A recent court decision in the District of Columbia has denied a preliminary injunction that would have significantly impacted the United States Parole Commission. The case, *Kenan Braxton, et al. v. United States Parole Commission, et al.*, centers on the Commission’s authority to detain and incarcerate individuals on supervised release in light of the ongoing federal government shutdown.
The core of the issue stems from the failure of Congress to pass a budget by the end of September 2025. This failure also meant that Congress didn’t extend the Parole Commission’s enabling statute, which was set to expire. The plaintiffs, including Kenan Braxton, Stanley Petty, and Michael Dunbar, argued that without this extension, the Commission lost its legal authority to operate, including the power to order arrests and detentions. They sought a preliminary injunction to halt the Commission’s actions and release approximately 70 individuals currently incarcerated for violating their supervised release conditions.
The Honorable Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan, however, denied the plaintiffs’ motion. While acknowledging the serious nature of the allegations and the potential for the Commission to be acting without proper authority, the court found that the plaintiffs did not meet the necessary requirements for a preliminary injunction.
The Plaintiffs’ Argument and the Court’s Response
The plaintiffs’ central argument was that the Commission’s actions were *ultra vires*—meaning they were acting beyond their legal authority—and thus violated the Administrative Procedure Act. They contended that their detention was causing them irreparable harm because it was being ordered by an agency lacking the power to do so.
The court, however, disagreed. Judge Sooknanan pointed out that the plaintiffs’ requested relief was a “conditional writ.” This meant that, rather than the court taking over supervision, the plaintiffs wanted the court to give the D.C. government a short timeframe (seven days) to establish or designate a new agency to assume the Commission’s responsibilities. If the D.C. government failed to do so within the timeframe, the 70 incarcerated individuals would be released. Furthermore, approximately 1,600 individuals under supervision would effectively be released without any entity to enforce violations of their supervised release conditions.
The court found that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently demonstrated that they would suffer “irreparable harm” in the absence of the preliminary injunction. The court reasoned that even if the Commission’s authority was questionable, the potential for detention and revocation of supervised release would still exist, even if a different entity were in charge. The judge stated that, “It is unclear, then, how the Plaintiffs are being concretely harmed—much less, irreparably harmed—by the Parole Commission’s detention decisions.”
Irreparable Harm and the Burden of Proof
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must demonstrate, among other things, that they are likely to suffer “irreparable harm” if the injunction is not granted. Irreparable harm is defined as an injury that is both certain and great, actual and not theoretical, beyond remediation, and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief. The D.C. Circuit has emphasized that the degree of proof required for irreparable harm is high.
The court noted that the plaintiffs’ argument rested on the assertion that being detained by an agency without authority constitutes per se irreparable harm. However, the court found that this argument was not persuasive because the plaintiffs had not shown that the outcome of their situations would change, regardless of who was making the decisions. The court also cited the fact that the plaintiffs acknowledged that their terms of parole or supervised release would remain in effect.
Balance of Equities and Public Interest
Even if the plaintiffs had shown irreparable harm, the court emphasized that the balance of equities and the public interest strongly favored denying the injunction. Granting the plaintiffs’ requested relief, the court argued, would cause significant disruption and uncertainty. It would require the D.C. Superior Court or a newly created entity to take over supervision responsibilities for a large number of individuals in a short amount of time. If the D.C. government failed to act, it would lead to the release of many individuals with no entity authorized to hold them accountable for violations.
The court highlighted the potential negative consequences of such a scenario, including risks to the public and difficulties for government agencies and personnel involved in supervision. The court also noted the possibility that Congress could resolve the issue by passing a budget and clarifying the Commission’s authority, which would then require a reassembly of the supervision program that the court would have dismantled.
What Happens Next?
While denying the preliminary injunction, the court emphasized the importance of resolving the underlying issues of the case. The court has ordered the parties to jointly propose an expedited summary judgment briefing schedule, with the aim of quickly resolving the merits of the dispute. The court also stated that because the preliminary relief was not warranted, it declined to rule on the plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at this early stage. The parties should also explain in the proposed summary judgment briefing schedule whether further briefing on class certification is necessary.
This case highlights the complex legal and practical challenges that can arise during government shutdowns. It also underscores the high standards that must be met to obtain a preliminary injunction, particularly when the requested relief could have far-reaching consequences. The court’s decision reflects a careful balancing of the competing interests at stake and the need to maintain the status quo until a final decision can be reached.