The Twelfth District Court of Appeals in Ohio has affirmed a lower court’s decision to deny Lonnie Rarden’s request for a complete resentencing, stemming from a correction made to his original 2006 prison sentence almost two decades ago. The core of Rarden’s latest appeal hinged on whether the trial court had the fundamental authority, or subject-matter jurisdiction, to modify his sentence in 2010 following his initial direct appeal.
The appellate court firmly concluded that the trial court acted within its statutory bounds when it addressed an error concerning postrelease control back in 2010, thereby rejecting Rarden’s argument that the entire 2006 sentence was voided by that later action.
A Long Road of Legal Challenges
Lonnie Rarden was convicted in 2006 in Butler County on multiple felony charges, including escape and complicity to perjury. He received a total sentence of 26 and a half years. While his initial conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in 2008, Rarden has since filed numerous postconviction motions seeking various forms of relief.
The current dispute traces back to March 2010, when Rarden moved the trial court to resentence him under Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) 2929.191(A)(1). This specific statute allows a court to correct a sentence if it initially failed to properly advise an offender about the mandatory period of postrelease control (parole supervision) that follows imprisonment. Rarden argued that while the court mentioned postrelease control in 2006, it neglected to explain the consequences of violating that control.
Finding merit in this specific argument, the trial court held a limited resentencing hearing in April 2010. This hearing was strictly focused on providing the proper advisements regarding postrelease control and issuing corrected judgment entries. Rarden appealed this limited remedy, arguing the court should have allowed a full resentencing (de novo). That appeal was unsuccessful, with the Twelfth District affirming in 2011 that the court was only required to correct the specific, flawed portion of the sentence related to postrelease control.
The 2024 Motion and the Void vs. Voidable Debate
Fast forward thirteen years. In December 2024, Rarden filed a new motion asking the trial court to resentence him entirely (de novo), claiming the 2010 correction was void. He based this claim on more recent Ohio Supreme Court rulings, *State v. Harper* (2020) and *State v. Henderson* (2020).
These landmark cases clarified that errors in imposing postrelease control render a sentence *voidable*, not *void*. A voidable error must be challenged during a direct appeal; otherwise, principles of *res judicata* (a legal doctrine preventing the same issue from being litigated again) prevent later challenges, especially in postconviction motions. Rarden argued that because the 2010 correction was based on a voidable error, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make the correction in the first place, thus voiding the entire process and requiring a fresh sentencing hearing.
The trial court rejected this argument in late 2024, finding that R.C. 2929.191 explicitly granted it the authority to hold the 2010 hearing, and that *Harper* and *Henderson* did not address the viability of that specific statute.
Appeals Court Upholds Statutory Authority
In reviewing Rarden’s first assignment of error, the appellate panel focused squarely on R.C. 2929.191. The court noted that this statute was enacted to provide a specific remedy for the exact problem Rarden raised: the failure to properly advise on postrelease control.
The court acknowledged the shift in Supreme Court precedent caused by *Harper* and *Henderson*—that sentencing errors are generally voidable. However, the Twelfth District adopted the reasoning of other appellate districts, which have found that R.C. 2929.191 remains “viable” and operative because the Ohio General Assembly has not repealed it, and the Supreme Court has not explicitly invalidated it.
“We find the reasoning of the First District persuasive and agree that R.C. 2929.191 remains viable following *Harper*,” the opinion stated, citing *State v. Harris*. The statute, therefore, provided the necessary subject-matter jurisdiction for the trial court to conduct the limited 2010 hearing.
The court also addressed Rarden’s contradictory claims about the 2010 proceedings. While Rarden attempted to argue in 2024 that the court *denied* his 2010 motion, the appellate court pointed to Rarden’s own filings from 2010. In an October 2010 motion to correct a clerical mistake, Rarden himself acknowledged that the court “granted that motion and conducted a re-sentencing hearing on April 14, 2010.” This admission undermined his current contention that the 2010 hearing never occurred under the authority of R.C. 2929.191.
Based on this analysis, the Twelfth District concluded that the trial court correctly denied the 2024 motion for a full resentencing because it had proper jurisdiction in 2010.
Second Assignment of Error Deemed Moot
Rarden’s second assignment of error was raised in anticipation: he argued that even if the 2010 resentencing was valid, his *original* 2006 sentence might not have been a “final appealable order” because the trial court allegedly failed to impose a specific fine. This, he contended, would mean his sentence would not revert to the original term if the 2010 correction was somehow invalidated.
However, since the appellate court upheld the validity of the 2010 correction, the premise of Rarden’s second argument—that the original sentence needed to be reinstated—became irrelevant. Therefore, the court ruled the second assignment of error moot and did not rule on its merits.
The judgment of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas was affirmed.