The Supreme Court of Georgia has affirmed the malice murder conviction of Travis Smith, who was found guilty by a jury for the 2014 shooting death of Cortez Dowell. In a decision issued January 5, 2026, the high court rejected Smith’s numerous arguments, which centered on the admission of evidence, the denial of mistrial motions, and claims that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
Smith was convicted in June 2016 in Fulton County Superior Court for malice murder and several other charges stemming from an altercation that occurred during a gathering where dice were being played. He was sentenced to life without parole for the murder. His appeal followed a lengthy post-trial process involving multiple amendments to his motion for a new trial over several years.
Challenging Evidence: Hearsay and Confrontation Rights
A significant portion of Smith’s appeal focused on the trial court’s decision to admit certain testimony, arguing it constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers.
The Supreme Court found these claims unpersuasive, often noting that Smith failed to properly preserve the issues for review by not stating specific objections during the trial.
For instance, witness Kisha McNeil testified that after the shooting, she heard another man ask Smith why he had shot Dowell, to which Smith allegedly replied, “The mother-fker should not [have] tried me.” Smith objected when McNeil was asked if the speaker was in the courtroom, but he didn’t specify grounds of hearsay or confrontation. The Supreme Court ruled that McNeil’s identification was based on her own observations, meaning it was not hearsay under Georgia law. Furthermore, since McNeil testified and was cross-examined, Smith’s Confrontation Clause rights were not violated.
Similarly, Smith argued against testimony from an investigating detective regarding a witness who provided a photograph of Smith. The Court noted that in some instances, the trial court actually *sustained* Smith’s hearsay objections. Regarding the Confrontation Clause claim related to the detective’s testimony, the Court reviewed the issue under the demanding “plain error” standard because no specific objection was raised. The Court found no clear or obvious error, noting that the detective only testified to the *fact* that a picture was sent, not the substance of any accompanying assertion, and that inanimate objects like photographs generally do not trigger Confrontation Clause protections.
Mistrial Denials Over Witness Fear and Silence
Smith also contended the trial court wrongly denied his motions for a mistrial.
One motion stemmed from witness McNeil’s testimony that she was scared to testify because she heard threats in the street, including that she would be killed, and had asked the District Attorney’s office about protective custody. While the trial court sustained Smith’s objections to these statements and issued a curative instruction, it denied the motion for a mistrial. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion, emphasizing that trial courts have broad discretion in these matters. Because the judge acted promptly by sustaining objections and giving instructions, the ruling preserved Smith’s right to a fair trial.
A second mistrial motion arose after a detective testified that Smith “lawyered up” and declined to speak to investigators. Smith objected immediately, the objection was sustained, and the testimony was struck with instructions to disregard. However, Smith did not move for a mistrial until after the detective and another witness had finished testifying. The Court held that a motion for mistrial must be made promptly when the party becomes aware of the issue. Because Smith’s counsel delayed the motion—despite lodging a contemporaneous objection—the issue was deemed unpreserved for appeal.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Smith argued that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to specific parts of the State’s closing argument and certain jury instructions. To win on an ineffective assistance claim, Smith had to prove both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
1. Closing Argument: Smith claimed counsel should have objected when the prosecutor asked the jury, “Would you be afraid of him?” arguing it violated the “golden rule” (asking jurors to place themselves in the victim’s shoes) and improperly referenced future dangerousness.
* The Court found no “golden rule” violation, as the question was part of a broader argument about witness intimidation, not asking jurors to feel the victim’s pain.
* The future dangerousness argument also failed. The prosecutor suggested Smith acted brazenly, expecting witnesses to remain silent out of fear. This was deemed a permissible inference from the evidence, not an assertion that Smith would harm more people in the future if acquitted. Therefore, failing to object to these meritless points was not deficient performance.
2. Jury Instructions: Smith argued counsel should have objected to instructions regarding witness credibility that mentioned “intelligence” and the pattern charge on “prior consistent statements.”
* Regarding witness intelligence, the Court cited existing precedent confirming that while omitting reference to intelligence is the better practice, its inclusion is generally not reversible error. Since the instruction itself wasn’t reversible error, Smith could not show the required prejudice for an ineffective assistance claim on this point.
* Similarly, while the Court noted that instructions on prior consistent statements should generally be avoided unless necessary, the instruction given, when viewed in context with the entire charge, was not reversible error. Thus, failing to object did not cause prejudice.
Finally, the Court considered the cumulative effect of any presumed deficiencies but found that because the individual alleged errors lacked significant prejudicial impact, the collective effect was insufficient to warrant overturning the conviction.
The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.