The North Carolina Supreme Court has overturned a second-degree murder conviction, ruling that the trial court gave the jury legally flawed instructions regarding the state’s “castle doctrine” defense. The high court found that the errors were fundamental and likely caused the jury to convict the defendant based on conduct the state legislature intended to be justifiable.
George Lee Allison was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting and killing Brandon Adams outside his Burke County home in December 2020. The core issue before the Supreme Court was whether the trial judge correctly explained the castle doctrine protections afforded to lawful occupants under North Carolina General Statute § 14-51.2.
Conflicting Accounts Lead to Murder Conviction
The facts presented at trial were highly contested. The evidence showed that Adams had argued with his girlfriend, Pamela Rodgers, who then went to Allison’s house. After drinking bourbon with Allison, Rodgers reportedly told him Adams was abusive.
When Adams later arrived at Allison’s home, he allegedly became aggressive, pointing at Rodgers, causing her to flinch. Allison asked Adams to leave, and a physical confrontation ensued near the doorway where Adams reportedly tried to force his shoulder into Allison. Later, after Adams sent threatening text messages—including one stating, “I will drag him outside and beat the fuck out of him”—Allison drove past Adams’ home. Adams followed and confronted Allison outside his residence, allegedly stating, “You are going to have to kill me to keep me from dragging that fucking bitch out of your house.”
Allison testified that Adams then prevented him from closing his front door by sticking his hand and foot inside the threshold. Feeling overpowered, Allison retrieved a shotgun, warned Adams repeatedly, counted down multiple times, and ultimately shot Adams when he perceived Adams making a forward movement.
The State, however, presented testimony from Rodgers suggesting a much less threatening scenario. Rodgers testified that Adams was not aggressive, never attempted to cross the threshold, and that Allison retrieved the shotgun and shot after counting down, without any forcible entry occurring.
The trial court ultimately instructed the jury on the defense of habitation under the castle doctrine but failed to incorporate the full scope of the statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court in subsequent rulings. Allison was convicted and sentenced to 144 to 185 months in prison.
The Core Legal Dispute: Rebutting the Presumption
North Carolina’s castle doctrine provides significant protections to lawful occupants of a home, vehicle, or workplace, granting them the right to use deadly force against unlawful intruders without a duty to retreat. Crucially, when the statute’s criteria are met, the occupant is *presumed* to have a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm.
The key legal battle revolved around how the State can overcome this presumption. N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c) lists five specific circumstances under which the presumption *does not apply*. The State argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed based on prior precedent, that the State could rebut the presumption simply by presenting substantial evidence that the defendant did not actually have a reasonable fear of imminent harm—an argument effectively allowing the jury to weigh the reasonableness of the fear regardless of the five statutory exceptions.
Justice Berger, writing for the majority, firmly rejected this interpretation, relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in *State v. Phillips*. The Court clarified that the presumption of reasonable fear “may *only* be rebutted by the circumstances contained in section 14-51.2(c).” The majority stressed that if the State fails to prove one of those five exceptions beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption stands, and the defendant must be acquitted if deadly force was used.
The Court found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that they could find the defendant justified *only if* he reasonably believed Adams would kill or harm someone *and* that the force used was necessary to stop the entry. This framework improperly subjected the defendant’s fear to a general reasonableness test, despite the statutory presumption.
Furthermore, the instructions failed to inform the jury that the “curtilage”—the area immediately surrounding the home—is protected under the definition of a “home” in the statute.
Plain Error Leads to Reversal and New Trial
Because Allison failed to object to the instructions at trial, the Supreme Court reviewed the matter for “plain error.” This standard requires showing a fundamental error that probably impacted the trial’s outcome and warrants review because it seriously affects fairness.
The Court held that the instructional errors were fundamental, rising to the level of denying a fundamental right, as they foreclosed the jury from considering conduct the legislature deemed lawful. The majority concluded that the error had a probable impact on the outcome.
“If a properly instructed jury found that Adams unlawfully and forcibly entered or attempted to enter the home’s curtilage… and that defendant knew or had reason to believe such entry or attempted entry occurred, then the castle doctrine’s mandatory presumptions would apply,” the opinion stated. Under the correct law, if the State failed to prove any of the five rebuttal circumstances, the jury would have been compelled to acquit Allison.
The Court found that because there was evidence supporting the claim of an unlawful, forceful entry (Adams blocking the door), a properly instructed jury might have reached a different verdict. The conviction based on conduct deemed justifiable under the statute was deemed “abhorrent to the principles of fairness,” leading the Supreme Court to reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case for a new trial.
Justice Riggs dissented, arguing that the majority’s reliance on *Phillips* was misplaced, contending that the language in *Phillips* limiting rebuttal solely to the five statutory exceptions was nonbinding dicta. Riggs argued that the plain language of the statute was ambiguous and that other statutes in the same scheme suggest rebuttal is possible beyond the explicit exceptions listed in subsection (c).