The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently issued a complex ruling concerning two defendants, Courtland Reed and Cedric Swanagan, convicted of serious methamphetamine distribution and conspiracy charges. While the appellate court upheld both men’s convictions and affirmed Swanagan’s lengthy sentence, it vacated Reed’s sentence, ordering the lower court to resentence him based on a critical recalculation of his prior criminal history.
The opinion addressed a host of challenges raised by Reed and Swanagan, including the admissibility of law enforcement testimony interpreting wiretapped calls, the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, and potential prejudice from jurors seeing the defendants in shackles.
Swanagan’s Challenges Fail to Overturn Conviction or Sentence
Cedric Swanagan appealed on several fronts, most notably challenging the warrant used to wiretap his phone. He argued that the affidavit supporting the wiretap contained reckless or intentional falsehoods, specifically regarding DEA Officer Budde’s interpretation of a water emoji as symbolizing methamphetamine, and his interpretation of a phone call involving $6,000 as drug proceeds rather than a loan repayment.
The Sixth Circuit was unconvinced. For the emoji interpretation, the court noted that Swanagan only showed possible ambiguity, not intentional falsehood, and pointed to other context in the affidavit where “water” clearly referred to drugs. Regarding the $6,000 interpretation, the court found that even if Swanagan’s witness testimony suggested otherwise, the initial affidavit was not clearly erroneous, and the challenge was not properly renewed after trial testimony. Consequently, the denial of Swanagan’s motion to suppress evidence was affirmed.
Both defendants also challenged the testimony of investigating officers Dirickson and Fleury, who summarized and interpreted intercepted phone calls for the jury. The defendants argued this usurped the jury’s role. The court applied a nuanced standard under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, distinguishing between officers merely narrating events they personally observed (admissible) and those drawing broad inferences about the government’s theory of the case (less permissible).
While the court found some of Detective Fleury’s interpretations bordered on impermissible, several mitigating factors—including the district court’s guidance to the prosecutor, corroborating physical evidence, and defense counsel’s cross-examination—prevented the admission from being deemed an “obvious or clear error.” The convictions for both men were therefore affirmed based on the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial.
Furthermore, Swanagan’s challenges to his sentencing enhancements—including his classification as a career offender and his leadership role enhancement—were also rejected. The court found that his prior Kentucky drug conviction qualified as a predicate offense under the relevant guidelines, and the evidence supported the four-point enhancement for being an organizer or leader of a conspiracy involving at least five people. His request to vary his sentence based on methamphetamine purity levels was also denied, as the sentence remained within the resulting range even with the requested adjustment.
Reed’s Sentence Vacated Over Prior Felony Classification
The most significant victory for the defense came on behalf of Courtland Reed regarding his sentence. Reed was convicted on the same charges as Swanagan, but his sentence was significantly impacted by a prior conviction for First Degree Burglary in Kentucky from 2011. The district court used this conviction to apply a mandatory minimum sentence enhancement under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 851, classifying it as a “serious violent felony.”
The Sixth Circuit agreed with both Reed and the government’s concession that this classification was incorrect. Applying a categorical analysis derived from recent Supreme Court precedent concerning violent felonies, the court determined that the elements of Kentucky’s First Degree Burglary statute were broader than the federal definition of a “serious violent felony.” Specifically, the Kentucky statute allowed for conviction based on being armed during flight from a building, which does not necessarily require the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
Because the residual clause of the federal statute (which covers offenses that involve a substantial risk of force) was recently deemed unconstitutionally vague by the Supreme Court in cases like *Johnson* and *Dimaya*, the court could not rely on it. Since the underlying Kentucky conviction does not categorically meet the required elements, it cannot serve as the basis for the enhanced 25-year statutory minimum sentence applied to Reed.
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit vacated Reed’s 300-month sentence and remanded the case specifically for resentencing, leaving his conviction intact.
No Error Found in Trial Management Issues
Both defendants argued that seeing them in shackles while being escorted through the courthouse lobby on the second day of trial prejudiced the jury and violated their right to a fair trial. The court reviewed this for “plain error” since Reed did not object at the time.
The court emphasized the distinction between visible shackles *in the courtroom* (which is inherently prejudicial) and brief exposure *elsewhere in the courthouse*. The district court took immediate steps, including separating potentially exposed jurors and conducting individual *voir dire*. Since the three potentially exposed jurors assured the court they could remain impartial, and the district court found them credible, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion.
The court also dismissed Reed’s argument that the district court erred by failing to hold a hearing on the use of shackles *at the defense table*, noting that the record showed the judge had confirmed with Reed’s counsel off the record that the shackles were covered by the table cloth and were not visible to the jury.
In summary, the convictions of both Swanagan and Reed stand, but Reed will get a second chance at sentencing based on the federal classification of his past crime.