The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently issued a significant opinion addressing its jurisdiction to review decisions regarding the timeliness of asylum applications, while ultimately denying a Nicaraguan native’s petition for review on the merits of his claims. The case centered on Christian Ruiz, whose asylum application was rejected by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) because it was filed long after the statutory one-year deadline.
Jurisdiction Over Asylum Timeliness: A Post-Wilkinson Analysis
A key focus of the court’s opinion was determining whether it had the authority to review the BIA’s finding that Ruiz failed to show “extraordinary circumstances” to excuse his late filing. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), jurisdiction to review decisions regarding the one-year asylum timeliness requirement is generally stripped from federal courts (8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3)).
However, the Ninth Circuit navigated a complex web of precedent stemming from the REAL ID Act, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), which preserves jurisdiction for “questions of law.” The court had previously relied on its 2007 *Ramadan v. Gonzales* decision, which held that reviewing the “extraordinary circumstances” determination was a reviewable application of a statutory standard to undisputed facts, not an unreviewable exercise of discretion.
The panel noted that the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in *Wilkinson v. Garland* had an impact on the *Ramadan* reasoning. *Wilkinson* clarified that certain threshold determinations, even when phrased using phrases like “to the satisfaction of the Attorney General,” are inherently discretionary and thus subject to judicial review as “mixed questions of law and fact” under § 1252(a)(2)(D).
The Ninth Circuit panel held that, to the extent *Ramadan* suggested the “extraordinary circumstances” determination was *not* discretionary, it was irreconcilable with *Wilkinson*. Nevertheless, the court reaffirmed its jurisdiction. This was achieved by relying on the core holding of *Wilkinson*: that mixed questions of law and fact are reviewable as “questions of law” under § 1252(a)(2)(D), even if the underlying INA provision makes the issue discretionary.
Ultimately, the court determined it had jurisdiction to review the BIA’s extraordinary circumstances finding, albeit with deference due to its fact-intensive nature.
Denial of Asylum Exception
Turning to the merits of Ruiz’s asylum claim, the panel found no error in the BIA’s conclusion that he did not qualify for the timeliness exception. Ruiz argued that his past trauma in Nicaragua, stemming from persecution his family faced from the Sandinistas in the 1970s and 1980s, constituted extraordinary circumstances justifying the 13-year delay in filing.
The court acknowledged that regulations allow mental health effects from past persecution to qualify as extraordinary circumstances. However, Ruiz failed to explain the direct causal link between his trauma and his failure to file the application within the required year. As the court stated, the relationship between the trauma and the delay was not “self-evident,” meaning the BIA could not simply speculate that the delay was reasonable.
Withholding of Removal and CAT Protection Rejected
Ruiz also sought withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), based on the persecution his family suffered decades ago. The BIA had found that the presumption of future persecution, which arises from past persecution, was rebutted by changed country conditions in Nicaragua since the Sandinista civil war ended in 1990.
The court agreed with the BIA. Substantial evidence supported the finding that Nicaragua has changed significantly. Ruiz and his family returned to Nicaragua in the 1990s and again in the early 2000s without suffering harm, even obtaining official documents. While the court recognized rising authoritarianism in Nicaragua, Ruiz offered no evidence that the current government specifically targeted him or his family. Furthermore, his sister remained in the country unharmed.
The court also dismissed Ruiz’s speculative claim that he would speak out against current injustices if returned, noting he had never been politically active previously. For these reasons, the denial of withholding of removal and CAT relief was affirmed.
Administrative Closure Motion Denied
Finally, Ruiz challenged the BIA’s denial of his motion for administrative closure. He sought this closure so he could pursue an immediate adjustment of status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen, as regulations often require removal proceedings to be closed before an unlawful presence waiver can be filed while in the U.S.
The BIA denied closure primarily because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) objected, citing Ruiz’s criminal history (multiple DUIs) and immigration record as persuasive reasons for the case to move forward on the merits. The BIA also noted that an alternative path existed for Ruiz to seek a waiver after his order of removal became administratively final.
The Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s decision. The BIA reasonably weighed the circumstances, giving significant weight to DHS’s opposition based on Ruiz’s conduct. Moreover, the court confirmed the BIA’s finding that administrative closure was unnecessary because Ruiz could use a different statutory procedure to seek the required waiver once his removal became final.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision, denying Ruiz’s petition for review across all claims.