The Supreme Court of Georgia has affirmed the decision to grant a writ of habeas corpus to Tamara Nicole Weaver, overturning her previous convictions for child cruelty and assault. The state’s highest court found that Weaver’s trial lawyer operated under an actual conflict of interest stemming from his prior representation of her husband and co-defendant, Michael Tyler, which significantly impaired his ability to defend her zealously.
Weaver was convicted in 2014 following a jury trial stemming from the severe physical abuse of her infant son, K.W., in 2013. She faced multiple charges, including first-degree cruelty to children and aggravated battery. After exhausting her direct appeals, Weaver sought habeas relief, arguing that her trial counsel, Morris Fair, was ineffective due to this conflict.
The Core Conflict: Representing Both Sides
The crux of the Supreme Court’s ruling rests on the actions of attorney Morris Fair. Fair initially represented both Weaver and Tyler in pretrial proceedings following their arrests in March 2013. The medical evidence presented at trial, including 16 bone fractures in the infant, pointed strongly toward physical abuse. Crucially, Weaver and Tyler were the only two adults with regular access to the child, meaning any defense strategy necessarily involved either implicating the other or arguing accident.
During the habeas hearing, Fair admitted he recognized the potential for conflict months before the trial, even suggesting Tyler find separate counsel. However, he continued to represent Weaver when she was ultimately tried jointly with Tyler in March 2014. Fair’s office-mate, Pamela Stephenson, ended up representing Tyler at trial.
The Supreme Court noted that a conflict adversely affects representation when counsel is prevented from pursuing a defense theory favorable to one client but prejudicial to the co-defendant. Here, the only viable alternative suspect to Weaver was Tyler.
“Fair conceded at the habeas hearing that medical evidence showed that K.W. was ‘beat’ up and that the only alternative suspect was Tyler,” the opinion stated. “Given this concession… it is inexplicable that, as a matter of trial strategy, conflict-free counsel would have failed to blame, or even investigate, Tyler in any way.”
The habeas court found that Fair’s prior loyalty to Tyler prevented him from effectively cross-examining Tyler or pursuing a defense that shifted blame to him. Fair’s trial strategy, as presented in hindsight, was vague—alternating between arguing Weaver was innocent or suggesting the injuries were accidental, a theory the court found inconsistent with the medical evidence.
Deference to the Habeas Court
The Warden appealed the habeas grant, arguing that Weaver failed to show the conflict *adversely affected* Fair’s performance. The Supreme Court reviewed this as a mixed question of fact and law, accepting the habeas court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous.
The state’s high court credited the habeas court’s determination that Fair’s conflict significantly constrained his representation. The court dismissed the Warden’s argument that Weaver herself instructed Fair not to blame Tyler, noting that the evidence on this point was conflicting, and the habeas judge was authorized to find Fair less credible than Weaver, who testified she never discussed trial strategy with him.
Ineffective Appellate Counsel Excuses Procedural Bar
The Warden also argued that Weaver’s claim should have been barred because she failed to raise the conflict of interest issue during her direct appeal to the Court of Appeals. To overcome this procedural hurdle, Weaver had to show “cause and prejudice.”
The Supreme Court agreed with the habeas court that the cause for the default was the ineffective assistance of her appellate counsel, Ivars Lacis. Lacis testified that he did not thoroughly review the entire trial record and mistakenly believed that initial joint representation followed by separate counsel was standard practice, failing to investigate the merits of the conflict claim.
The Court found that appellate counsel’s failure to raise such a “meritorious issue” fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Because the underlying trial counsel conflict was indeed meritorious—meaning Weaver likely *would have* succeeded on appeal had the issue been raised—the prejudice prong of the test was satisfied.
“Due to her trial counsel’s ineffective assistance of counsel arising from his conflict of interest and her appellate counsel’s ineffective assistance of counsel arising from his failure to raise this issue during her direct appeal, the habeas court’s grant of a new trial is fully supported by the record and the controlling law,” the Supreme Court concluded, affirming the judgment.
The ruling effectively grants Weaver a new trial where she can be represented by counsel free from the ethical constraints that plagued her first trial.