicated Brown never intended to go to trial, the court affirmed the conviction, despite the initial procedural mistake by the lower court.
Secondary Constitutional Challenge Rejected
Brown also raised a separate challenge, arguing that the federal statute criminalizing firearm possession by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) was unconstitutional as applied to him, particularly in light of his Second Amendment rights.
The Third Circuit swiftly dismissed this argument, relying on existing circuit precedent. The court confirmed that § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional as applied to individuals on parole or probation. Since Brown was on probation when the offense occurred, his Second Amendment challenge failed.
The final ruling upholds the guilty plea, concluding that while the District Court erred by negotiating, its actions did not ultimately deprive Brown of his fundamental right to choose trial over a plea.