The North Carolina Supreme Court has issued a ruling in the case of *State v. Demetria L. Norman*, modifying and affirming a lower court’s decision regarding a search warrant. The core issue revolved around whether evidence obtained by law enforcement during a “knock and talk” at Ms. Norman’s residence was admissible. The Supreme Court decided the evidence was admissible, but the court’s decision also leaves some legal questions unanswered.
Background of the Case
The case began with an investigation into a breaking and entering at Mr. Pete’s Market in Fletcher, North Carolina, on February 12, 2021. The perpetrators stole approximately $2,600 in cash, lottery tickets, and cigarettes.
On February 16, 2021, someone tried to redeem one of the stolen lottery tickets at a store in Edneyville, North Carolina. The security footage from the store showed a black Dodge Durango with a missing front bumper. The driver of the car, a woman, attempted to cash the ticket but was unsuccessful. The car then drove in the direction of Hendersonville, North Carolina.
Detective Diaz of the Fletcher Police Department followed the Durango and located it parked in the driveway of a residence at 58 Stepp Acres Lane in Hendersonville. The detective ran the license plate, which came back as fictitious. The plate was registered to a rental car company.
Detective Diaz, along with other officers, then went to the residence. They conducted a “knock and talk,” knocking on the door but receiving no answer. Detective Diaz then looked through the driver’s window of the Durango and saw a lottery ticket and cigarettes inside.
Based on this information, Detective Diaz drafted a search warrant application for the Durango. Ms. Norman was later identified as the registered owner. During the search of the Durango, officers found various items, including cutting tools, ski masks, gloves, and more cigarettes.
Later, officers searched Ms. Norman’s home, where they found additional evidence related to the Mr. Pete’s Market break-in.
Ms. Norman moved to suppress all the evidence, arguing that the officers’ observations at her residence and of the items inside the vehicle were made improperly without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, and Ms. Norman was later convicted of multiple charges.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court reasoned that the officers had probable cause to seek a search warrant before the knock and talk, and the evidence was admissible. Ms. Norman appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, but with a modification. The court’s primary finding was that the search warrant for the Durango was valid because it was supported by probable cause, even without the information obtained during the knock and talk. This meant that even if the officers had acted improperly during the knock and talk, the evidence found in the Durango and later at the home could still be used in court.
The Court decided not to rule on whether the officers’ actions during the “knock and talk” exceeded the boundaries of what is constitutionally permissible.
Legal Principles and the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. This protection extends to the home and the area immediately surrounding it, known as the curtilage. Generally, law enforcement needs a warrant based on probable cause to search a home or curtilage.
The Court cited the standard for probable cause, which is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
In this case, the Supreme Court determined that the information available to the officers before the “knock and talk” – including the stolen lottery ticket, the description of the car, and the fact that it was parked at a specific residence – provided enough probable cause to issue a search warrant for the Durango.
Concurring Opinion Highlights Potential Issues
Justice Earls, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the majority’s conclusion but expressed concern that the court avoided addressing the constitutionality of the “knock and talk” itself. He argued that the court has an obligation to address all the merits of the case when reviewing a suppression motion.
Justice Earls explained that the “knock and talk” doctrine allows officers to approach a home and knock, which is generally permissible. However, he argued that this permission is limited. Officers can’t go beyond what a typical visitor would do, which includes “snooping around the premises.”
Justice Earls pointed out that the officers in this case, after knocking, went beyond the path a visitor would typically take, walking around the car to look inside. He concluded that this action might constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment because it went beyond the scope of an implied invitation.
Justice Earls argued that the court’s failure to address this issue leaves uncertainty about the boundaries of the knock and talk doctrine, particularly regarding actions like walking around a vehicle parked in a driveway.