The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has affirmed the conviction of Antwan Eiland, who was found guilty by a jury for two sales of crack cocaine to a government informant. Eiland had appealed on several grounds, arguing the evidence was insufficient, the prosecutor improperly commented on his decision not to testify, and a juror later showed bias based on his silence. The Seventh Circuit rejected all three challenges, upholding the jury’s verdict.
The Case Background: Controlled Buys
The charges against Antwan Eiland stemmed from two controlled drug purchases orchestrated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) in 2017, utilizing a confidential informant named Luis Villegas. Eiland was indicted in 2021 on two counts of distributing a controlled substance. At trial, Eiland’s primary defense was that he was not the person known as “Black,” the alleged seller.
The government’s case relied heavily on Villegas’s identification and testimony regarding the initial meeting in a courthouse lobby, where the informant received the nickname “Black.” A critical piece of evidence linking Eiland to the sales was a phone number exchanged at that meeting. ATF Special Agent Mike Ramos testified that when Villegas accidentally called the number before contacting his handler, the number traced back to Antwan Eiland. Villegas subsequently identified Eiland from a driver’s license photo and later in the courtroom.
The first drug sale occurred in a Popeye’s parking lot, where Eiland was a passenger in a car driven by Theresa Robinson. Robinson, who testified for the defense, confirmed she drove Eiland and had heard him referred to as “Black.” The second sale took place in a McDonald’s bathroom.
Challenging Witness Credibility and Evidence Sufficiency
Eiland argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction, primarily by attacking the credibility of the government’s witnesses and pointing to alleged gaps in the investigation.
The appellate court, however, stressed the high deference given to a jury’s factual findings. When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and only overturn it if no rational jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Eiland’s defense counsel successfully highlighted inconsistencies on cross-examination, such as a minor timing discrepancy in Villegas’s account of his courthouse arrival versus the actual time of an accidental phone call. Defense counsel also pointed to flaws in Agent Ramos’s record-keeping and the poor quality of surveillance footage during the transactions.
The Seventh Circuit panel found these issues went to witness credibility, which is the exclusive domain of the jury. The court noted that the defense brought out all these weaknesses during cross-examination, but the jury chose to credit the testimony anyway. The court stated that an inconsistency does not make testimony “incredible as a matter of law” unless it is “physically impossible” or violates the laws of nature. The minor timeline issue, the court concluded, did not meet this high bar.
Prosecutor’s Rebuttal: Comment on Silence?
Eiland also claimed the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by implicitly commenting on his choice not to testify. Because Eiland failed to object to the remarks during trial, the appellate court reviewed the issue under the strict “plain error” standard.
The challenged remark followed the defense attorney’s closing argument, which focused on evidence the government allegedly failed to produce (e.g., Eiland’s cell phone records). The prosecutor responded: “And I get why Mr. Boyle focused on what there wasn’t, is because they don’t have an answer for what there was.”
Eiland argued this implied that only he could have provided an answer to the government’s evidence. However, the Seventh Circuit looked closely at the context. Citing precedent, the court noted that such comments are generally improper only if the prosecutor manifestly intended to reference the defendant’s silence, or if the jury would naturally and necessarily interpret it that way.
The court found that the prosecutor was clearly responding to the defense’s strategy of highlighting “missing” evidence. The prosecutor explicitly contrasted the defense’s focus on “what there wasn’t” with the evidence that *was* presented—”what there was”—which pointed to guilt. The panel concluded the comment was aimed at the defense counsel’s argument, not Eiland’s silence, and therefore was not improper.
Furthermore, the court dismissed a secondary argument that the prosecutor improperly equated the burdens of proof by stating “both sides start at zero,” noting that the prosecutor immediately clarified that the government bore the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Juror Bias Claim Rejected
Finally, Eiland sought a new trial based on post-verdict comments made by one juror (Juror A) to the prosecution team. Juror A speculated that Eiland might have worn a mask during trial or chosen not to testify specifically to avoid comparison with the poor-quality video and audio evidence.
The court addressed this under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which severely limits inquiry into a jury’s deliberations. Generally, jurors cannot testify about their mental processes concerning the verdict. An exception exists for evidence of “extraneous prejudicial information” or “outside influence.”
Eiland argued that the prosecutor’s alleged improper comment (discussed above) constituted this “extraneous prejudicial information” that tainted the juror’s thought process.
However, the Seventh Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion without interviewing Juror A. The court reasoned that Juror A’s comments—speculating about Eiland’s motives for silence or physical appearance—fell squarely within the protected realm of the juror’s internal “mental processes concerning the verdict.” Crucially, Juror A’s comments did not state or imply any connection to the prosecutor’s closing argument. Since Eiland failed to show that the prosecutor’s comments actually reached the jury room as an external influence, the juror’s subsequent speculation about the defendant’s silence was inadmissible evidence of bias.
Based on the affirmation of the evidence, the rejection of the prosecutorial misconduct claim, and the inadmissibility of the juror bias evidence, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction.